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Abstract
The aim and motivation of this dissertation can be best described in one of
the most important application fields, the cloud computing. It has changed
entire business model of service-oriented computing environments in the
last decade. Cloud computing enables information technology related ser-
vices in a more dynamic and scalable way than before – more cost-effective
than before due to the economy of scale and of sharing resources. These
opportunities are too attractive for consumers to ignore in today’s highly
competitive service environments. The way to realise these opportunities,
however, is not free of obstacles. Services offered in cloud computing en-
vironments are often composed of multiple service components, which are
hosted in distributed systems across the globe and managed by multiple
parties. Potential consumers often feel that they lose the control over their
data, due to the lack of transparent service specification and unclear security
assurances in such environments. These issues encountered by the consumers
boiled down to an unwillingness to depend on the service providers regarding
the services they offer in the marketplaces. Therefore, consumers have to
be put in a position where they can reliably assess the dependability of a
service provider. At the same time, service providers have to be able to
truthfully present the service-specific security capabilities. If both of these
objectives can be achieved, consumers have a basis to make well-founded
decisions about whether or not to depend on a particular service provider
out of many alternatives.
In this thesis, computational trust mechanisms are leveraged to assess
the capabilities and evaluate the dependability of service providers. These
mechanisms, in the end, potentially support consumers to establish trust on
service providers in distributed service environments, e.g., cloud computing.
In such environments, acceptable quality of the services can be maintained
if the providers possess required capabilities regarding different service-
specific attributes, e.g., security, performance, compliance. As services in
these environments are often composed of multiple services, subsystems and
components, evaluating trustworthiness of the service providers based on the
service-specific attributes is non-trivial.
In this vein, novel mechanisms are proposed for assessing and evaluating
the trustworthiness of service providers considering the trustworthiness of
composite services. The scientific contributions towards those novel mecha-
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viii
nisms are summarised as follows:
• Firstly, we introduce a list of service-specific attributes, QoS+ [HRM10,
HHRM12], based on a systematic and comprehensive analysis of exist-
ing literatures in the field of cloud computing security and trust.
• Secondly, a formal framework [SVRH11, RHMV11a, RHMV11b] is
proposed to analyse the composite services along with their required
service-specific attributes considering consumer requirements and rep-
resent them in simplified meaningful terms, i.e., Propositional Logic
Terms (PLTs).
• Thirdly, a novel trust evaluation framework CertainLogic [RHMV11a,
RHMV11b, HRHM12a, HRHM12b] is proposed to evaluate the PLTs,
i.e., capabilities of service providers. The framework provides computa-
tional operators to evaluate the PLTs, considering that uncertain and
conflicting information are associated with each of the PLTs and those
information can be derived from multiple sources.
• Finally, harnessing these technical building blocks we present a novel
trust management architecture [HRM11] for cloud computing market-
places. The architecture is designed to support consumers in assessing
and evaluating the trustworthiness of service providers based on the
published information about their services.
The novel contributions of this thesis are evaluated using proof-of-concept-
system, prototype implementations and formal proofs. The proof-of-concept-
system [HRMV13, HVM13a, HVM13b] is a realisation of the proposed archi-
tecture for trust management in cloud marketplaces. The realisation of the
system is implemented based on a self-assessment framework, proposed by
the Cloud Security Alliance, where the formal framework and computational
operators of CertainLogic are applied. The realisation of the system enables
consumers to evaluate the trustworthiness of service providers based on
their published datasets in the CSA STAR. A number of experiments are
conducted in different cloud computing scenarios leveraging the datasets in
order to demonstrate the technical feasibility of the contributions made in
this thesis. Additionally, the prototype implementations of CertainLogic
framework provide means to demonstrate the characteristics of the computa-
tional operators by means of various examples. The formal framework as well
as computational operators of CertainLogic are validated against desirable
mathematical properties, which are supported by formal algebraic proofs.
Zusammenfassung
Ziel und Motivation der vorliegenden Dissertation lassen sich am besten
an einem ihrer wichtigsten Anwendungsgebiete beschreiben, dem Cloud
Computing. Dessen zunehmende Bedeutung hat in letzten Jahrzehnt die
Geschäftsmodelle für IT-Dienste grundlegend verändert. Cloud Computing
ermöglicht dynamischere und flexiblere Dienstangebote; Skaleneffekte und ge-
meinsame Ressourcennutzung können erhebliche Kostenreduktion bewirken.
Der allgegenwärtige Wettbewerb und Kostendruck führt zu großem Interesse
vieler IT-Dienstanbieter an Cloud-Computing-Diensten; Einsatz und Nut-
zung entsprechender Angebote sind jedoch nicht frei von Hindernissen. In
Cloud-Umgebungen angebotene Dienste sind zunehmend aus verschiedenen
Teilkomponenten zusammengesetzt, welche ggf. auf über den ganzen Globus
verteilten Systemen betrieben und von unterschiedlichen Anbietern verwaltet
werden. Beispielsweise fürchten potentielle Kunden häufig, dass sie die Kon-
trolle über ihre eigenen Daten verlieren. Mangelnde Transparenz in Dienst-
spezifikationen und unklare Sicherheitsversprechen der Anbieter erhöhen die
Unsicherheit potenzieller Nutzer von Cloud-Computing-(Mehrwert-)Diensten.
Noch brisanter wird die Situation, wenn - bspw. über digitale Marktplätze -
mehrere alternative Dienste angeboten werden: den potenziellen Kunden fehlt
dann eine zuverlässige Vergleichsbasis, um sich zwischen den Alternativen
fundiert entscheiden zu können.
Vor dem beschriebenen Hintergrund sind in diesem Beispiel also einerseits
zuverlässige Hilfsmittel für Kunden d.h. potenzielle Dienstnehmer erforderlich,
um Cloud-Dienste nach den für sie relevanten Kriterien bewerten zu können.
Andererseits sollten auch Anbieter die Möglichkeit erhalten, die Qualität
Ihrer Dienste hinsichtlich verschiedener Kriterien (möglichst nachprüfbar)
beschreiben zu können. Diesen beiden Herausforderungen widmet sich die
vorliegende Dissertation und versteht sie als zwei Facetten der Vertrauens-
bildung; konsequenterweise siedelt sich die Arbeit im Forschungsbereich
Computational Trust an.
Dabei wird dem genannten Trend Rechnung getragen, dass zunehmend
Cloud-Computing-Mehrwertdienste aus mehreren einfacheren Basisdiens-
ten komponiert werden im Sinne einer Wertschöpfungskette. Unter diesem
Blickwinkel sind Cloud-Computing-Dienste eine spezielle - und derzeit die po-
pulärste - Klasse verteilter Dienste-Netze. Die Dissertation leistet also wissen-
schaftliche Beiträge im Bereich Vertrauensbildung für verteilte Dienste-Netze
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xund verwendet Cloud-Computing-Dienste als konkretes Anwendungsgebiet,
zur Konkretisierung der Forschungsansätze und für Evaluationszwecke.
Die vorliegende Dissertation stellt also neuartige Verfahren zum Ver-
trauensaufbau vor und fokussiert dabei die Einschätzung und Prüfung der
Vertrauenswürdigkeit von zusammengesetzten Diensten und deren Anbie-
tern. Inbesondere die folgenden wissenschaftlichen Beiträge werden in der
Dissertation vorgestellt:
• Zunächst wird eine Liste von dienstspezifischen Eigenschaften einge-
führt, genannt QoS+ [HRM10, HHRM12]. Diese Eigenschaften basieren
auf einer systematischen und umfassenden Analyse existierender Li-
teratur zu den Themenbereichen Cloud Computing, Sicherheit und
Vertrauen.
• Darauffolgend wird ein formales Rahmenwerk [SVRH11, RHMV11a,
RHMV11b] zur Analyse von zusammengesetzten Diensten definiert,
zusammen mit deren erforderlichen dienstspezifischen Eigenschaften
bezüglich Kundenanforderungen, welches diese Eigenschaften in leicht
verständlichen Formeln ausdrücken kann: propositionallogische Aus-
drücke (Propositional Logic Terms, PLTs).
• Anschließend wird ein Ansatz zur Vertrauensbewertung namens Cer-
tainLogic [RHMV11a, RHMV11b, HRHM12a, HRHM12b] vorgestellt,
samt Operatoren zur Auswertung solcher PLTs, also der Fähigkeiten
von Dienstanbietern, unter Berücksichtigung unsicherer und konfliktbe-
hafteter Informationen aus verschiedenen Quellen.
• Die vor genannten Beiträge werden zu einer neuartigen Architek-
tur [HRM11] für Vertrauensmanagement in Marktplätzen für Cloud
Computing zusammengefügt, um Kunden die Einschätzung und Prü-
fung der Vertrauenswürdigkeit von Dienstanbietern zu ermöglichen.
Diese Einschätzung und Prüfung basiert auf Veröffentlichungen der
Dienstanbieter über ihre Dienste.
Die neuartigen Beiträge dieser Dissertation wurden mittels eines Proof-
of-Concept-System, prototypischer Implementierungen und formaler Beweise
evaluiert. Das Proof-of-Concept-System [HRMV13, HVM13a, HVM13b] setzt
die vorgeschlagene Architektur für Vertrauensmanagement in Marktplätzen
für Cloud Computing um. Die Umsetzung des Systems basiert auf umfang-
reichen Selbsteinschätzungen, die von der Organisation CSA (Cloud Security
Alliance) als neutraler Instanz systematisch erfasst werden. Hierauf wurden
das formale Analyserahmenwerk sowie die Operatoren aus CertainLogic
angewandt. Diese Umsetzung ermöglicht Kunden die Prüfung der Vertrau-
enswürdigkeit von Cloud-Dienstanbietern. Um die technische Umsetzbarkeit
der Beiträge dieser Dissertation zu demonstrieren, wurde eine Vielzahl von
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Experimenten durchgeführt, welche unterschiedliche Szenarien des Cloud
Computing mit verschiedenen Datensätzen berücksichtigten. Zusätzlich bie-
tet die prototypische Implementierung des CertainLogic-Rahmenwerks die
Möglichkeit, Charakteristiken der Operatoren an zahlreichen Beispielen auf-
zuzeigen. Das formale Rahmenwerk sowie die Operatoren von CertainLogic
wurden auf geeignete mathematische Eigenschaften hin überprüft, gestützt
durch algebraische Beweise.
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Introduction
Trust is a common phenomenon that determines our behaviour and actions
in our daily life. In other words, it acts as a facilitator for decision making
in environments, e.g., from ancient fish markets to electronic service pro-
visioning to modern social interaction, where decisions are subject to risk
and uncertainty. According to the Oxford online dictionary, trust is defined
as firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something.
In the real world one can use various facial or physical cues, e.g., rely on
a document or a referral to known authorities to initiate the process of
trust establishment [CDC08]. Today, distributed service environments, e.g.,
cloud computing, introduce new challenges for establishing trust on service
providers, due to the fact that one faces the absence of these physical cues.
Moreover, people in general struggle to trust online services than oﬄine
services [BKL07]. This thesis, thus, addresses the interesting challenges
regarding trust establishment in distributed online service environments.
1.1 Motivation
Emerging service computing [HS05] environments have generated new oppor-
tunities for individuals, organisations, and government authorities. In such
environments, computing power, data storage, and software are modelled
as services. Services of these types are widely adopted in distributed ser-
vice environments, such as in cloud computing [AFG+09, HHRM12], where
consumers are able to provision services in a cost-effective, dynamic and
highly scalable manner. Moreover, cloud-based services are often composed
of multiple service instances, which are hosted in distributed systems across
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the globe and managed by multiple parties. Potential consumers often feel
that they lose the control over their data due to the lack of transparent
service specification and unclear security assurances in cloud computing
environments [KM10]. These concerns act as a barrier for consumers to
establish trust towards service providers in marketplaces, which is reflected
in a survey [Fuj10] on 3000 consumers from 6 countries. According to this
survey, 84% of the consumers are concerned about their data storage location
and 88% of the consumers worry about who has access to their data. As a
result, consumers are less reluctant to provision computing services available
in cloud computing marketplaces. Hereby, trust mechanisms [UKJS10] can
play a major role to establish consumers’ confidence on the capability of
service providers.
In order to motivate the importance of trust establishment in distributed
service environments, we draw a typical service provisioning example in
cloud computing. The example we consider here is the one of a healthcare
provider who wants to outsource its in-house application that deals with
medical records to a cloud-based service. As a potential consumer, the main
goal of the healthcare provider is to minimise the IT expenditure as well as
allow doctors, patients, and insurance companies to have seamless access
to these medical records. In cloud marketplaces, there can be a number of
service providers offering cost-effective medical record management services
with the required functionality. As medical records consist of sensitive
information, the healthcare provider wants to make sure that the service
provider has the capability to offer assurances which are beyond the functional
properties of a service. For the healthcare provider, assurances on compliance
with regulatory acts, data protection, safe geographical location and high
availability may be important. The healthcare provider considers a cloud
provider “trustworthy”, if the provider is able to fulfil the assurances on these
attributes. Since the cloud service market for offering medical record services
is competitive, the healthcare provider faces the challenge of assessing the
trustworthiness of service providers that fulfil its requirements. This thesis
aims to address the problem of assessing and evaluating the trustworthiness
of service providers based on consumer requirements, i.e., service-specific
attributes of a provider.
1.2 Research Challenges and Goals
The main objective of this thesis is to provide novel concepts and mechanisms
for trust establishment in distributed service environments. In particular,
attention is given for developing mechanisms in order to assess and evaluate
the trustworthiness of service providers in such environments. In the course of
establishing trust towards service providers, the consumers face the following
challenges.
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1. Which service-specific attributes are essential for trust establishment
in distributed service environments?
2. How to assess those attributes and formally represent them in the
context of trust establishment?
3. How to aggregate the attributes and present the aggregated result to
the consumers?
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Figure 1.1: Research Challenges and Goals
Addressing the above-mentioned challenges is crucial to select trustworthy
service providers in distributed service environments. Particularly, it is non-
trivial when the offered services are composed of sub-services and these
sub-services are managed by multiple parties. In order to achieve these
goals, this thesis aims to provide novel trust establishment mechanisms that
evaluate the trustworthiness of service providers considering:
i the trustworthiness of composed services regarding the service-specific
attributes (independent from how the attributes are assessed),
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ii information regarding different attributes (or requirements) under uncer-
tainty (in the sense of incomplete or unreliable information), and
iii conflicting (in the sense of contradiction) information derived from mul-
tiple sources.
An overview of the research challenges and the objectives of this thesis
are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1.3 Scientific Contributions
This thesis derives from the introduced research problems following the
reference scenario of cloud computing, which is an ideal example of distributed
service environment. In particular, we instantiated our research contributions
in the challenging domain of cloud computing marketplaces. However, our
contributions are not restricted to this particular domain.
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Figure 1.2: Overview of the Trust Management System Architecture
In cloud computing marketplaces, it is essential to assess the trustworthi-
ness of service providers based on their published service-specific attributes.
The number of service providers in cloud marketplaces is growing rapidly with
new providers entering the market. Hence, the providers will increasingly
compete for customers by providing services with similar functionality. In
traditional service oriented environments, functional attributes serves as a
basis for matching services according to user requirements. The functional
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attributes are usually referred to service types, e.g., software as a service
or platform as a service. In a real-world setting, a consumer does not only
depend on the service types, but also on the non-functional attributes of the
service and their underlying instances.
In order to support the consumers for assessing and evaluating the
trustworthiness of service providers regarding non-functional attributes, we
propose a novel architecture [HRM11, HRMV13] for trust management in
cloud computing marketplaces. On an abstract level, we contribute to this
architecture novel trust mechanisms considering i) consumer requirements,
ii) non-functional attributes regarding the services, iii) composite structure
of the services as well as the attributes, and iv) multiple sources that pro-
vide information about the fulfilment of the attributes published by service
providers. An overview of the architecture is provided in Figure 1.2.
On a technical level, we contribute new trust mechanisms that are essential
for mechanising the proposed trust management system architecture (cf.
Figure 1.2). Within this context, the main contributions are as follows:
• QoS+ [HRM10, HHRM12], a list of non-functional attributes (or trust
attributes) that potentially contribute to the trustworthiness of a
service in cloud computing marketplaces. These attributes go beyond
the usual Quality of Service (QoS) parameters introduced in the context
of trust-aware web service selection by Wang et al. [WV07b]. QoS+
attributes are identified by a thorough analysis of existing literatures
in the field of cloud computing security and trust.
• Formal framework [SVRH11, RHMV11a, RHMV11b], an approach to
formally analyse the composite services along with their attributes
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considering consumer requirements and represent them by means of
Propositional Logic Terms (PLTs). The proposed framework is gener-
alised and flexible so that it is able to represent distributed composition
of services into PLTs. These PLTs can be customised by consumers
according to their requirements.
• CertainLogic [RHMV11a, RHMV11b, HRHM12a, HRHM12b] is a novel
framework to evaluate the trustworthiness of composite services in the
face of uncertain and conflicting information. The proposed frame-
work relies on the PLTs that represent composite services and their
attributes in a simplified manner. The framework considers that infor-
mation regarding each proposition in PLT s are derived from multiple
sources and are represented by the CertainTrust representational model
proposed by Ries [Rie09b]. The CertainLogic framework contains com-
putational trust operators for evaluating PLT s and is a novel extension
of the established CertainTrust representational model.
An overview of the thesis contributions and the coherent connection
among the contents are illustrated in Figure 1.3.
1.4 Evaluation
The novel contributions of this thesis are evaluated using proof-of-concept
and prototype implementations along with formal proofs. The main goal of
the evaluation is to demonstrate the applicability and technical feasibility of
our contributions in the domain of distributed service environments.
For that, in the context of this thesis a realisation of the novel architecture
(cf. Figure 1.2) for trust management has been implemented. The imple-
mented system considers a self-assessment framework proposed by the Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA) as a trust information source. CSA’s framework
enables cloud providers to publish detailed information about the capabilities
of the services they offer. The proof-of-concept system integrates the formal
framework to assess the capabilities and represent them in terms of PLTs.
The computational operators of CertainLogic are used to evaluate the PLT s.
Each of the propositions in the PLTs are associated with information derived
from publicly available registry, i.e., STAR (Security, Trust & Assurance
Registry [CSAd], about cloud providers’ capabilities. The STAR datasets are
leveraged to conduct experiments in different cloud computing scenarios. The
goal of the conducted experiments is to demonstrate the technical feasibility
of trust establishment mechanisms in assessing and evaluating the trustwor-
thiness of service providers. Additionally, the prototype implementations of
CertainLogic framework provide means to demonstrate the characteristics
of the computational operators. The mathematical validity of the formal
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framework as well as computational operators of CertainLogic is supported
by formal algebraic proofs.
1.5 Publications
The contributions in this thesis are published in a number of peer-reviewed
journals, conferences, workshop proceedings and technical reports. The
results as well as the proof-of-concept system are also presented and discussed
at conferences and demo sessions.
The research challenges in cloud computing regarding trust establishment
and the importance of introducing QoS+ attributes in this domain have been
addressed in [HRM10, HHRM12]. The mechanisms for representing and
evaluating distributed composite services and systems in the form of PLTs
and how the evaluation of PLTs relates to the evaluation of the composite
services’ trustworthiness, are published in [SVRH11, RHMV11a, RHMV11b].
The mechanism for evaluating the trustworthiness of service providers based
on the information derived from multiple sources is published in [HRHM12a,
HRHM12b]. The novel trust management system architecture comprising the
computational trust operators and the formal framework has been published
in [HRM11]. The experimental evaluation of the proposed architecture as well
as the computational trust operators are published in [HRMV13, HVM13a,
HVM13b].
1.6 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis comprises of six chapters, which are as follows:
Chapter 2 provides background information related to trust establish-
ment mechanisms discussed in this thesis. The chapter is divided into two
parts, where the first part provides the basic understanding of trust from
social, as well as from security point of view. The second part pins up the
basic mechanisms of trust and focus on the essential technical apparatus of
trust establishment mechanisms.
Chapter 3 first specifies requirements that are essential to design trust
systems for distributed service environments. Then, state-of-the-art trust
systems and their mechanisms are discussed with respect to the requirements.
Finally, the gaps in the state-of-the-art are identified and the pointers to
address those gaps to fulfil the objectives of this thesis are provided.
Chapter 4 introduces the formal framework that models and formalises
trustworthiness in the context of composite services. The framework serves
as a building block for trustworthiness assessment of service providers in
distributed service environments.
Chapter 5 provides novel mechanisms to evaluate the trustworthiness of
service providers in the face of uncertain and conflicting information derived
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from multiple sources. The chapter also introduces a novel architecture for
trust management in cloud marketplaces, in which the formal framework
and the trustworthiness evaluation mechanisms are integrated.
Chapter 6 provides the implementation details of the realised system
for trust management, which is leveraged to conduct the experiments in
different scenarios. Moreover, experimental evaluation of the CertainLogic
operators is provided under different test cases.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and the chapter ends with directions for
future research.
2
Background
This chapter provides the necessary background information related to the
contents of this thesis. Section 2.1 provides basic concepts and definitions of
trust. Section 2.2 discusses the basis of trust mechanisms available in the
field of security and related areas.
2.1 Trust Concepts
Trust is a complex notion that has been studied in various fields such as
sociology, psychology, and even economics. It is a common phenomenon that
determines our behaviour and actions in our everyday social life. Hereby,
trust serve us as a basis to interact with unknown participants in uncertain
environments, be the environment physical or virtual. For example, Alice
prefers to eat pizza in restaurant ‘X’ instead of restaurant ‘Y’, because she
trust ‘X’ for making tasty pizzas but not ‘Y’ for the same purpose or in a
virtual environment, Alice buys a notebook from provider ‘XYZ’ whom she
trust for delivering an authentic notebook in time. Likewise, trust also plays
a major role in the field of information security. For example, Alice provisions
a cloud service if it is hosted in a trusted platform or in other words, she
trusts the service provider if the service is hosted in trusted platform. Thus,
we discuss the concept of trust from two perspectives. Though we draw a
basic example related to trust concept from physical environment, this thesis
focuses on trust concepts in virtual environments only.
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2.1.1 Trust as a social concept
Trust is usually reasoned in terms of a relationship within a specific context
between a trustor and a trustee, where trustor is the subject that trusts a
target entity, which is referred to as trustee. In a social environment, trust
facilitates a person (i.e., trustor) to delegate tasks and responsibilities to
another person (i.e., trustee). In order to delegate tasks to the trustee, a
trustor requires evidence about the trustee’s behaviour in the past. Evidence
about a trustee can be derived from direct experience or asking another
trustor about their own experience, i.e., indirect experience. This is termed
as social concept of trust and has been widely used in the field of computer
science [JIB07, GS00]. More detailed discussion on the definitions in the field
of philosophy, sociology, psychology, and economics are provided in [MC96,
Gra07].
Although researchers agree on the social concept of trust, it is not easy
to get a single definition of trust based on universal consensus. A definition,
that is adopted by many researchers in the field of computer science, is the
definition provided by the sociologist Diego Gambetta [Gam90, Gam00]:
Definition 2.1.1 Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of
the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or
group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor
such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it)
and in a context in which it affects his own action.
In the context of this thesis, an agent or a group of agents refers to
service providers, who provide the requested service by contemporaneously
meeting service-specific requirement r, e.g., confidentiality, availability, etc.
In another setting, a service provider may publish r by means of service
attributes, e.g., compliance, information security, data governance. The
assurance of r corresponds to what is referred to as perform a particular
action.
Following Gambetta’s definition, we consider the subjective notion of
trust in this thesis. Mui et al. [MMA+01] also defined trust as a subjective
expectation that an agent has about another’s future behaviour based on the
history of their encounters. The definition particularly demonstrates the
need to learn from past interactions or experiences.
By analysing the definitions in existing literature, Grandison [Gra07]
found the following notable characteristics of trust. Summarising the def-
initions, trust is measurable, subjective belief about a particular action, a
belief that expresses an expectation about the trustee [Jon99] and a belief
that has implications on the features, properties, attributes of a service or
system [KC98]. However, these definitions do not consider the needs of
electronic service or distributed service environments.
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Grandison [Gra07] defined trust by merging the important aspects of the
state-of-the-art definitions previously discussed and that reflect the needs of
distributed e-service environments.
Definition 2.1.2 Trust is the quantified belief by a trustor with respect to
competence, honesty, security, and dependability of a trustee within a specified
context.
The central theme of trust is well-integrated in this definition, namely
subjectivity, contextual belief, expectation, the implications of trust on
system attributes, and measurable trust. A set of specific trust requirements
in the context of distributed service environments is discussed in Section 3.1.
2.1.2 Trust concept in security
Security technologies, services, and primitives aim to provide safe and tamper-
proof computing environments and network. Hereby, trust is placed on service
platforms or systems based on the existence of provable security primitives.
In this sense, trust is synonymous to security. A detailed discussion is given
in the following to clarify the understanding of trust in the security field.
TCSEC and Common Criteria: Trust has been playing a foundational
role in the field of security since last four decades. Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [oD85], often referred to as the Orange Book,
is one of the earliest standards that involved the notion of trust in the
field of computer system security. In this standard, trust was reasoned
through the process of convincing the observers that a system’s model,
design, and implementation was correct and secure and the system behaved
as intended. The TCSEC defines four divisions, D,C,B, and A, where each of
the divisions represents a significant difference in trust an organisation or an
indvidual could place on the evaluated system. Systems in D division had
minimal protection, it means that the systems in this division failed to meet
the security requirements upon evaluation for the higher divisions whereas
systems in division A had highest protection that the security requirements
of the systems were formally verified. Thus, the systems in higher division
corresponded to more secure system than the system that are in lower
divisions. These differentiation also leads to higher or lower level of trust
that an organisation or individual could place on a evaluated system. The
TCSEC was replaced by the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation [Nat12b, Nat12c, Nat12d, Nat12a] standard in 2005.
Trust Management: In the mid-1980s and 1990s, with the rise of dis-
tributed systems, trust played an implicit role in distributed system security.
The notion of trust was reasoned in the form of trusted authorities responsible
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for the management of security services. A number of trusted authorities
such as certification authority, authentication and key management authority,
access control authority and trusted third party were introduced to collec-
tively assure trust on the security services. A typical access control service
in today’s world can be referred to as a security service that managed by
several trusted authorities. For instance, Alice wants to access a resource of
Bob; Bob will only grant the access right to Alice, if Alice can provide the
required credentials. Policies regarding the required credentials are stated
by the access control authority. The credentials are issued and signed by the
certification authority in the form of certificates. The certificates may state
information about the identity of the owner [ITU97] or information about
the rights of the owner [BFL96]. In [BFL96], the main idea of the proposed
approach is to establish trust using necessary credentials that are defined
using policies. This is referred to as policy-based trust management.
Soft security and Hard security: In the late 1990s, the social concept of
trust became popular in the field of information system security. Rasmusson
et al. coined the need for trust derived from social control mechanisms
to provide security in the context of e-commerce. They refer this type of
security as soft security that can be derived from intangible information such
as past experiences, reputation and coalition. They also coined the term hard
security that refers to security derived from traditional mechanisms such
as passwords and certificates. These are validated using concrete security
techniques and can be characterised by certainty. They argued that systems
become vulnerable once the hard security mechanisms are bypassed. However,
soft security mechanisms provides persistent security as they only accept
good behaviours. Few years later, Jøsang analysed trust (i.e., soft security)
and security (e.g., hard security) in a similar manner. In his words, security
represents the idealistic side, including formal modelling, verification and
development, i.e., how the system should be in theory. Trust on the other
hand assumes that no hard security mechanisms are perfect and errors exist
no matter how rigid the design procedures are. Chapter 3 provides a detailed
survey on the trust systems that support soft and hard security.
Trusted Computing: The notion of trusted platform was introduced in
the early 2000s by Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA), currently
known as Trusted Computing Group (TCG). This is considered as a signifi-
cant development towards promoting trustworthy computing in the field of
security. A ‘trusted platform’ is one that contains hardware based subsystem,
i.e., Trusted Platform Module (TPM ), devoted to maintain trust and security
between machines. The TPM has a mechanism by which it can collect and
provide evidence on the state of the hardware, software and firmware that
are installed on the platform. It has another special mechanism ‘attestation’
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which enables a trusted platform to disclose the state of its components to a
third party. The default attestation mechanism, proposed by TCG, is based
on hash values and the mechanism is defined as binary attestation [TCG11].
However, hash values have the disadvantage of having frequent changes even
for a trivial update in the system. Furthermore, hash values are cumbersome
to use as policies, as it is difficult to interpret them to be meaningful system
states. These shortcomings led researchers to propose the property based
attestation [PSHW04, SS04] as an extension of the binary attestation. The
property based attestation leverages the binary attestation to abstract the
low level hash values to high level meaningful security properties of the
platforms. Using this mechanism, it is possible to prove that the availability
of a certain hash measurement guarantees the availability of certain security
property.
According to the discussion above, we see that trust concepts has played
an important role in the landscape of security. Though the relationship
between security and trust is debated by Nissenbaum [Nis99] arguing that
security primitives can only mitigate risk, a major portion of the security
community believes that trust and security are closely related to each other.
They argue that changes in the security levels influence the levels of trust. For
example, a consumer is willing to provision a service from a service provider
if their offered services are hosted in trusted platforms. Similarly, changes in
trust levels also influences the security levels [Nag10]. This is particularly
relevant to emerging distributed service environments [HHRM12, UKJS10]
where entities may initiate interaction with each other without having had
prior contacts. For example, consumers are willing to provision services from
cloud providers that transparently publish their security-specific capabilities,
i.e., a service provider is believed to be less transparent (hence, less trusted)
than the provider who is transparent about security-specific capabilities.
This thesis views trust and security as a complementary technologies and
demonstrates trust as a augmenting concept to security.
2.2 Trust Establishment
According to the trust concepts discussed in the previous sections, it is certain
that a trustor can establish trust on a trustee using two approaches in the
context of distributed service environments. In the existing literature [AG07,
Rie09b], the approaches are termed as policy-based and evidence-based trust
management.
2.2.1 Policy-based trust mechanisms
The approaches behind the policy-based trust management basically rely on
hard security mechanisms, e.g., policy orchestration and credentials. Trusted
third parties ensure that the credentials, defined in the policy base, owned by
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an entity is genuine based on the information about the identity of the entity.
Thus, the entity is considered trustworthy. Blaze et al. [BFL96, BFIK99]
demonstrate that credentials may include the information about specific
rights of the owner. According to Blaze et al. [BFL96, BFIK99],
Definition 2.2.1 Trust management is an unified approach to specifying
and interpreting security policies, credentials and relationships that allow
direct authorization of security-critical actions.
This trust management approach treats the concept of trust implicitly
while the process of trust establishment is external. These issues are further
confirmed by Grandison [Gra03] and Cahill et al. [CSG+03]. Moreover, trust
based on the credentials issued by the public key infrastructure [ITU97]
requires additional means for key distribution, verification and revocation.
Further discussion on the research trends of trust management systems are
provided in Section 3.4.
2.2.2 Evidence-based trust mechanisms
Trust mechanisms, which usually rely on pieces of evidence derived from past
interactions or experiences, are referred to as evidence-based trust mechanisms.
Evidence can be derived from direct interactions between a trustor and a
trustee. Direct interactions, however, may be rare in certain cases, e.g.,
newcomers in service marketplaces. Thus, evidence-based mechanisms also
consider evidence derived from indirect interactions, i.e., an entity provides
another entity with pieces of evidence about its past interactions. This
is usually referred to the exchange of recommendations. Apart from the
direct and indirect interactions, pieces of evidence are also derived from
various virtual cues, e.g., certifications. Deriving evidence based on these
cues are shown practical and essential in the context of distributed service
environments [Nag10, HVHM12]. Often these pieces of evidence are not
only based on explicit interactions with the trustee, but also based on past
interactions with certification authorities that issue certificates to a trustee
or that are based on security assessments of a trustee.
Unlike policy-based trust mechanisms, evidence-based trust mechanisms
establish trust between entities based on their previous interactions or ex-
periences. In the policy-based mechanisms, a trustor directly evaluates a
trustee based on its presented credential(s) and access rules but not based on
their previous interactions or experiences. Recently, researchers have demon-
strated the integration of both mechanisms in the context of distributed
authorisation in trusted platforms [KV11].
The existing evidence-based trust mechanisms [BLB04, TPJL06, JI02,
WJI05, HJS04, RH08, HWS09] usually leverage Bayesian probabilities [Bol04]
to estimate the future behaviour of the trustee based on the available pieces
of evidence from the past interactions. These are referred to as Bayesian
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trust mechanisms. These mechanisms leverage the Beta probability den-
sity function to estimate the future behaviour. As the approach considers
evidence from the past, it is subject to uncertainty.
Uncertainty For making our understanding of uncertainty more explicit,
we refer to a simple example with dice. For a Laplace die, it is not possible to
say whether it will show a 6 when thrown the next time, but it is known that
the probability for showing a 6 is 1/6. Although, in this case, the outcome
of the next throw is uncertain, there is no uncertainty associated to the
probability. In contrast, for a real die the latter must not be true. When
given a real die, one could assume that the probability for showing a 6 is 1/6
based on a subject’s prior knowledge about dice, however, this statement is
still subject to uncertainty, as the die could have been manipulated. In order
to reduce the uncertainty, one could throw the die a number of times, e.g., 5
times, 10 times, 100 times, based on the assumption that this leads to more
representative estimates about the probability for showing a 6. Formally,
this could be modelled using the Beta probability density function. On the
other hand, instead of throwing the die one could examine it and say based
on one’s expert knowledge that it is quite certain that the probability for a 6
is 1/6, or a non-expert could say, “I guess the probability is 1/6, but I am not
really certain about this guess". In this thesis, we are focusing on the latter
type of uncertainty, where uncertainty is associated to the probabilities under
evaluation and relates to the question whether the past pieces of evidence
are representative for the future behaviour.
Apart from the Bayesian approach, there are well-known approaches for
modelling uncertainty outside the trust field. At first, there is the standard
probabilistic approach. However, this approach only allows to deal with the
uncertainty of the outcome of the next event, but probabilities are assumed
to be known.
Fuzzy logic [Zad75] seems to be related, however, it models another type
of uncertainty, which could be typed as linguistic uncertainty. For example, if
it is hot in a room with a degree of 0.8, it does not mean that the probability
that it is hot in this room is 80% (assuming that being hot means temp > 30
degree celcius); but, it means that one cannot agree on a specific threshold
when it is hot (we assume 30 degrees), and thus a degree of 80% states that
it is closer to hot than to cold.
Beta probability distribution The Beta distribution [Bol04] is a com-
monly used distribution for a continuous random variable 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The
Beta probability density function f(p | α, β) can be given as:
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f(p | α, β) = Γ(α+ β)Γ(α)Γ(β)p
α−1(1− p)β−1,
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α > 0, β > 0 .
(2.1)
By defining α = r+r0 and β = s+r0, it is possible to relate the probability
function directly to the collected evidence (or observed outcomes). Here,
r and s represent the number of positive and negative pieces of evidence,
respectively, and r0 and s0 define the prior knowledge (r0+s0 , 0) (cf. [Rie09a,
JHF03]). The expectation value is defined as E = αα+β . The mathematical
foundations of the Bayesian approach are described in [Bol04].
The Bayesian models are extended [Rie09a] to integrate context-dependent
parameters, e.g., dispositional trust, as well as support human users with an
intuitive representation of trust, CertainTrust. The Bayesian model [JI02],
based on Subjective logic, also includes a quantitative representation of trust.
A detailed discussion on the Subjective Logic and CertainTrust representa-
tional models are given in Section 2.2.2.1 and Section 2.2.2.2 respectively.
This is important to understand the novel contributions of this thesis. Note
that our discussion is limited to binomial representation of both approaches.
2.2.2.1 Subjective Logic (SL) Opinion Model
Jøsang proposed a belief-based trust model [Jøs99, Jøs01] for decision making
in electronic transactions (e.g., eCommerce). It is based upon the Dempster-
Shafer belief theory [Sha76], a mathematical theory of evidence. Belief theory
posits that the sum of the degrees of belief assigned to different alternatives
in the decision process is 1. Contrary to this mathematical theory, the sum
of degrees of beliefs over all possible outcomes in Jøsang’s approach does not
necessarily add up to 1. Rather, the remaining probability mass, i.e., the
difference between 1 and the sum of the degrees of belief over all outcomes,
is interpreted as uncertainty [Jøs01]. In this model, an opinion is denoted
as ωAx = (b, d, u, a), which expresses the relying party A’s belief in the truth
of statement x. Here, b, d, and u represent belief, disbelief and uncertainty
respectively where b, d, u ∈ [0, 1] and b+ d+ u = 1. Thus, three parameters
are dependent to each other and one parameter is redundant. The parameter
a ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative atomicity that is used in absence of evidence
for computing an opinion’s probability expectation value E(ωax) = b + au,
meaning that a determines how uncertainty shall contribute to E(ωax).
A graphical representation, the opinion triangle, is proposed to map an
opinion to a point in an equal-sided triangle. According to [Jøs01, Jøs07], the
horizontal line between the belief and disbelief points or corners in Fig. 2.1
is the probability axis. The relative atomicity is graphically represented as a
point on the probability axis. The line joining the top corner of the triangle
and the atomicty (ax) point is director in Fig. 2.1. As an example, the
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Figure 2.1: Opinion triangle
position of the opinion, ωx = (0.40, 0.10, 0.50, 0.60), is indicated as a point in
the triangle. The positions of the probability expectation value, E(x) = 0.70
as well as the relative atomicity, ax = 0.60, are shown in Fig. 2.1.
Operators: SL consists of a set of operators that operates on subjective be-
liefs about an entity. The representation of subjective belief is denoted as the
term opinion (i.e., ωx = (b, d, u, a)). SL operators operates on opinions using
standard logical operators as well as non-standard operators. For example,
consensus and discounting operators are for combining opinions from multiple
observers and weighting opinions from the recommenders respectively; these
are non-standard operators. The standard logical operators are conjunction,
disjunction and negation, which are the special case of binary logic operators,
AND, OR and NOT respectively. The interpretation and justification of SL
operators are provided in [Jøs01, Jøs07].
Subjective Logic provides mapping [Jøs01] to the Bayesian probabilities,
i.e., evidence space. This allows the elements of evidence space to be combined
with the belief space in order to model trust based on pieces of evidence
under uncertainty.
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2.2.2.2 CertainTrust (CT) Opinion Model
Ries [Rie09b] proposed CertainTrust as a representational trust model. This
model is able to represent trust under uncertain probabilities. The truth of
a statement can also be expressed by a construct called opinion. By design,
this opinion construction addresses evidence under uncertainty and user’s
initial expectation about the truth of a statement. CertainTrust opinion is
defined as follows.
Definition 2.2.2 (Representation CertainTrust)
An opinion oA about the truth of a proposition A is given as oA = (t, c, f)
where the parameters are called average rating t ∈ [0, 1], certainty c ∈
[0, 1], and initial expectation value f ∈ [0, 1]. If it holds c = 0 (complete
uncertainty), the expectation value (see Def. 2.2.3) depends only on f ,
however, for soundness we define t = 0.5 in this case.
Here, the average rating t indicates the degree to which past pieces of
evidence support the truth of the proposition. It depends on the relative
frequency of observations or pieces of evidence supporting the truth of the
proposition. The extreme values can be interpreted as follows:
• average rating = 0: There is only evidence(s) contradicting the propo-
sition.
• average rating = 1: There is only evidence(s) supporting the proposi-
tion.
The certainty c indicates the degree to which the average rating is
assumed to be representative for the future. It depends on the number of
past observations (or collected pieces of evidence). The higher the certainty
of an opinion is, the higher is the influence of the average rating on the
expectation value in relation to the initial expectation. When the maximum
level of certainty (c = 1) is reached, the average rating is assumed to be
representative for the future outcomes. The extreme values can be interpreted
as follows:
• certainty = 0: There is no evidence available.
• certainty = 1: The collected evidence(s) is considered to be representa-
tive.
The initial expectation f expresses the assumption about the truth of a
proposition in absence of evidence.
Definition 2.2.3 (Expectation value of CT)
The expectation value of an opinion E(t, c, f) ∈ [0, 1] is defined as
E(t, c, f) = t ∗ c+ (1− c) ∗ f .
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It expresses the expectation about the truth of the proposition taking
into account the initial expectation, the average rating and the certainty. In
other words, the expectation value shifts from the initial expectation value
(f) to the average rating (t) with increasing certainty (c). The expectation
value, E, expresses trust of the trustor on trustee and referred to as trust
value in CertainTrust model.
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Figure 2.2: Human Trust Interface (HTI)
Ries provides a graphical representation of the CertainTrust opinion to
allow easy interpretation and manipulation of trust values by human users.
The so called Human Trust Interface (HTI) is based on the parameters intro-
duced above. The two parameters, t and c, are the basis for two-dimensional
layout of the graphical representation. In Fig. 2.2, x-axis represents the
average rating (t) and y-axis represents the certainty (c). The parameter,
trust value (E), is represented by a red-yellow-green color gradient. The
color gradient intuitively represents the semantics of the trust value. The red
gradient indicates a low (E = 0), yellow a medium (E = 0.5) and a green
indicates a high trust value (E = 1). The values in between are calculated
using a linear combination of the colours, red, yellow, and green, in the
RGB color model. Fig. 2.2 visualizes the trust value of a trustee, B. This is
based on A’s experience with B in a specific context. As an example, the
collected pieces of evidence are represented as opinion, oA = (0.83, 0.96, 0.5).
The trust value, E = 0.82, is calculated using Def. 2.2.3 and the value is
visualized with a black dot.
Operators: CT contains a set of basic operators particularly designed for
aggregating and weighting evidence units from multiple recommenders. The
basic operators are denoted as consensus and discounting which are equivalent
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to the SL consensus and discounting operators, as there exists a bijective
mapping between CT and SL representation of opinions. In addition to the
basic operators, CT contains extended consensus and extended discounting
operators. These are particularly designed for mitigating Sybil attacks in
the context of trust propagation [RA09]. The justification and evaluation of
the operators are provided in [Rie09b].
The CertainTrust model is designed on the basis of evidence space. Thus,
it provides a mapping [Rie09b] to the evidence space. In [Rie09b], it has been
also shown that there exists a bijective mapping between the CertainTrust’s
opinion representation and Subjective Logic’s representation of binomial
opinion; thus, the representational models are equivalent. However, the
models have certain advantages and disadvantages which demand a thorough
technical discussion.
2.2.2.3 Discussion on Subjective Logic and CertainTrust repre-
sentational models
The advantage of both models are that they provide means for modelling
trust in presence of uncertain pieces of evidence. However, by design, the
parameters representing opinion in SL are dependent to each other, whereas
parameters representing CT opinion are independent of each other. Let us
discuss this issue with a set of intuitive examples:
SL case: Assume that an opinion about the truth of a proposition A
is given as, ωA = (b, d, u, a) where A = This service provider offers good
customer support. As parameter a is not relevant for the discussion in this
section, we can assume atomicity, a = 0.5.
• Redundant parameter: According to the given constraint, b+ d+
u = 1, the model has one parameter redundant. It means that the
redundant parameter does not increase the expressiveness of the model
as u = 1 − b − d or b = 1 − u − d or d = 1 − b − u. However, the
author argued that the redundant parameter is kept to allow compact
expressions of opinion operators.
• Dependent parameters: As stated above, the parameters of bino-
mial opinion representation in SL are interrelated by b + d + u = 1.
This has another consequence that the range of possible values for each
parameter depends on the actual values of the other parameters. Let
us discuss use cases regarding the consequence.
– The three parameters cannot be chosen independently in the range
of [0, 1]. For instance, if a user choose b = 0.4, d = 0.5, u = 0.6,
then the constraint, b+ d+ u = 1, is not fulfilled.
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– It is not even possible to choose two parameters independently in
the range of [0, 1]. For example, if a user choose, b = 0.5, d = 0.6,
it leads to u = 1− 0.5− 0.6 = −0.1, which is not in the range of
[0, 1].
– Finally, it is also not possible to change the value of a single
parameter without affecting at least the value of other parameter.
For example, a user wants to change a particular value (u) in the
given opinion, (0.1, 0.1, 0.8). In this example, it is not possible to
change the value of u = 0.8 without changing the value of b or d
or both together.
Now, in the context of evidence-based trust, the parameters can be
categorized as follows:
– Parameter related to (un-)certainty, i.e., parameter u indicates
the uncertainty associated with an opinion.
– Parameters related to the collected evidence units, e.g., positive
or negative evidence units.
This categorization is inspired by the given mapping [Jøs01] between
SL opinion representation and the evidence space. The mapping is as
follows:
b = r
r + s+ 2
d = s
r + s+ 2
u = 2
r + s+ 2
(2.2)
where, r and s are referred to as positive and negative pieces of evidence
respectively.
Following the discussion above, we conclude that the following state-
ments are true for SL:
– The parameters in the category collected evidences are dependent
to each other as b + d = 1 − u; thus, the parameters cannot
be chosen independently in the range of [0, 1], e.g., b = 0.5 and
d = 0.6 is not possible.
– The parameters across the categories are dependent. For example,
if uncertainty, u = 0.5, this directly influences the values of the
parameters in the category collected evidence units, i.e., b or d
should lie in the range of [0, 0.5].
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The influence of dependent parameters can also be reasoned by the
following use case, particularly focusing on the quantity of collected
evidences. Assume that the trust value (i.e., probability expectation
value) associated with the proposition A is 0.5. This value can be based
on two different set of opinions as follows.
– If the opinion is based on few representative evidence units, the
values of the opinion are as follows: (b,d,u)=(0.1, 0.1, 0.8).
– If the opinion is based on relatively more representative evidence
units, the values of the opinion are as follows: (b,d,u)=(0.4, 0.4, 0.2).
We observe that both opinions differ only based on the amount of
collected evidences, but all three parameters have to be changed.
CT case: Assume that an opinion about the truth of a proposition A is
given as, oA = (t, c, f) where A = This service provider offers good customer
support. Again, as parameter f is not relevant for the discussion, we can
assume f = 0.5.
From the given Def. 2.2.2, we see that the parameters in the CT model
are independent and the CT representational model does not contain any
redundant parameter. It means that
• A user can choose any value for the parameter t independently in the
range of [0, 1] without any influence by the value of the parameter, c.
• A user can choose any value for the parameter, c, independently in the
range of [0, 1] without any influence by the value of the parameter, t.
• A user may want to change a value of a particular parameter (e.g., to
reflect high certainty) in the given CT opinion, (t, c) = (0.6, 0.1). In
this case, the user only has to adjust the value of the parameter c. For
example, the adjusted opinion may appear as (t, c) = (0.6, 0.7).
Let us discuss the issue of independent parameters focusing on the cate-
gories introduced in the SL discussion above.
• Parameter related to (un-)certainty, i.e., parameter c indicates the
certainty associated with an opinion; uncertainty would be 1− c.
• Parameters related to collected evidence units, i.e., parameter t indicates
relative frequency of the collected pieces of evidence.
As stated above, there exists a mapping between the CT opinion space
and the evidence space. The mapping is as follows:
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t = r
r + s
c = N.(r + s)2.(N − (r + s)) +N.(r + s)
(2.3)
where, r, s, and N are referred to as positive, negative pieces of evidence
and maximum expected evidence units respectively. The mapping with the
definition of N is given in Section 6.1.2.
Following the discussion above, we conclude that the following statements
are true for CT.
• The parameters can be assigned, adjusted or changed across the cate-
gories independently.
• The parameters are independent within the categories, as each category
has only one parameter.
Finally, the influence of independent parameters can be reasoned following
the same use case as discussed in the SL discussion. Assume that the trust
value (i.e., expectation value, E) associated with the proposition A is 0.5.
This value can be based on two different set of opinions as follows.
• If the opinion is based on few representative pieces of evidence, the
values of the opinion are as follows: (t, c) = (0.5, 0.2).
• If the opinion is based on more representative pieces of evidence, the
values of the opinion are as follows: (t,c)=(0.5, 0.8).
We see that both opinions differ only based on the amount of collected
pieces of evidence, and only the parameter for certainty c has to be changed.
According to the discussion above, we conclude that the independence
feature of the parameters in CT opinion representation and the way the
parameters are chosen are an advantage of CT representational model. The
model is flexible and simpler in contrast to the SL model, i.e., parameters of
the CT opinion representation can be adjusted and interpreted in a more
intuitive manner than the parameters in the SL opinion representation.
However, both representational models are equally expressive in representing
evidence-based information, as a bijective mapping exists between those two
models. Moreover, graphical representation (i.e., HTI) of CT model is more
user-friendly [RS08], than the one (i.e., opinion triangle) of SL model. This
is considered as an important requirement (cf. Section 3.1.1) in the context
of this thesis. The extended consensus and extended discounting operators for
allowing Sybil-resistant trust propagation (i.e., robust evidence aggregation)
are also considered as an requirement (cf. Section 3.1.2) for this thesis.
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2.3 Summary
This chapter provides a elementary introduction to the trust concepts from
two complementary fields. Moreover, a dedicated technical section is provided
to give a basic idea of the trust establishment process in virtual environments.
The chapter can be summarised as follows:
• In distributed service environments, a consumer’s trust on a service
provider can be expressed as subjective belief where belief has implica-
tions on the service attributes, e.g., security attributes, performance
attributes.
• Bayesian approach is a good choice, which model trust as a subjective
probability. The reason is that the approach allows direct integration of
collected evidence units in the past, which are subject to uncertainty.
• Extended Bayesian approach such as CertainTrust has significant
advantages with respect to its representational model. However, the
model lacks trust operators, which are important means for trust
establishment mechanisms in distributed service environments.
• Finally, assurances regarding hard security mechanisms seems comple-
mentary to trust establishment in distributed service environments.
Thus, existing approaches considering evidence on security attributes
are worth to investigate in the field of trust establishment.
3
State-of-the-Art: Trust Establishment
Mechanisms
This chapter presents state-of-the-art trust establishment mechanisms which
have been proposed by research communities as well as in industry. The
mechanisms that are driven by computational trust models and reputation
systems are the main focus of this section. For brevity, we refer to these
models and systems as trust systems. In both communities, a number of
trust systems are proposed for different application scenarios. Beside these
trust systems, a number of technologies provide means for establishing trust
in distributed service environments. Hereby, we focus on three topics that
are closely related to the contributions in this thesis: 1) commercial and
research trends of trust systems, 2) applied technologies and 3) research
trends of trust management systems.
3.1 Requirements
In existing literature [HRM10, HHRM12, HRM11], several requirements have
been pointed out to design trust systems for distributed service environments,
e.g., cloud computing. The requirements are grouped into functional and
non-functional requirements.
3.1.1 Functional requirements
The requirements that are essential for a trust system to be functional in
distributed service environments are as follows:
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FR1 Multi-faceted Trust Computation: The computation of trust
should consider opinion (cf. Section 2.2.2) about multiple attributes (cf.
Section 4.2.2 for detailed description), which refer to competencies and
capabilities of a service provider. These competencies and capabilities
can be regarding different attributes, e.g., security, compliance, data
governance or customer support. Considering multiple attributes in
the computation of trust introduce further challenges, which are dis-
cussed in the next section. Note that criteria, categories, and aspects
are interchangeably used to denote attributes where applicable in this
thesis.
• Multi-attribute: In order to assess trustworthiness of a service
provider, required mechanisms should consider all relevant opin-
ions about different attributes. These opinions usually resemble
different qualities of a service which service providers offer. Fur-
thermore, each of the attributes can be composed of several other
attributes. Therefore, aggregation of opinions about different at-
tributes, independent of how the opinions are assessed, is a major
challenge.
• Multi-source: When considering multiple attributes, the quanti-
tative or qualitative information (opinions) that being factored
into the trust establishment process can be derived from different
sources. Additionally, one has to consider that these sources might
have different characteristics; for instance, information derived
from a trusted platform module (TPM) or certificates provided
by a property attestation authority need to be handled differently
from information derived from user feedback or expert ratings.
Therefore, combining information about service-specific attributes
derived from different sources is a major challenge.
• Multi-context: A service provider may offer services of different
types or in different contexts, which require consumers to consider
a different set of attributes to evaluate the trustworthiness of
that provider in different contexts. For example, different service
delivery models resemble different contexts in cloud computing
marketplaces; a service provider might be trustworthy in the
context of Software as a Service (SaaS) but not in the context
of Platform as a Service (PaaS). Hence, trust systems should be
context-aware in order to enable the evaluation of trustworthiness
of a service provider regarding service-specific attributes, which are
suitable for specific contexts. This leads to another challenge that
how to transfer trust across contexts. For example, transferring
trust established in the SaaS context to the PaaS context is not
a trivial task.
3.1. REQUIREMENTS 27
FR2 Trust Customization: It is important to consider the subjective
interests and requirements of the customers when assessing the trust-
worthiness of a service provider. Based on the individual interests and
requirements, each customer gets a local (subjective) or customised
trust value of a service provider. Subjective trust values provide means
for integrating the preference of each customer in detail. Customers
may give priority to specific sources of trust information or to a specific
attributes based on their interests and requirements or both. Thus,
trust systems require mechanisms to deliver customized trust values to
the users.
FR3 Trust Evaluation: In distributed service environments, a service or
system usually consists of several subsystems and components man-
aged by multiple providers. Therefore, trust establishment mechanisms
require knowledge about the architecture of the service as well as trust-
worthiness of its service instances, components, and subsystems in order
to evaluate the trustworthiness of the whole system or service. Recently,
a categorisation of such mechanisms is introduced in [HHRM12]. The
categorisation is as follows:
• Black box: In black box approach, trustworthiness of an entity or
a service is evaluated based on the observed output, for example,
only based on user feedback. Trust systems and models in this
class treat the service as a black box, in other words, these systems
do not consider any knowledge about the internal processes and
components of the service.
• Inside-out: This approach evaluates trustworthiness of an entity
or a service based on the knowledge about the architecture of
the service and the trustworthiness of its components (or subsys-
tems). This approach seems to be a perfect fit considering the
composite and distributed nature of services in cloud computing
environments.
• Outside-in: This particular approach requires knowledge about
the internal architecture of a service and its components as input
as well as information about observed behaviour of a service. The
goal of this approach is to assess and evaluate trustworthiness of
internal components of a service composition based on its external
behaviour. This is far from trivial, but can be successful when
some instances are re-used in multiple services and if certain errors
in the behaviour of the service composition can be backtracked to
the originating instance.
FR4 Trust Representation: The representation of trust needs to be trans-
parent and comprehensible so that the consumers can make trust-based
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decision in a convenient and confident manner. In order to make an
appropriate decision about which service provider to select in a com-
petitive marketplace, users require an intuitive representation of trust
together with additional information regarding relevant attributes.
3.1.2 Non-functional requirements
The requirements that are related to the mechanisms for assessing and
evaluating trustworthiness of service providers and systems are as follows.
NR1 Trust Computation under Uncertainty: In real world applica-
tions, the information (opinions) about trustworthiness of the systems
and its components are subject to uncertainty (cf. Section 2.2.2). For
example, trustworthiness values based on expert assessment might
be based on insufficient information and the current solutions in the
field of trusted computing, that assess the trustworthy behaviour of
a system, is not able to effectively capture dynamic changes in trust.
Thus, mechanisms for evaluating trustworthiness should be able to
calculate and express the degree of uncertainty associated to the derived
trustworthiness of the overall system.
NR2 Trust Computation under Conflict: The information about trust-
worthiness of the service providers as well as their underlying services
and systems can be derived from multiple sources, e.g., experts, users,
accreditators. These sources might provide conflicting information
which could influence the evaluation of trustworthiness of a service
provider. In order to ensure representative trustworthiness value, the
computational trust mechanisms should be able to calculate and ex-
press the degree of conflict as well as consider it during the evaluation
of trustworthiness.
NR3 Attack Resistance: As soon as the influence of trust mechanisms
on decision-making of customers will grow, the interests in manipu-
lating those values will grow accordingly, as already have been seen
in distributed service environments [KC09]. A number of different
attacks, e.g., playbook, proliferation attacks, reputation lag attacks,
false praise or accusation (collusion), whitewashing (re-entry), sybil
attacks, against trust systems have been discussed in [KC09, JG09].
Effective mechanisms for resisting these attacks are essential to develop
robust trust systems in distributed service environments.
3.2 Commercial and Research trends
In this section, first we present the state-of-the-art trust systems, i.e., trust
models, reputation systems, trust models in the field of Trusted Comput-
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ing. Second, the trust systems are analysed based on the requirements that
are outlined in Section 3.1. The objective is to examine the underlying
mechanisms of the existing models and systems whether these address the
requirements for establishing trust in distributed service environments. Fi-
nally, in the discussion section the lacking requirements are identified based
on the analysis of existing trust systems.
3.2.1 Trust systems
There are a number of commercial trust models, as well as numerous proposals
in different research communities, targeting various application areas such as
eCommerce, product review sites, Peer to Peer (P2P) networks, Online Social
Networks (OSNs), Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), ubiquitous, grid and
cloud computing. At first, sixteen promising trust systems and models from
different application areas are described. Then, these systems and models
are analysed with respect to the requirements mentioned in Section 3.1.
3.2.1.1 Commercial systems
Trust systems used in current eCommerce applications and product review
sites fall into this category. Most of these systems are centralized and use
summation-based models for aggregating feedback given by different users. A
significant advantage of these models are that aggregated feedback can easily
be transferred to reputation information which is used to establish trust
between users. The most widely known commercial reputation systems are
those offered by Ebay and Amazon. There is, however, a multitude of similar
systems available in online marketplaces, such as Epinions, AllExperts and
Bizrate, to name but a few. A brief description about the characteristics of
two such systems are given in the following:
eBay: 1 eBay is a popular online auction site, allowing sellers to put up
items for sale and buyers to bid for those items, with the highest bid winning
the auction. After each transaction, sellers and buyers get the opportunity
to rate and/or comment on each other through a Feedback Forum. eBay’s
primary rating system, the general feedback, is based upon ratings of three
types – positive, negative or neutral. An user’s general feedback score is
determined by the number of positive feedback ratings the user received,
while her general feedback rating, i.e. reputation, is defined as the quotient of
the number of positive ratings by the total number of positive and negative
ratings. In order to determine the recent behaviour of a participant, the
total number of positive, negative and neutral ratings are also displayed for
different periods (i.e., within the past month, the past 6 months and over
the preceding 12 months).
1http://www.ebay.com/
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Beyond general feedback, eBay includes detailed seller ratings that provide
users with information on eBay sellers, according to four distinct categories:
• item as described is defined as the measurement of the accuracy of the
item description.
• communication is defined as the measurement of degree of satisfaction
along with the way and timeliness by which a seller address questions
and concerns.
• shipping time is defined as the measurement of the time at which
bought items were dispatched.
• shipping and handling charges is defined as the measurement of the
appropriateness of fees incurred by mailing and packaging items, as
well as charges levied for time spent on packaging and mailing.
Detailed seller ratings category displays average reputation that a seller has
for each of these categories, measured on a 5 grade rating scale, for instance, 1
(poor) to 5 (excellent) stars. While the general rating system is personalized,
i.e., a user can identify the rating from another user. However, detailed seller
ratings are independent of the general rating system, for instance, they do
not affect each other.
Epinions: 2 It is a review site on which users can comment on and rate
their experience with various kinds of objects or services (e.g. places, products,
movies, companies), rate reviews given by other users and choose to trust
or block (i.e., distrust) specific reviewers. A review generally consists of a
quantitative rating ranging from 1 to 5 stars. In addition to the star rating,
additional means of rating are as follows: a short summary briefly outlining
the benefits (the Pros), the shortcomings (the Cons) and overall impression
(the Bottom Line) about a product. The additional means are complemented
with qualitative textual description that vary in length between twenty to
199 words for express reviews and more than 200 words for regular reviews.
Depending on the type of item or service reviewed, the quantitative rating
can be supplemented by sub-ratings for category-specific products or service
aspects, e.g. ease of use, battery life or durability when rating hand held
electronic devices or ease of ordering, customer service and on-time delivery
when rating online shops.
Furthermore, registered users of the Epinions community can rate reviews
by other users. The rating scale for assessing the quality (or helpfulness) of
reviews is based upon discrete verbal statements incorporating verbal hedges
(i.e., Not Helpful, Somewhat Helpful, Helpful, and Very Helpful). The rating
for the reviews basically express the helpfulness that those are accorded,
2http://www.epinions.com/
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how prominently a given review can be placed, and overall the status of
the reviewer. A member can obtain the status Advisor, Top Reviewer or
Category Lead depending on the quality and company of his or her reviews,
as well as taking into account the trust and block relationships within the
Epinions community.
3.2.1.2 Application-specific trust models
The trust models that are proposed for different application scenarios are
described in this section.
FIRE model for multi-agent systems: Huynh et al. [HJS06] tailored
FIRE particularly to the requirements of agents operating in multi-agent
environments. They consider that such a trust model should be distributed
and take a wide variety of information sources into consideration. Thus,
agents should be able to evaluate trust accorded to other agents subjectively
and the trust model, furthermore, should be robust to lying. The resulting
system includes four distinct types of modules contributing in the computa-
tion of a trust score, although FIRE is extensible to include further modules.
The four modules presented in [HJS06] are as follows:
1. interaction trust module derives a score based upon prior direct
interaction experience between the evaluating agent (trustor) and the
agent under evaluation (trustee).
2. role-based trust module derives a score based upon the, for instance
institutional, role of the trustee within the context as determined by
the interaction context.
3. interaction trust module derives a score based upon recommenda-
tions regarding the trustee received by the trustor from neighbouring
agents; takes into account the recommenders’ prior performance in
making correct recommendations.
4. interaction trust module derives a score based upon certificates,
i.e., positive references from other agents involved in prior interactions,
presented by the trustee to the trustor.
Each individual module supplies a module-specific value that is associated
with a corresponding reliability value. In order to derive the final trust value
for a trustee agent, the trustor agent aggregates each of the individually
determined scores. The aggregation is in the form of a weighted sum, weighing
the separate scores by a pre-determined module weight and their associated
reliability value. This value is composited from the module-specific reliability
scores. The FIRE model is flexible – by allowing the user to extend it
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with further modules – and combines and adapts approaches of other trust
models for agent systems, such as REGRET [SS02a, Sab03] or the model by
Ramchurn et al [RHJ04].
socialReGreT model for multi-agent systems: Sabater et al. pro-
posed a reputation system, socialReGreT [SS02b], that is based on three
dimensions of reputation: i) individual dimension, ii) social dimension, and
iii) ontological dimension. They argued that the social relations in the social
networks can be used to analyse trust and reputation in multi-agent system
environments. Therefore, instead of using direct interactions and the informa-
tion provided by other agents in the community about their past experiences,
social relations should be taken into account when analysing reputation of
an agent. Direct interactions and the information that comes from other
members as well as the social relations are classified as individual dimension
and social dimension respectively. Moreover, the socialREGRET system
considers multi-facet concept of reputation, e.g., reputation of being a good
travel agent summarizes the reputation of having a good air-carrier, a good
hotel and good food during the travel. These different types of reputation
and their combination into a single type is classified as ontological dimension.
EigenTrust model for P2P environments: Kamvar et al. proposed
the EigenTrust [KSGM03] model that manages reputation in file-sharing P2P
networks. The major aim of the approach lies in eliminating users spreading
inauthentic files from the network. Therefore, EigenTrust computes and
assigns a unique global trust value to each peer, based on the peer’s previous
upload behaviour. The basic unit of evidence in the computation of Eigen-
Trust is a binary rating assigned to the sharer by its peers, signifying their
satisfaction with the sharer. Behavioural information is, conceptually, stored
in a matrix of aggregated ratings for each pair of peers. Trust estimation
in large networks and for remote peers achieved by consulting the vector
corresponding to the peer under evaluation. This computation is aided by
a statistical convergence of the queried vector to the first eigenvector of
the queried matrix – hence the name EigenTrust. The secure distributed
aggregation for computing these global trust values is based on Power itera-
tion method. Further design goals of EigenTrust include decentralization,
anonymity, low computational overhead, collusion resistance, and providing
no incentive for whitewashing by leaving and re-entering the system under a
new pseudonym.
BNTM model for P2P environments: Wang et al. [WV03] proposed
a Bayesian Network-based Trust Model (BNTM) that models and aggregates
trust from multiple criteria. The model is demonstrated in a P2P-based
file sharing scenario and Bayesian network is leveraged to model the trust
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between an agent and a file provider. The authors of the proposed model
argued about two kinds of trust that a user builds on a service provider.
One is the trust that a user build on provider’s competence in providing a
service. Another is the trust that a user build in another agent’s reliability
in recommending a service provider. Therefore, direct interaction and other
agents’ recommendation are taken into account for calculating the aggregated
trust or updating the corresponding Bayesian network. In order to address
the reliability of the recommenders, the model considered the following two
aspects: i) whether the information from a recommender is truthful or not
and ii) whether a user agent and a recommender agent have similar behaviour
regarding different criteria; if criteria are similar, then two agents can trust
each other otherwise not.
Bucheggers’smodel for P2P andMobile Ad-hoc networks: Bucheg-
ger et al. proposed a robust reputation system in order to cope with false
disseminated information for P2P and mobile ad-hoc networks. The rep-
utation system is based on a distributed modified Bayesian trust model.
The authors of the proposed model extended the standard Bayesian model
by integrating a discounting factor that serves as the fading (i.e., ageing)
mechanism for past experiences. The main objective of the proposed reputa-
tion system is to cope with false ratings. In this case, information provided
by recommender nodes are considered as long as they are similar to the
direct experience of a node’s itself. This is based on a deviation test that
computes the absolute difference between the expectation value calculated
based on direct experience and the expectation value calculated based on
recommendation. Moreover, a static weighting factor is introduced to reduce
the influence of recommendations in the proposed system.
Billhardt’smodel for Service-oriented environments: Billhardt et al.
proposed a integrated system that combine trust and reputation mechanisms
with service discovery or match-making mechanisms in order to select the best
provider in a service-oriented environment. They consider a user’s confidence
value (refer to as direct interaction) and the reliability of the confidence value
to calculate the trust score of a service provider. The reliability calculation
of a confidence value is based on the mechanism proposed in FIRE [HJS06],
which considers the number of interactions a confidence value is based on,
and the variability of the individual values over past interactions. In case,
the reliability value falls below a given threshold, the confidence values
provided by recommenders are taken into account to calculate the trust
value. The authors of the proposed model also introduced a mechanism that
demonstrates how to transfer trust across similar contexts (i.e., services)
offered by a service provider. The idea is based on the assumptions that
services from the same provider will have a similar quality and more similar
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its service types are, the more similar the quality of these services will be.
Hang’s model for Service-oriented environments: Hang et al. [HS11]
proposed a trust-aware service selection model in the context of service com-
positions. The proposed model considers qualities (e.g., latency, throughput,
failure) of a service as well as their constituent services to enable trustworthy
service selection in web service environments. They use Bayesian networks to
model service compositions and the dependency of providing a good service
quality between the composite and the constituent services. Beta-mixture
approach is considered to learn about the quality distribution of the services
and provides the information of the constituent services, i.e., how much each
constituent service contributes to the quality of the composite service. The
proposed model also includes a mechanism that can deal with incomplete
observable data. The main objective of the model is to select service instances
to form suitable compositions based on the desired qualities.
TidalTrust model for OSNs: Golbeck [Gol05] proposes a trust model
called TidalTrust, enabling a participant (the trustor) to infer trust about
another (the trustee) by specifically considering the intermediate connections
between the two in a web-based online social network (OSN). The TidalTrust
model is more complex of two models proposed in [Gol05] as it is capable of
dealing with continuous rather than merely binary trust ratings. Moreover,
the model presents a breadth first search algorithm for traversing a graph
formed by the connections among neighbors in a social network. The goal of
the presented algorithm is to infer a trust value by traversing those edges,
which form both the shortest path between the two participants and represent
the strongest (intermediary) connections between the two. The strength
of the connections is based upon the individual trust scores assigned by
intermediary participants to the edges connecting to the next participant
on the path from trustor to trustee. The final inference mechanism for
computing the trust score is given by a weighted sum over the edges of the
selected paths. Aside from presenting the trust inference mechanism, Golbeck
validates her model in two different applications, i.e., FilmTrust, Trustmail,
with regard to robustness and applicability in real-world scenarios.
RFSN model for WSNs: Ganeriwal et al. [GBS08] proposed a trust
model, RFSN, that is particularly tailored to application in sensor networks.
RFSN is a distributed, symmetric reputation-based model that uses both
first-hand and second-hand information for updating reputation values. The
process for updating of reputation values in RFSN is based upon a Beta
probability distribution, allowing for higher flexibility by enabling the system
to process continuous rather than merely discrete values. It incorporates
both ageing and updating mechanisms, as well as incorporating weighing of
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witness opinions. For a more comprehensive overview of the numerous trust
and reputation models targeting adhoc and sensor networks, we refer the
readers to [STL+09].
GridEigenTrust model for Grid Environments: Laszewiski et al.
adapt EigenTrust [KSGM03] framework into a trust model [GvL05] for
classical grids. They integrate the model into a QoS management framework.
By using the framework, grid-resources are probabilistically pre-selected
based on their likelihood of possessing the requested capabilities and ca-
pacities. The approach of Laszewiski et al. is one of the few approaches
that aim to improve QoS management in grid environments by integrating a
reputation service.
Abawajy’s model for Cloud Environments: Abawajy [Aba09] pro-
posed a reputation manager in order to determine the trustworthiness of a
cloud vendor for the purpose of service sharing among the vendors. Rep-
utation rating is based on direct experience or observation and indirectly
by sharing experiences with other vendors. Service-specific attributes that
are considered important to select service providers in distributed service
environments, e.g, cloud computing, are not taken into account in this model.
3.2.1.3 Non-application specific Trust models
Beta reputation system Jøsang et al. [JI02] proposed a centralized
reputation system for general e-commerce environments. The reputation
system is based on Subjective Logic that combine the elements of Bayesian
probability theory with belief theory. The Subjective Logic is explained in
Section 2.2.2.1. The authors of the proposed system argued that in contrast
to other similar systems the beta reputation system has a firm basis in the
theory of statistics. The operators [Jøs01] of subjective logic are used to
aggregate ratings per interaction partner from different sources. The system
allows different weights to the feedback based on the age, i.e., old feedback
is given less weight than recent feedback. Furthermore, another type of
weighting mechanism is introduced to discount reputation rating based on
the trustworthiness of the entity who provides the rating.
CertainTrust model: Ries [Rie09a, Rie09b] suggested a trust model
called CertainTrust for selecting trustworthy interaction partners in op-
portunistic networks. The author argued that the model can also be used
for the same purpose in eCommerce and Web 2.0, e.g., recommendations
in online platforms, scenarios. The model is an extension of Bayesian trust
models [JI02, BLB04] integrating context-dependent parameters, such as
dispositional trust and aging of evidence. One such parameter, the maximum
number of evidence units, allows the user to define the number representative
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of pieces of evidence about an entity’s behaviour in an application context.
CertainTrust explicitly allows modelling of a trust score and the certainty
attributed to that score, based upon an expectation, for instance derived
from the evaluator’s disposition to trust and the behaviour of the entity
under evaluation. Furthermore, transformation functions are presented in
order to transfer average rating (t) and certainty (c) into the opinion space of
Jøsang’s Subjective Logic [Jøs01]. A detailed discussion on the CertainTrust
model is provided in Section 2.2.2.2.
3.2.1.4 Trust models in Trusted Computing
Apart from the field of trust and reputation models, there are a number
of approaches from the field of trusted computing designed to ensure trust-
worthy cloud infrastructure. Krautheim et al. developed a private virtual
infrastructure (PVI), which is a security architecture for cloud computing and
uses a trust model to share the responsibility of security between the service
provider and client [Kra09]. Schiffman et al. constructed a hardware-based
attestation mechanism to provide assurance of data processing protection
in the cloud for customers [SMV+10]. There are further approaches such
as property-based TPM virtualization [SSW08], which can be used in the
cloud scenario to assure users about the fulfilment of security properties in
cloud platforms using attestation concepts. However, in general, attestation
concepts based on trusted computing, e.g., [SS04], focus on the evaluation
of single platforms not on compositions. Moreover, Nagarajan et al. [NV11]
argue that given the nature of property-based attestation mechanisms, an
attestation requester (e.g., service consumer) cannot be absolutely certain
that an attesting platform will behave as it is expected to behave.
Thus, Nagarajan et al. [NV11] proposed a hybrid trust model, TESM,
based on soft trust model to address uncertainties arise from attestation
mechanisms. They combine hard trust from certificate-based property attes-
tation mechanism with soft trust from past experiences and recommendations
regarding the properties in the proposed hybrid model. The hard trust mod-
ule includes a logical language, ALOPA, to formalize authorisation derivation
in trusted platforms. The soft trust module leverages Subjective Logic for
modelling and assessing the uncertainties arise due to the nature of property
attestation mechanism. The authors applied the hybrid trust model for au-
thorisation evaluation in distributed service environments, e.g., web service
platforms [Nag10]. In particular, they consider the platforms as composition
of multiple platform instances and applied the soft trust module to evaluate
trust in presence of composite platform. The TESM for authorisation eval-
uation is demonstrated to be more effective in comparison to the existing
approaches when authorisation needs to be evaluated in presence of multiple
security properties of composite distributed platforms and in presence of
uncertain property assessment method.
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3.2.2 Analysis of Trust Systems
First, we analyse the trust systems based on the functional requirements,
i.e., FR1 (Multi-attribute), FR2 (Trust Customisation), FR3 (Trust Evalua-
tion), and FR4 (Trust Representation). Then we analyse the trust systems
based on the non-functional requirements, i.e., NR1 (Trust Computation
under Uncertainty), NR2 (Trust Computation under Conflict), NR3 (Attack
Resistance).
3.2.2.1 Analysis based on Functional Requirements
Trust computation under multiple attributes (i.e., Multi-attribute) is not a
mechanism that can be found usually in the existing trust systems. Com-
mercial trust systems such as eBay and Epinions consider multiple attributes
for computing trust ratings. However, eBay’s seller ratings, displayed in four
distinct categories, do not affect the overall rating process, i.e., categorical
ratings are not taken into account to compute the overall rating. Only three
models – TESM, BNTM, and socialReGreT – proposed by the research
community, consider multiple criteria in computing trust. TESM model
leverages soft trust operators for computing platform trust by aggregating
trust information about different properties of platforms and their underlying
components. BNTM model uses Bayesian network for representing trust
values in different attributes of a service provider. Bayes rule is used to
compute the trust value for each of the attribute in the model. socialReGreT
system also enables multi-attribute concept for trust computation and the
mechanism that drives the concept is defined as “ontological dimension”.
None but one of the trust systems consider different trust information
sources when computing trust based on multiple attributes. Beta reputation
system leverages Subjective Logic operators to aggregate feedback from
multiple sources. Unfortunately, this system does not differentiate between
the sources, e.g., trust information derived from experts is different from the
trust information derived from user feedback. Thus, the mechanism of the
proposed system does not fulfil the requirement regarding multi-source trust
computation.
Commercial models such as Epinions aggregate trust ratings from multiple
contexts to provide an overall reputation score for an entity. Interestingly,
commercial models like eBay and most of the trust systems proposed by
the research community do not support the feature. A couple of trust
systems, GridEigenTrust and BNTM, from the research community provide
mechanisms to combine trust values from multiple contexts in order to
provide an overall trust score. However, none of these systems are able
to transfer trust across contexts. Conversely, Billhardt’s model does not
support the multi-context feature, but it is capable of transferring trust across
contexts. Therefore, significant improvement is required for trust systems in
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distributed service environments to support both of those features.
Trust customization is one of the requirements that is fulfilled in a number
of commercial applications and research community’s proposals. Most of
the commercial trust models, e.g., eBay, Epinions, support a single trust
rating for all customers. Most of the trust systems, proposed by the research
community, support local (subjective) trust score that reflect customers’
preferences except Eigentrust, GridEigentTrust, and Abawajy’s model.
Types of Trust evaluation mechanism is one of the important requirement
when trust is evaluated in distributed service environments. Evaluation
mechanisms in most of the trust systems can be classified as Black box
approach because they do not consider the knowledge of internal architecture
or behaviour of internal processes in the trust evaluation. The only exception
is the Hang’s model that considers observed behaviour of composite service
to assess and evaluate trustworthiness of constituent components. This is
classified as Outside-in approach. This approach is useful to identify con-
stituent service who is responsible for unsatisfactory quality of the composite
service. In distributed service environments, particularly in cloud computing
environments, the consumer would be interested to know the trustworthiness
of composite service as well as their constituent services without even inter-
acting with that composite service upfront. This is classified as Inside-out
approach. Evaluation mechanisms of the GridEigenTrust and the TESM
do follow the Inside-out approach, but the mechanisms does not provide a
formal approach which make the mechanisms specific to grid environments
and trusted platforms respectively.
Commercial models like eBay and Epinions provide a graphical interface
(e.g., star rating) together with detailed information (e.g., detailed seller
ratings, detailed opinions) to the customers. On the one hand, the graphical
interface in commercial models does not provide comprehensive trust infor-
mation but with the help of detailed information the models mitigate that
problem. On the other hand, most of the trust models from the research
community do not provide a graphical interface for trust representation
except the CertainTrust model and the Beta reputation system.
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3.2.2.2 Analysis based on Non-functional Requirements
The trust systems that are discussed in Section 3.2.1 usually don’t consider
uncertainty in trust computation. Only three existing systems and models–
Beta reputation, CertainTrust, and TESM– consider uncertainty while com-
puting trust. The underlying mechanisms of Beta reputation system and
TESM model use the Subjective Logic operators for computing trust under
uncertainty. CertainTrust model is also able to model trust under uncertainty
and it provide a intuitive graphical interface (i.e., HTI) to visualize trust
under uncertainty. However, this model is lacking mechanisms that can
compute trust of a service or a service provider in composition of different
trust attributes.
None of the state-of-the-art trust systems provide mechanisms for com-
puting trust under conflicting trust information. This requirement is essential
when computing trust based on the information derived from multiple sources.
Each of these sources might use different information reasoning mechanisms,
which may produce different trustworthiness value. Thus, an entity, who
wants to compute trust based on the information provided by these sources,
have to deal with the deviation (i.e., degree of conflict) of information and
reflect the deviation in trustworthiness value.
Most of the trust models are subject to different kinds of attacks, while
a few of them are resistant to particular attacks such as False Praise or
Accusation (FPA), Sybil (S) and Whitewashing (W) attacks. Considering
these we limit our scope to those three attacks in order to make the compar-
isons concise in Table 3.2. CertainTrust model includes mechanisms to deal
with sybil and FPA attacks, while Buchegger’s model and socialREGRET
are resistant to FPA attacks only. EigenTrust model does not provide a
mechanism to deal with Sybil attacks. However it suggests that imposing a
cost to create new IDs, e.g., integrating captcha [Cap] in their approach will
make costly for an adversary to create Sybil entities. None of these models
address mitigation mechanisms against whitewashing attacks.
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3.2.3 Discussion
According to the analysis of different trust systems, it is evident that none
of the systems provide mechanisms that fulfil all the requirements for es-
tablishing trust in distributed service environments. However, mechanisms
such as Subjective Logic and CertainTrust opinion model considered by
trust systems – TESM, Beta reputation, CertainTrust – fulfil some of the
important requirements for designing trust systems in distributed service
environments. The mathematical foundation of these mechanisms rely on
the Bayesian approach (cf. Section 2), which allows
• to model trust based on collected pieces of evidence in the past and
subjective prior knowledge.
• trust to be modelled as subjective probability.
Additionally, mechanisms underlying those models offer following features
required for trust establishment in distributed service environments.
• Subjective logic offers computational trust operators (cf. Section 2.2.2.1)
that are able to deal with uncertainty. This model provides a trust
representation by means of a construct namely opinion and its corre-
sponding graphical interface, i.e., opinion triangle.
• CertainTrust model also offers computational operators (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2.2.2) that are able to deal with uncertainty. This model provides
a intuitive graphical trust representation, i.e., HTI, designed particu-
larly for human users.
A detail discussion on Subjective logic and CertainTrust model is pre-
sented in Section 2.2.2.3. According to that discussion, we concluded that
CertainTrust is a relatively a better choice in terms of its flexible and simple
representational model.
In this thesis, CertainTrust model is extended according to the functional
(cf. Section 3.1.1) and non-functional (cf. Section 3.1.2) requirements. The
extension of CertainTrust model is required by means of computational trust
operators that should be able to compute;
• trust based on information about multiple attributes and the informa-
tion is subject to uncertainty.
• trust based on information derived from multiple sources and the
information is subject to uncertainty as well as conflicting.
In order to fulfil the requirements– trust customization, trust evaluation –
further mechanisms are required to
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• customize trust value according to consumers’ preference and interests.
• evaluate the trustworthiness of a composite service or system based on
the trustworthiness of constituent components and subsystems.
3.3 Applied technologies
In this section, we present the technologies that support consumers to
build trust on service providers in distributed service environments. The
focus is given on the technologies that service providers in cloud computing
marketplaces leverage to build trust.
Service Level Agreements (SLAs): In practice, one way to establish
trust on service providers is the fulfilment of SLAs. SLA validation [HBS10]
and monitoring [3Te09] schemes are used to quantify what exactly a cloud
provider is offering and which assurances are actually met. In service ori-
ented environments, customers are usually responsible for monitoring SLA
violations (e.g., service downtime) and inform the providers for compensation.
The compensation clauses in SLAs are written by the cloud providers in
such a way so that the customers merely gets the opportunity to apply for
compensation (e.g., service credits) due to SLA violation. This problem arises
from not having standardised SLAs for service providers in the marketplaces,
particularly in cloud marketplaces. Although, the problem is addressed by
an industry driven initiative [Clo10] for establishing standardized SLAs, this
initiative is far from completion and implementation in practice.
Researchers from the academia and industry – Irfan et al. [HAP+10],
Wang et al. [WZWQ10], and Pawar et al. [PRNZ12] – has already demon-
strated the practical use of SLA compliance for establishing trust on service
providers in grid computing, web service, and cloud computing environments.
Irfan et al. proposed a trust model based on certificates (i.e., PKI-based)
and reputation-based trust system as a part of an SLA validation frame-
work. Wang et al. proposed a trust model that takes multiple aspects
(reputation, trustworthiness, and risk) into account for evaluating web ser-
vices. Both approaches consider SLA validation as the main factor for
establishing trust on the grid service and web service providers. The SLA
compliance issue has also recently been considered in a trust model proposed
by Pawar et al. [PRNZ12]. The trust model was developed in the context
of a cloud-specific project [FHT+12] for evaluating trustworthiness of cloud
infrastructure providers.
Auditing: Cloud providers use different audit standards (e.g., SAS 70
II, FISMA, ISO 27001) to assure users about their offered services and
platforms. For example, Google lists SAS 70 II and FISMA certification to
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assure users about the security and privacy measures taken for Google Apps.
The audit SAS 70 II covers only the operational performance, e.g., policies
and procedures inside datacenters, and relies on a highly specific set of goals
and standards. They, however, are not sufficient in alleviating the users’
security concerns [Sea09] and most cloud providers are not willing to share
their audit reports, which also leads to a lack of transparency. Even though
the audit-driven certificates have shortcomings, they serve as persistent trust
anchors for transient online services, e.g., service offerings by cloud providers.
Recently, researchers have demonstrated the integration of certification
processes into reputation-based trust models [HVHM12]. They argued that
the integrated trust model will be able to mitigate the market entry problem
for comparatively new service providers. Moreover, the model enables the
certified service providers to serve as persistent trust anchors for more
transient online services, such as service offerings by cloud providers. The
authors demonstrated the integration of audit-driven certification processes
into established CertainTrust model.
Ratings & Measurements: Recently, a cloud marketplace3 has been
launched to support consumers in identifying dependable cloud providers.
Cloud providers are rated based on a questionnaire that needs to be filled
in by current cloud consumers. In the future, CloudCommons aims to
combine consumer feedback with technical measurements for assessing and
comparing the trustworthiness of cloud providers. Furthermore, there is
a new commercial cloud marketplace named SpotCloud4 that provides a
platform where cloud consumers can choose among potential providers based
on cost, quality, and location. In this platform, cloud providers’ ratings are
displayed in an Amazon-like “star” interface with no documentation on how
the ratings are computed.
Self-assessment Questionnaires: According to recent studies [Fuj10],
lack of security control transparency is the leading inhibitor to the adoption
of cloud services. In order to enable transparency, the Cloud Security
Alliance (CSA) proposed a self-assessment framework [CSAc] that enables
cloud providers to publish their security-specific capabilities of the services
they offer. This framework includes a questionnaire, i.e., CAIQ, that provides
means for cloud providers to document their capabilities in terms of different
attributes, e.g., compliance, information security, governance.
The published capabilities serve as an indicator of trustworthiness for
cloud providers. In order to enable the process, a metric is required to
assess the published CAIQs and leverage the assessment result for evaluating
trustworthiness of cloud providers. The CSA self-assessment framework as
3http://beta-www.cloudcommons.com/web/cc/about-smi
4http://www.spotcloud.com/
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it stands does not provide such a metric. Recently, researchers have coined
the need for such a metric in order to design a practical trust evaluation
system [HHRM12] for cloud marketplaces.
3.4 Research trends: Trust Management (TM) Sys-
tems
According to [JKD05], TM systems should allow relying entities to reliably
represent their capabilities and competencies of the underlying systems in
terms of relevant attributes. Such systems should also allow reliant parties
to make assessments and decisions regarding the dependability of potential
transactions based on the available evidences. For the latter part, Bayesian
trust systems provide means for assessing the trustworthiness of relying
entities based on observations and evidence. Thus, TM system can be
considered as a driving element in trust establishment process. Note that
trustee is termed as relying party and trustor is termed as reliant party.
The TM systems developed in the last century, e.g., KeyNote [BFK98],
REFEREE [CFL+97], IBM Role-based Access Control Model [HMM+00],
assumed trust relationships to be monotonic and do not manage trust con-
sidering the notion of learning from the available information. These systems
are useful for access control decisions where a service provider determines
what a consumer is allowed to do, but, not in a scenario where trust is a
negotiation process, e.g, cloud computing marketplaces.
To overcome these problems in the existing TM s, Grandison et al. [GS03]
proposed a policy-based TM framework that includes notation for specifying
trust concepts as well as software tools for analysing and monitoring trust
specifications. However, the proposed framework does not address the concept
of uncertainty as a part of trust specification language for specifying trust
relationships between a trustor (e.g., consumer) and a trustee (e.g., service
provider).
Modelling and representing uncertainty is important when a trustor assess
trustworthiness of a trustee based on evidence units, which are incomplete,
insufficient and derived from unreliable sources. Hence, TM systems directed
for distributed service environments should consider a mechanism that is
able to deal with uncertainty and reflect it explicitly in representation as
well as in computation of trust. Moreover, distributed service environments
contain composed services in addition to published service-specific attributes
that can be composed of several other attributes. Thus, underlying trust
mechanisms should be able to compute trust under composition of attributes
and services. Furthermore, evidence regarding the service-specific attributes
can be derived from multiple sources. Therefore, underlying trust mechanism
of a TM system should consider the issues such as user preference in selecting
sources and computation of trust under conflicting information. Nevertheless,
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policy-based approach, e.g., Grandison et al. [GS03], is an important element
of a TM system. In this thesis, policy orchestration is not considered as the
main focus for designing a TM system.
3.5 Summary
This chapter provides an extensive review on the state-of-the-art trust mech-
anisms proposed in different application scenarios. These mechanisms are
rigorously analysed with respect to a set of functional and non-functional
requirements. The contents of this chapter is summarised as follows:
• There is no one-fits-all solution to establish trust in distributed service
environments.
• However, there are a couple of mechanisms, i.e., Subjective Logic
and CertainTrust, that fulfil important non-functional requirements.
We choose the CertainTrust representational model, as it allows one
to adjust the opinion parameters independently and one to take the
advantage of intuitive graphical representation of trust.
In this thesis, the author aims to provide the following mechanisms in
order to address the gaps identified in the state-of-the-art:
• A generalized formal framework to assess trustworthiness of composed
distributed services and service providers based on their published
service-specific attributes.
• By design, the framework should be able to customise trust values
according to consumers’ personal preferences and interests.
• An extended computational framework based on CertainTrust is re-
quired for enabling trustworthiness evaluation considering composed
architecture of the systems and services as well as composed service-
specific attributes.
• A TM system by integrating the generalized trust assessment framework
and the computational framework for trust evaluation is required to
enable trust establishment in distributed service environments.
4
Formal Framework for Trust Establishment
In service oriented environments, computing resources such as computing
power, data storage, software are modelled as services. These services are
offered directly or composed into other services. Even if the services are
offered directly, the services can still be composed of systems or subsystems
that are distributed across the world and managed by several parties. These
kind of services are widely adopted in distributed service environments, e.g.,
cloud computing. For example, a cloud-based video rendering service might
be composed of several distributed services such as a storage service from
cloud storage provider and compute service from another provider. In such
a service environment, a number of providers may provide services with
similar functionality. However, there might be huge differences regarding
the provided quality level of those services as well as the capabilities of the
service providers. These are referred to as non-functional characteristics of
a service provider. Therefore, distinguishing service providers based on their
non-functional characteristics is essential for potential consumers to identify
a dependable service. Grandison [Gra07, Wu11] suggests a relationship
between trust and dependability in the context of distributed system by
stating that the trustworthiness of a service relies on the dependability level
of a trustee.
Dependability is defined as the ability of any trustor (i.e., consumer)
to rely on trustee’s (i.e., service provider) behaviour. In the context of
trust establishment, service provider’s behaviour regarding non-functional
requirements should be able to meet the expectation of a consumer. Thus,
it is important to formally model the expected behaviour of a trustee from
a trustor’s perspective. Moreover, the formal model should also consider
the behaviour of services that service providers offer. As these services are
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increasingly aggregated to offer a composed service in emerging distributed
service environments, it is also important to consider the concept of composi-
tion when modelling the expected behaviour of services. Hence, we propose a
formal framework to model the expected behaviour regarding non-functional
attributes of service providers as well as of underlying services that are com-
posed of subsystems and components. It will become evident in Section 4.2.1
that fulfilling the expected behaviour of a consumer ultimately influence the
trustworthiness assessment process of service providers in distributed service
environments.
Firstly, we revisit the cloud computing example briefly discussed in
Chapter 1 in order to illustrate the means and necessity of trust assessment
in distributed service environments. Then, the required concepts behind
the formal framework are discussed in detail. Finally, the trust assessment
framework is formulated along with intuitive examples driven by a couple of
cloud computing scenarios.
4.1 Revisited Cloud-based Healthcare Scenario
In scenario (cf. Fig. 4.1) one considers a healthcare provider who wishes
to outsource their in-house application, for managing medical records, to a
cloud-based service. The main goal of the healthcare provider, the cloud
consumer in this case, is to minimize IT expenditure as well as allowing
doctors, patients, and insurance companies seamless access to these medical
records using the cloud-based service. The medical records contain private
information and outsourcing them to a service in the cloud requires that
the service provider who hosts the service is trustworthy in handling private
information. The healthcare provider requires assurances on compliance
with regulatory acts such as HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act), data protection through security and privacy attributes,
geographical location (e.g., data should not leave specific political border) as
well as high availability of the service. The healthcare provider considers
service providers as trustworthy if they possess the capabilities to fulfil
these assurances. Since the cloud service market for offering medical record
services is competitive, the healthcare provider faces the challenge of selecting
a trustworthy service provider that is best-suited and most appropriate for
meeting its requirements from several alternatives.
In order to select a trustworthy cloud provider, the consumer (i.e., the
healthcare provider) should be able to compare the offered services or so-
lutions independently. This task includes analysing the SLA whether it
address consumer’s requirements and check whether the provider conform to
specific audit standards or not. In order to perform these processes for each
of the cloud providers could turn out to be a difficult and cumbersome task.
Moreover, ratings derived from consumers’ feedback about the capabilities
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Figure 4.1: Means for Assessing Trustworthiness in Cloud Marketplaces
of cloud providers provide means to distinguish one service from the other.
Recently, the CSA has introduced a self-assessment framework CAIQ [CSAc]
that provides means to publish service-specific capabilities of cloud providers
regarding various security and privacy attributes. The consumers can make
use of these published capabilities from the STAR (Security, Trust & Assur-
ance Registry) to get a better handle on the security attributes the cloud
providers have. In the CAIQ, fulfilment of these attributes can be reasoned
in a composite manner similar to service composition, for instance, a cloud
provider is considered to fulfil the Information Security (IS) attribute given
that the constituent attributes (IS-01–IS-34) are also fulfilled. However,
the CAIQ framework as it stands does not provide a solution of how to
analyse the composite structure in the context of trust assessment. Figure 4.1
summarizes the means for assessing the trustworthiness of service providers
in the current scenario.
Moreover, cloud services (e.g., medical record management) are hosted in
complex distributed systems (cf. Fig. 4.1), which are composed of subsystems
and components. These systems are usually managed by multiple parties,
i.e., service providers. Thus, it is essential to assess trustworthiness of cloud
services considering (1) the trustworthiness of the underlying subsystems and
atomic components (independent from how these trust values are assessed),
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(2) information on how the system or a service combines its subsystems and
components, and (3) the knowledge about which subsystems and components
are redundant. The latter means that a system can be composed of identical
components or subsystems, where each of those components and subsystems
provides exactly the same functionality as others. Trustworthiness of a cloud
service is assessed based on these information and the given requirements
that users are interested of. For example, the healthcare provider might want
to assess the trustworthiness of the cloud-based service regarding a security
or an availability attribute.
4.2 Concepts behind the Formal Framework
The formal framework is designed to assess the composite structure of a
service or system considering service-specific attributes given that these at-
tributes are specified by the consumers. Moreover, the framework is adapted
to the context of assessing the composite structure of attributes. In all these
cases, it is assumed that service and system specification and the informa-
tion about service-specific attributes are available. Thus, the framework
only focus on assessing the composite structure of the service regarding
the attributes and represent them in simplified meaningful terms. These
representative terms serve as a formal basis for assessing the trustworthiness
of service providers in distributed service environments, e.g., cloud comput-
ing marketplaces. Before introducing the formalisation of the framework,
it is necessary to understand the rationale behind the construction of the
framework.
4.2.1 Trustworthiness Assessment
Trust concepts are extensively discussed in the existing literatures as pre-
sented in Chapter 2. However, Chang et al. [CHD05] claimed that the related
term trustworthiness has not been clearly distinguished in the existing lit-
erature. According to Chang et al., these literature are lacking a distinct
definition comprising of trust, trust values and trustworthiness. To address
the gap, Chang et al. defined trustworthiness as a measure of the level of trust
that a trustor has in the trustee. They also argue that the trustworthiness is
measured against the trustworthiness scale. According to the wide spread
understanding of trust (cf. Section 2.1.1), it is subjective and in the context
of this thesis it is modelled using subjective probabilities. Thus, the term
“a measure” in the definition of trustworthiness refers to an estimate of the
degree of trust which aligned with the concept of trustworthiness mentioned
in [CHD05].
In order to assess the trustworthiness of a service provider according to
consumers’ requirements we model the consumers’ notion of dependability
in the context of distributed service environments by means of propositional
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statement. For brevity, we refer the propositional statement as proposition.
According to the stated relation between dependability and trustworthiness,
we model dependability by means of expected behaviour of offered services
or systems regarding different attributes. From a consumer perspective, the
expectation of a consumer can be stated in the form of different attributes
that a service and a service provider should have. On an abstract level,
those attributes can come, for instance, from the fields of security, privacy,
performance, customer support, and compliance. The following examples of
propositions demonstrate how a consumer’s expectation about the behaviour
of a service, system and service provider regarding different attributes can
be modelled.
• “Alice expects video rendering Service A to respond within 100ms.”
(Performance)
• “Alice expects that storage Service provider B has the capability to
provide data protection.” (Security)
• “Bob expects Cloud A to provide 99.99% uptime in a yearly average
for their storage service.” (Availability)
• “Bob expects Cloud B to provide competent customer support for their
platform service”. (Customer support)
• “Charlie expects Cloud X’s medical record management service comply
with HIPAA” (Compliance)
Assessing trustworthiness in the presence of composite services and sys-
tems becomes non-trivial when each of those propositions need to be fulfilled
by the constituent components and services. For example, Service A might
be composed of several other services and subsystems. In this case, trust-
worthiness of Service A regarding performance attribute depends on the
trustworthiness of constituent services and subsystems regarding the perfor-
mance attribute. Moreover, each of the attributes may have been composed
of sub-attributes, e.g., Compliance attribute may depend on a number of
sub-attributes– HIPAA, ISO 270001− 2005, SAS 70 II. In this case, Charlie
might expect that Cloud X’s service complies with all three standards, i.e.,
sub-attributes.
From the discussion above, a question arise here is which attributes are
important to consider in the trustworthiness assessment of service providers.
Hence, the next section focuses on service-specific attributes that contribute
into trustworthiness assessment of cloud providers.
4.2.2 Trust Attributes
According to the scenario in Section 4.1, there can be several service providers
offering cloud-based healthcare services with similar functionalities. As stated
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above, the consumers are interested to select cloud providers not only based
on the functional characteristics (i.e., service types or methods) of the services
but also based on non-functional characteristics. This refers to how well a
service behaves and what sort of capabilities the providers possess regarding
non-functional attributes. In cloud computing environments, according
to Habib et al. [HRM10, HHRM12] those attributes go beyond the non-
functional QoS parameters [WV07a], which are considered important for
selecting trustworthy web service providers.
There are only two approaches [HRM10, UKJS10] known from the exist-
ing literature that attempt a systematic, well-founded, and comprehensive
listing and identification of service-specific attributes. These attributes po-
tentially contribute to the trustworthiness of a service, particularly services
in cloud computing. One is described in [HRM10] and denoted as QoS+. It
is based on a survey of existing literature in the field of cloud computing secu-
rity, privacy and trust. The other one is described in [UKJS10] and denoted
as trust affectors. These affectors are identified based on semi-structured
interviews conducted over 33 persons representing cloud providers, cloud
consumers, regulation authorities, and researchers from security, privacy,
trust, and user experience (UX) field.
In the present thesis, the QoS+ serves as a list of attributes that influence
trust establishment on cloud providers from a consumer’s perspective. The
trust affectors identified in [UKJS10] only demonstrates the need of such
attributes that influence consumers to establish trust towards the service
providers. Thus, we focus on identifying the sources of information and the
methods for deriving information regarding the QoS+ attributes. Nevertheless,
the motivating discussion of trust affectors in [UKJS10] demonstrates the need
for those attributes in the trust establishment process. The information about
the attributes are often available from multiple entities, e.g., Cloud Providers
(CPs), Cloud Consumers (CCs), Cloud Accreditators (CAs), Cloud Brokers
(CBs), Cloud Carriers (CCas). They provide the information regarding the
service-specific attributes using different methods. In Table 4.1, the QoS+
parameters are listed along with their sources of information and the methods
that can be used for extracting trust information.
1. SLAs: As discussed in Section 3.3, SLA is a common practice that
service providers consider in order to build a contractual relationship
with a potential consumer. In the context of SLA, a CC trust a CP
to provide compensation in the case of violation of specific clauses
in the agreement. The SLA violations are usually detected using
SLA monitoring followed by validation mechanisms. These mechanisms
assume that a SLA is machine-readable, however, it is not yet a standard
practice in the cloud marketplaces. Moreover, the SLAs in the cloud
marketplaces are lacking a standardised format which is important to
distinguish CPs only based on the clauses and compensation amount
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Table 4.1: QoS+ Parameters: Information sources and approaches
QoS+ Parameters Who provide the
information?
How to derive the information?
SLA CPs, CBs, CCs,
CCas
SLA validation and monitoring mechanisms
Compliance CAs, CSA Audit Standards, CCM
Portability
CPs SLAsInteroperability
Geographical
Location
Customer Support CCs, CPs, CBs,
CCas
SLAs, User Feedback
Performance CBs, Independent
Third-party, CCs,
CPs
Measurement, User Feedback
Security CSA, CPs, CAs CSA CAIQ, Property Attestation mechanism,
Audits
User Feedback CCs Measuring and Ratings (User Feedback)
Service
Deployment
Models
CCs, CBs, CRs Context Dependency and Similarity techniques
Service Delivery
Models
formulated in the SLAs.
2. Compliance: CPs consider audit standards as an assurance for the
existence of technical (e.g., security) and organizational policies re-
lated to the services they offer. CAs analyse and examine the systems,
software applications, security policies, hardware components, and
organisational policies on-site or remotely using automated techniques.
Upon satisfaction of the necessary requirements and guidelines, CAs
issue valid certificates. Additionally, the information regarding the
compliance with different audit standards can be published via the
CSA STAR. Therefore, information regarding the audit compliance can
be obtained from the CPs as well as from the CSA.
3. Portability, Interoperability, and Geographical Location: In
cloud computing environments, these three attributes are desirable by
the consumers in order to ensure portability of their outsourced data
once contract ends with the provider, interoperability of a composed
service across multiple platforms hosted by multiple providers, and
preferred geo-location of hosted service, e.g., data storage. The infor-
mation regarding these attributes are usually obtainable from the CPs.
The existence of terms and clauses related to portability and interoper-
ability are usually mentioned in the SLAs. The geographical location
of the required service can be selected from cloud service management
platform (if supported) while deploying a service. In certain cases,
information regarding the location of the datacenters are mentioned in
the SLAs.
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4. Customer Support: A dedicated and on-time customer support is
unavoidable and desirable when outsourcing mission critical applica-
tions in the cloud. CPs usually provide assurances in the form of
terms and clauses regarding “customer support” in the SLAs. CBs and
CCas are also required to include similar terms in their SLAs for their
respective consumers, e.g., CPs or CBs or CC s.
5. Performance: In cloud computing environments, the information
about the performance attributes (e.g., availability, latency, bandwidth,
elasticity) is obtained using service monitoring technologies [CA ].
Usually, CPs and CBs provide applications for monitoring those pa-
rameters, which take place only after service provisioning contract.
CC s may hire third-party brokers (if required) to monitor those at-
tributes before service provisioning takes place, e.g., in service trial
period. However, real time data regarding availability and latency
attributes of cloud services are publicly available through API status1
website. The monitored or observed data regarding the performance
attributes can be compared with the committed data specified in the
SLAs by means of SLA validation mechanisms [LGO10]. Based on
the validation results followed by relative comparison of those results
among different providers may support CCs to select trustworthy CPs
regarding performance attributes.
6. Security: CC s are interested to know about the existence of certain
security and privacy attributes before outsourcing their computing
resources to the cloud. CPs are able to publish these attributes and their
detail information in the CSA STAR. In cloud computing marketplaces,
this is the only way to learn about the capabilities of CPs regarding
their service-specific security and privacy attributes before signing a
contract with the respective providers. Moreover, CPs are increasingly
hosting services in trusted platforms containing the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) introduced in the early 2000s by Trusted Computing
Group (TCG) [TCG10]. In distributed service environments, e.g, cloud
computing, consumers can learn about the security or non-security
related behaviour of the software and hardware components running
on those platforms using property attestation mechanism [NV11].
7. User Feedback: Feedback through recommendation, reviews, and
experience from the consumers are valuable for service selection in
e-marketplaces. User feedback may appear in quantitative (e.g., satis-
faction score) and/or in qualitative (e.g., reviews) forms. Consumers’
experience can be used to complement each of the above mentioned
attributes to allow user control in evaluating the trustworthiness of
service providers.
1http://api-status.com/
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8. Service Deployment and Delivery Models: Trust models and
mechanisms are usually context-specific. In cloud computing envi-
ronments, the service delivery models such as SaaS, PaaS, IaaS can
be considered as contextual parameters. Trusworthiness of a service
provider might vary from one context to the another. Therefore, it
makes sense to design context-aware trust systems in cloud computing
environments. In order to develop such systems, context dependency
and similarity techniques proposed by Jeh et al. [JW02] and Tavakoli-
fard et al. [TKH08] should be taken into consideration.
4.3 Formal Framework
An overview of the formal framework is presented in Fig. 4.2. The framework
follows two steps of formalization in order to assess composite services and
systems regarding specific attributes. The first step is to analyse system and
service descriptions considering given attributes and formally represent the
whole system and service in trustworthiness terms. The second step is to
convert the trustworthiness terms into a simple form called Propositional Logic
Terms (PLTs). As an optional step, the PLTs can be converted to equivalent
normal forms, i.e., Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) and Disjunctive Normal
Form (DNF).
System/Service 
Descriptions 
Trustworthiness Terms 
PLTs 
PLTs in Normal Forms (DNF/CNF)  
Analysis 
Formal derivation 
Formal derivation 
CertainLogic  
(Chapter 5) 
Evaluation of PLTs 
                        Propositional  Logic Terms (PLTs) 
  
 
 
 
 
System/Service  
Attributes 
Service Providers 
Publish 
Figure 4.2: Formal Framework
In the next section, we discuss the basis of the formal framework and
demonstrate how to represent a composite service/system using the formal
apparatus of the framework.
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4.3.1 Service/System Descriptions to PLTs
The basic idea of the framework rests on [Vv97, HKS00], which uses secret
shares (cf. [BK05] for more details) and the concept that k out of n entities
are needed for reconstructing the secret key and correspondingly decrypting
a cipher text. We adapt this concept in the context of trust and propose a
framework for modelling the composite services in distributed environments,
where “k out of N constituent services/systems need to show trustworthy
behaviour”, in order not to compromise the trustworthiness of the composite
service. In the case of Shamir’s secret sharing mechanism [Sha79], the
property k out of n means that we need to trust k out of N regarding
availability and n − k + 1 out of N regarding secrecy; where N is the set
of share holders and n is the number of share holders. Thus, the choice of
the actual value of k is dependent on the security attribute (or ‘requirement’
of a consumer) under consideration. In contrast to the existing work in
the aforementioned papers, which consider entities as homogeneous, our
approach regard entities (i.e., services) as heterogeneous with respect to
different requirements or attributes, e.g., security, compliance, availability
by explicitly considering the itemized set of N . We use this model to
formally represent the trustworthiness of a composite service regarding
different attributes. Different attributes can lead to different representations.
For example, in a system that implements a mixnet [Cha81], which routes
messages sequentially through a set N of n anonymous nodes, each of the
nodes must be trustworthy regarding availability attribute (n out of N),
while only one node needs to be trustworthy regarding anonymity (1 out of
N).
4.3.1.1 Transforming Composite Services/Systems into Trustwor-
thiness Terms
Before presenting the formal definitions, the terminologies that are going to
be used in this section need a brief discussion. First of all, the terms ‘system’
and ‘service’ are used to denote a composite service. Secondly, if a service
has constituent services, which cannot be split further, these services are
denoted as ‘components’ and the service is denoted as “atomic service”. If a
service has constituent services, which are further composed of constituent
services, then the latter ones are denoted as “(sub)systems” and the service
is denoted as “non-atomic service”.
The definition of trustworthiness terms in terms of syntax and semantics
follows the inductive definition of services and is provided by Definitions 1-
4. For brevity, we introduce the abbreviation “wrts. r" (with regard to
security requirement or attribute r). The informal notion “out of” used in
the above discussion are formally used as ‘out-of’ in the following defini-
tions. The motivation behind using ‘out-of’ term is to formally consider the
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composite structure of services and reflect the service composition in the
formal representation of trustworthiness regarding above mentioned security
primitives.
Let S be an atomic service with the set of components A = {A1, . . . , An}.
Definition 1 A service S can be described by the trustworthiness term
(k ‘out-of’ |N |), k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, N ⊆ A, wrts. r
:⇔

At least k components ‘out-of’
N need to show trustworthy be-
haviour wrts. r so that S meets
requirement r.

In order to get more flexible representations of requirements on atomic
services, we define it in the following trustworthiness terms:
Definition 2 A service S can be described by the trustworthiness term (a)
((k1?. . .?km) ‘out-of’ (N1, . . . , Nm)), (b) ((k1>. . .>km) ‘out-of’ (N1, . . . , Nm)),
ki ∈ {1, . . . , |Ni|}, Ni ⊆ A ∀i, wrts. r
:⇔

For a) each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, b)
any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, at least ki
components ‘out-of’ Ni need
to show trustworthy behaviour
wrts. r so that S meets require-
ment r.

With regard to non-atomic services, we define trustworthiness terms
similarly:
Let {Si}ni=1 be (sub)systems of a service S, and let system Si be described
by the trustworthiness term (k ‘out-of’ li) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 3 A service S can be described by the trustworthiness term
(k ‘out-of’ {li1 , . . . , lim}), k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, wrts. r
:⇔

At least k systems ‘out-of’
{Si1 , . . . , Sim} need to show
trustworthy behaviour wrts. r
so that S meets requirement r.

Definition 4 A service S can be described by the trustworthiness term a)
((k1?. . .?km) ‘out-of’ (Q1, . . . , Qm)), b) ((k1>. . .>km) ‘out-of’ (Q1, . . . , Qm)),
ki ∈ {1, . . . , |Qi|}, Qi ⊆ {l1, . . . , ln} ∀i, wrts. r
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Figure 4.3: A MRM service: inductive determination of PLTs
:⇔

For a) each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
b) any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, at
least ki systems ‘out-of’ the
set of systems for which Qi
contains trustworthiness terms
need show trustworthy be-
haviour wrts. r so that S meets
requirement r.

We now apply the inductive steps on the following two scenarios to
determine the trustworthiness terms from given system/service descriptions.
Example 1 Let us take an example from the field of cloud computing, and
demonstrate how to analyse a composite cloud service considering its internal
architecture and transform that service into trustworthiness terms. The
objective is to assess trustworthiness of a simple Medical Record Management
(MRM) service wrts. availability of the service.
In the example (cf. Fig. 4.3), the MRM service S directly relies on two
subsystems and an atomic component: S1 provides authentication capabili-
ties, S2 offers storage capacity for medical records, and an atomic component
C is responsible for service-related billing. Subsystem S1 consist of two
authentication servers (A1 and A2), where at least one of the servers/systems
has to be available for the service to be functional. Similarly, subsystem
S2 is composed of three redundant database servers and only one needs
to be available. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the procedure of transforming a
composite service into PLTs.
Applying definitions 1 and 3, the following trustworthiness terms are
obtained with respect to the availability attribute:
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• A: (1 ‘out-of’ {A1, A2})︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
=:l1
(def. 1)
• B: (1 ‘out-of’ {B1, B2, B3})︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
=:l2
(def. 1)
• C: (1 ‘out-of’ {C})︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
=:l3
(def. 1)
• S: (3 ‘out-of’ ({l1, l2 l3})) (def. 3)
Example 2 Figure 4.4 demonstrates a composite web service scenario, in
which a retailer (i.e., consumer) uses three web services in order to identify
end customers’ behavior at the end. Service A offers data mining capabilities
and stores sales data, including customer IDs. Service B is offered by a
financial service provider, who provides credit ratings of customers. Service
C provides storage capacities and stores master data on customers, including
their customer IDs and identities. In this example, the retailer considers
secrecy with regard to information, i.e., which customer has bought what
under which financial conditions should not be revealed. Secrecy attribute is
fulfilled if one of the providers A and B is trustworthy, or if one of B and
C is trustworthy. With regard to subsystem A, we assume that this system
accounts for secrecy by storing data on two components (A3 and A4) and
implements a secret sharing mechanism [BK05]. Components A1 and A2
are responsible for distributed computation in terms of data mining; both
components receive data from A3 and A4. With regard to financial service B,
customer IDs generated by B (they differ from customer IDs stored at A) are
stored on B1 and B2 together with financial data by implementing a secret
share mechanism. Components B3 and B4 store names of customers and
customer IDs (generated by B) respectively. Analogous to A and B, storage
service C implements a secret share mechanism when storing customer data.
In Figure 4.4, l refers to the composite service/system and li with i ∈
{1, 2, 3} represents its constituent subsystems. Applying definitions 1, 2a, 2b,
and 4b to the given scenario, we yield the following trustworthiness terms
with respect to the secrecy attribute or requirement:
• A: ((2? 1) ‘out-of’ ({A1, A2}, {A3, A4}))︸                                                  ︷︷                                                  ︸
=:l1
(def. 2a)
• B: ((1> 2) ‘out-of’ ({B1, B2}, {B3, B4}))︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸
=:l2
(def. 2b)
• C: (1 ‘out-of’ {C1, C2})︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
=:l3
(def. 1)
• S: ((1> 1) ‘out-of’ ({l1, l2}, {l2, l3})) (def. 4b)
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A1 A2 A3 
System A 
System S 
N11= {A1,A2} 
N12= {A3,A4} 
A4 B1 B2 B3 
System B 
N21= {B1,B2} 
N22= {B3,B4} 
B4 C1 C2 
(1 out of N3)=:l3 
System C N3= {C1,C2} 
((2   ∧  1) out of (N11,N12))=:l1 ((1  ∨  2) out of (N21,N22))=:l2 
((1  ∨  1) out of ({l1,l2}, {l2,l3}):=l 
Figure 4.4: A web service: inductive determination of PLTs
4.3.1.2 Mapping Trustworthiness Terms to Propostional Logic
Terms (PLTs)
The examples show that representation of a composite service by means of
trustworthiness terms can become complex even for simple services. In order
to represent trustworthiness terms in a simplest possible format for allowing
easy interpretation and evaluation, trustworthiness terms are transformed
into PLT s. The PLT s are further transformed into semantically equivalent
normal forms (i.e., CNF and DNF). These normal forms represent individual
strengths of a composite service: i) CNF allows determining “weak configu-
rations” such as single points of failure, ii) DNF allows determining “strong
configurations” such as redundancy of the subsystems or components which
leads to trustworthiness of the overall service, regardless of the trustworthi-
ness of other components and subsystems. Thus, both normal forms are
considered complimentary when representing trustworthiness of composite
services and systems in formal terms.
Theorem 4.3.1 Let service S consist of basic components A = {A1, . . . An},
and let {XA1 , . . . , XAn} be literals with ∀i:XAi = true , if Ai is trustworthy
wrts. r. Then, the trustworthiness term l of S can be mapped on a proposi-
tional logic formula f(l) such that S is trustworthy wrts. r if and only if f(l)
is true.
The proof regarding Theorem 4.3.1 is provided in Appendix A.1.
The examples presented in Fig. 4.3 and Figure 4.4 are used as running
examples to illustrate how to determine PLTs from corresponding trustwor-
thiness terms, namely l1, l2, l3, and l.
Example 3 The following example is the continuation of Example 1.
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• l1 = (1 ‘out-of’ ({A1, A2}))
⇒ f(l1) (A.1)= (A1) ∨ (A2)
=A1 ∨A2 =: fA
• l2 = 1 ‘out-of’ ({B1, B2, B3})
⇒ f(l2) (A.1)= (B1) ∨ (B2) ∨ (B3)
=B1 ∨B2 ∨B3 =: fB
• l3 = (1 ‘out-of’ {C})
⇒ f(l3) (A.1)= C =: fC
• l = 3 ‘out-of’ ({l1, l2, l3})
⇒ f(l) (A.4)= f((3 ‘out-of’ {l1, l2, l3}))
=(f(l1)) ∧ (f(l2)) ∧ (f(l3))
=(fA) ∨ (fB) ∨ (fC)
=(A1 ∨A2) ∧ (B1 ∨B2 ∨B3) ∧ C
(4.1)

Finally, we convert the resulting propositional logic term given in E4.1)
into CNF. ∨
X ∈ {A1, A2}
Y ∈ {B1, B2, B3}
(X ∧ Y ∧ C) (4.2)
The DNF formula given in Equation 4.1 shows that service S is trustwor-
thy with respect to availability attribute if all the subsystems are trustworthy
wrts. availability.
Example 4 The following example is the continuation of Example 2.
• l1 = ((2? 1) ‘out-of’ ({A1, A2}, {A3, A4}))
⇒ f(l1) (A.2)= (f((2 ‘out-of’ {A1, A2})))∧
(f((1 ‘out-of’ {A3, A4})))
(A.1)= ((A1 ∧A2)) ∧ ((A3) ∨ (A4)) = A1∧
A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4) =: fA
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• l2 = ((1> 2) ‘out-of’ ({B1, B2}, {B3, B4}))
⇒ f(l2) (A.3)= (f((1 ‘out-of’ {B1, B2})))∨
(f((2 ‘out-of’ {B3, B4})))
(A.1)= ((B1 ∨B2)) ∨ ((B3) ∧B4))
= B1 ∨B2 ∨ (B3 ∧B4) =: fB
• l3 = (1 ‘out-of’ {C1, C2})
⇒ f(l3) (A.1)= (C1) ∨ (C2) = C1 ∨ C2 =: fC
• l = ((1> 1) ‘out-of’ ({l1, l2}, {l2, l3}))
⇒ f(l) (A.6)= (f((1 ‘out-of’ {l1, l2})))∨
(f((2 ‘out-of’ {l2, l3})))
(A.4)= (((f(l1))) ∨ ((f(l2)))) ∨ (((f(l2)))∨
((f(l3))))
= (f(l1)) ∨ (f(l2)) ∨ (f(l3))
= (fA) ∨ (fB) ∨ (fC)
= (A1 ∧A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4))∨
(B1 ∨B2 ∨ (B3 ∧B4)) ∨ (C1 ∨ C2)
(4.3)

Finally, we convert the resulting propositional logic term given in (4.3)
into CNF.
∧
X ∈ {A1, A2, A3}
Y ∈ {A1, A2, A4}
Z ∈ {B3, B4}
(X ∨ Y ∨B1 ∨B2 ∨ Z ∨ C1 ∨ C2) (4.4)
(4.2) can be easily derived when we first transform (4.3) into DNF, given
by
(A1 ∧A2 ∧A3) ∨ (A1 ∧A2 ∧A4) ∨B1 ∨B2 ∨ (B3 ∧B4) ∨ C1 ∨ C2
The CNF formula given in (4.4) reveals that system S is trustworthy with
respect to secrecy attribute if at least one of the components B1, B2, C1, C2
is trustworthy wrts. r, which is a sufficient, but not necessary condition.
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4.3.2 System/Service Attributes to PLTs
In a distributed service environment, service provider might not be interested
in publishing service descriptions regarding different attributes. As an
alternative, capabilities regarding service-specific attributes can be published
using a self-assessment framework such as the CSA CAIQ (cf. Section 4.4.2
for more details). These attributes are composed of several other attributes.
Thus, the proposed formal framework can also be applied to represent
composite attributes in terms of PLT s.
For representing the composite attributes into PLTs, we simply replace
the term service(s) with attribute(s) in the Definition 1, 2, 3 and 4. In
the context of service-specific attributes, security requirement (i.e., r) term
used in the previous definitions are replaced by consumer’s requirement(s)
(R) where consumers might prefer to personalise a set of requirements.
Additionally, configuration of the PLT s depend on the consumers’ preferred
set of requirements from the published set of service-specific attributes
whereas in the context of composite services it depends on the type of
attributes, e.g., secrecy, availability. Note that “atomic attribute” and “non-
atomic attribute” share the same notion of “atomic service” and “non-atomic
service” respectively.
4.3.2.1 Transforming System/Service Attributes into Trustwor-
thiness Terms
The definition of trustworthiness terms in the context of published service-
specific attributes, follow similar syntax and semantics of the definitions
presented in Section 4.3.1.1. The formal inclusion of the ‘out-of’ term in the
following definitions share the same motivation as given in the context of
service composition. Here, the service attributes are considered as composite,
i.e., a service attribute may consist of sub-attributes. Regarding service-
specific composite attributes, the definitions are as follows.
Let S be a service with atomic attributes, P = {Pi}ni=1. Assume that user
requirements, R = {R1, . . . , Rn} are subset of published attributes, R ⊆ P .
In the case of single requirement, r ⊆ P . Every attribute Pi assumed to have
sub-attributes, |N |.
Definition 5 An atomic property Pi of a service S can be described by the
trustworthiness term (k ‘out-of’ N), k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, N ⊆ Pi, wrts. r
:⇔

At least k sub-attributes ‘out-
of’ N need to be satisfied so
that S meets requirement r.

In order to describe atomic attributes of a service that satisfies more
than one requirement, we define the following trustworthiness terms:
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Definition 6 Different atomic attributes P of a service S can be described
by the trustworthiness term, ((k1 ? . . . ? km) ‘out-of’ (N1, . . . , Nm)); ∀i
ki ∈ {1, . . . , |Ni|}, Ni ⊆ P , wrts. R
:⇔

For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} at
least ki sub-attributes ‘out-of’
Ni need to be satisfied so that
S meets requirements R.

In order to represent non-atomic attributes of a service by means of
trustworthiness terms we define the following two definitions. Let {Pi}ni=1 be
sub-attributes of a system S, and let property Pi of the system be described
by the following trustworthiness term li, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Assuming that user
requirements, R = {R1, . . . , Rn} are subset of published properties, R ⊆ Pi.
In the case of single requirement, r ⊆ Pi.
Definition 7 A non-atomic attribute Pi of a service S can be described
by the trustworthiness term (k ‘out-of’ {li1 , . . . , lim}), k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
{i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, wrts. r
:⇔

At least k attributes ‘out-of’
{Pi1 , . . . , Pim} need to be sat-
isfied so that S meets require-
ment r.

Definition 8 Different non-atomic attributes P of a system S can be de-
scribed by the trustworthiness term, ((k1?. . .?km) ‘out-of’ (Q1, . . . , Qm));∀i
ki ∈ {1, . . . , |Qi|}, Qi ⊆ {l1, . . . , ln} , wrts. R
:⇔

For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} at
least ki attributes ‘out-of’ the
set of attributes for which Qi
contains trustworthiness terms
need to be satisfied so that S
meets requirements R.

We demonstrate the analysis and determination of trustworthiness terms
with example 5. Figure 4.5 demonstrates the inductive determination of
trustworthiness terms from the given service-specific attributes.
Example 5 Assume that a cloud provider has a set of attributes: security,
compliance, data governance and the attributes are published according
to the guidelines of CSA CAIQ in a public repository. A user wants to
assess the trustworthiness of a cloud provider wrt. following requirements,
security and compliance. We assume that a static mapping between the
user requirements and published capabilities of cloud providers are already
available. For instance, in order to satisfy the user’s security requirement
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cloud provider has to posses capabilities regarding three attributes: “Facility
Security” (FS), Human resources Security (HS), and Information Security
(IS). The above definitions are used to convert the service-specific attributes
into trustworthiness terms. Applying definitions 5 and 7, the following
trustworthiness terms are obtained according to given requirements of the
user, i.e., security and compliance.
Security 
Attributes P 
N1= {FS,HS,IS} 
 
FS HS IS 
Compliance 
 
 
N2= {CO,LG} 
 
(3 out of N1)=:l1 (2 out of N2)=:l2 
(2 out of {l1,l2}):=l 
CO LG 
{Security,Compliance} 
Figure 4.5: Composite attributes: inductive determination of PLTs
• Security: (3 ‘out-of’ {FS,HS, IS})︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
=:l1
(def. 5)
• Compliance: (2 ‘out-of’ {CO,LG})︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
=:l2
(def. 5)
• {Security, Compliance}: (2 ‘out-of’ ({l1, l2})) (def. 7)
4.3.2.2 Mapping Trustworthiness Terms to PLTs
Similar to Section 4.3.1.2, the trustworthiness terms derived from system/ser-
vice attributes are mapped to PLTs to allow easy interpretation and evalua-
tion of trustworthiness. The notion of CNF and DNF are not considered
complimentary in the context of system/service attributes. A similar theorem
is formulated to derive PLTs from trustworthiness terms in the context of
system/service attributes. In the following theorem, the main focus is on
the system or service attributes instead of system/service components or
subsystems.
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Theorem 4.3.2 Let attributes P of system S consist of sub-attributes P =
{P1, . . . Pn} and let {XP1 , . . . , XPn} be literals with ∀i: XPi = true, if R ⊆ P
and r ⊆ Pi. Then, the trustworthiness term l can be mapped to a propositional
logic formula f(l) such that S is trustworthy wrts. r or R if and only if f(l)
is satisfied.
The proof regarding Theorem 4.3.2 is provided in Appendix A.2.
We use the example shown in Figure 4.5 to illustrate how to determine
the propositional logic formula of particular trustworthiness terms, namely
l1, l2, l3, and l.
Example 6 • l1 = (3 ‘out-of’ ({FS,HS, IS}))
⇒ f(l1) (A.7)= (FS) ∧ (HS) ∧ (IS)
=FS ∧HS ∧ IS =: fsecurity
• l2 = 1 ‘out-of’ ({B1, B2, B3})
⇒ f(l2) (A.7)= (LG) ∧ (CO)
=LG ∧ CO =: fcompliance
• l = 2 ‘out-of’ ({l1, l2})
⇒ f(l) (A.9)= (f(l1)) ∧ (f(l2))
=(fsecurity) ∧ (fcompliance)
=(FS ∧HS ∧ IS) ∧ (LG ∧ CO)
(4.5)

4.3.3 Evaluation of PLTs
The proposed framework provide means to model the trustworthiness of
composite distributed services regarding different attributes. Particularly,
the framework analyses the dependencies between the components and
subsystems as well as their redundancy in respect of service-specific attributes
under consideration. The PLTs allow to represent the specification of a
composite service and system in a simplified formal term. However, it does
not serve the purpose to quantitatively evaluate the trustworthiness of service
providers. The quantitative evaluation is important to compare services and
systems, offered by service providers, of similar non-functional attributes.
In order to evaluate the trustworthiness of composite distributed services,
there is a need for associating values with the PLTs. This means that each
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component and subsystem of a service should be associated with a value that
represents the satisfaction of a security attribute or service-specific attribute
of a component or a subsystem. The values should be aggregated according
to the derived specification (i.e., PLTs) of the composite services/systems.
According to existing approaches (cf. Chapter 2), such a value can appear
in the form of opinion, which is based on available pieces of evidence. These
are usually derived using tentative measurements such as past experience,
past interactions, self-assessment, expert assessment or remote assessment of
services in trusted platforms. Derived pieces of evidence can be incomplete,
unreliable or indeterminable due to the type of measuring methods. Thus,
opinions derived from this evidence is subject to uncertainty. Moreover, the
opinions derived from different sources might be conflicting either due to the
method they use, for assessing evidence, or simply because the sources are
unreliable. The evaluation mechanisms should consider these issues in order
to provide a representative trustworthiness value. The mechanism should
also be able to aggregate opinions in composition as represented in PLTs.
The propositions in the PLTs are combined with logical operators (i.e.,
AND (∧) and OR (∨)) and those operators should be able to combine
opinions, which are subject to uncertain and conflicting pieces of evidence.
In this vein, we propose novel definitions of the logical operators as well as
non-standard (i.e, FUSION) operators in the next chapter. These definitions
are particularly designed to deal with uncertain and conflicting opinions
associated with propositions.
4.4 Domains of Application
This section illustrates a selected set of domains, where trust establishment
mechanisms are applicable. In particular, the following domains demonstrate
the need for assessing and evaluating the trustworthiness of service providers
based on composite services they offer.
4.4.1 Cloud Marketplaces
Cloud marketplaces [LJ10] are emerging as a part of distributed service
environments to facilitate seamless trading of IT commodities among cloud
stakeholders. Cloud providers (sellers) and consumers (buyers) are the two
main participating entities in a cloud marketplace. As the business market is
growing rapidly in cloud marketplaces with new providers entering the market,
the providers are expected to compete for customers by providing services
with similar non-functional attributes, e.g., security, SLAs, performance,
customer support. However, there can be notable differences among the
service providers regarding the provided quality level as well as capabilities
regarding the attributes. It is difficult to assess these notable differences when
there are few solutions at hand, nor ones that are able to do so. Thus, cloud
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consumers require a solution that can reliably assess the cloud providers
in terms of their capabilities as well as support consumers to determine
dependable and trustworthy cloud providers.
Looking at a cloud computing marketplace from a microscopic point of
view, where consumers would like to provision a cloud based service from
the most dependable and trustworthy cloud provider; the scope is limited
to a single cloud provider in order to focus on the complexity of provider’s
internal service architecture. A company named MedicalVault (MV) offers
medical record management service to millions of customers, e.g., hospitals,
insurance companies, and patients. Obviously, medical records are sensitive
information and should remain private and confidential.
MV hosts a small data center where they keep control over their propri-
etary APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) that contain data process-
ing and mining algorithms and patented search technologies. For the rest
of the services, it uses a public cloud environment provided by Cloud A, a
Cloud provider located in Hamburg, Germany. Thus, we are dealing with a
hybrid cloud.
As shown in Figure 4.6, Cloud A is internally using Cloud B, a public
Cloud provider located in Bengaluru, India, for the following purposes (this
information is not publicly available as Cloud A considers this to be a business
advantage):
• medical image processing – using MV’s ProImage software hosted on a
remote server.
• advanced image processing tools (format conversion, filtering) – that
ProImage does not support but Cloud A support by using software
tools, TurboConv, TurboFilter from Cloud B and
• video archiving – using remote storage infrastructure
Cloud A site in Hamburg is responsible for hosting the ProImage software
in their application server. After processing the images, those are stored in
a temporary storage, marked (1) in figure 4.6.
Cloud A outsources advanced image processing tasks to Cloud B, a SaaS
provider located in Bengaluru, India, in order to oﬄoad their infrastructure.
On Cloud B’s site, the advanced image rendering takes place using the
TurboConv and TurboFilter services. Processed images are temporarily
stored in Cloud B’s (temporary) storage (2). Later, images are permanently
archived in storage (3), (4), and (5) of Cloud A’s storage infrastructure,
located in Hongkong, China.
In this case (cf. Figure 4.6), MV comprises three types of service deliv-
ery models: platform-as-a-service (PaaS), software-as-a-service (SaaS), and
infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS). MV leverages virtual platforms (i.e., PaaS)
at the Hamburg site of Cloud A to deploy the ProImage software. In the
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Figure 4.6: Cloud computing use case: microscopic view
SaaS case, MV uses the Cloud B’s TurboConv and TurboFilter services. In
the IaaS case, MV use the computing and storage infrastructure by accessing
virtual servers and storages provisioned in the physical infrastructure of
Cloud A.
Figure 4.6 illustrates how a composed service (e.g., medical record man-
agement) is processed and stored using several software and hardware compo-
nents located in different geographical locations (e.g., Hamburg, Bengaluru,
and Hongkong) around the globe. This distributed information sharing and
processing of data builds upon non-transparent service compositions that
are handled by several service providers (e.g., MV, Cloud A, and Cloud B).
Consequently, the presented scenario leads to the question how much and in
which contexts the end consumers can trust this kind of aggregated service,
or whether they should refrain from using it.
The proposed formal framework can be applied to assess the composite
architecture of the service, i.e., medical record management, and represent
the service architecture in the form of PLTs. The formation of the PLTs
depends on the service-specific attributes under consideration as discussed
in Section 4.3. PLTs, representing a composite service, are associated with
opinions, which represents the behaviour of the service and their underlying
components regarding service-specific attributes. These opinions are often
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available from different sources (cf. Figure 4.6) and are extracted using
different methods. For evaluating (cf. Section 6.3 and Section 6.4) the
trustworthiness of cloud providers, the opinions about their offered services
regarding different attributes need to be aggregated and represented in a
way so that the consumers can decide to provision a service from the most
trustworthy provider out of similar ones.
4.4.2 Security Control Self-Assessment Framework
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Figure 4.7: Current status of STAR
Cloud providers’ capabilities regarding security attributes are important
indicators of trustworthiness in competitive marketplaces. In order to en-
courage cloud providers, the CSA provides a self-assessment questionnaire,
i.e., CAIQ, directed for cloud providers to publish capabilities regarding
their service-specific attributes for potential consumers. In the last quarter
of 2011, the CSA unveil the Security, Trust, and Assurance Registry (STAR)
for publishing CAIQ profiles or reports regarding each of the services the
cloud providers offer. The main reason behind this initiative is to support
consumers to assess the security capabilities of providers before consumers
consider contracting with them. The STAR and CAIQ frameworks as they
stand (cf. Figure 4.7) does not offer consumers an automated solution to
assess the capabilities regarding security attributes nor does they provide any
means for consumers to specify their personal requirements when assessing
the capabilities. Due to these shortcomings, consumers have to manually
analyse the existence of security capabilities as well as manually check the
compliance of those capabilties with their specific requirements. The manual
process is undoubtedly a cumbersome task given that the CAIQ comprises
of 11 domains which is further classified into 98 controls complemented with
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197 questions and one has to manually assess the existence of capabilities
regarding the domains (i.e., security attributes) by analysing the assertions
given in response to the 197 questions.
CSA CAIQ 
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Figure 4.8: CSA CAIQ: Overview of basic structure
Each of the security attributes, as given in the CAIQ, maintain an
hierarchical structure (cf. Figure 4.8). The top node is the domain (i.e,
security attribute) followed by controls and control questions. For example,
Compliance (CO) domain is consist of eight controls and each of the controls
have one or more questions. Our proposed formal framework is applicable
to model such compositions which are extensively discussed in Section 4.3
with intuitive examples. Modelling and representing controls and domains in
terms of PLTs are the basis for automated assessment of completed CAIQs.
For quantitative assessment of CAIQs, all controls and domains should be
associated with numerical values (termed as “opinions”). These values can be
extracted from the given assertions in reply to control questions by the service
providers. The questions are designed in a way so that the providers are able
to answer them in “yes/no” manner. In special cases, cloud providers also
provide answers using other means, e.g., detailed comments, “Not Applicable”
or skip a specific question. All these different types of assertions are the
pieces of evidence, which refer to the existence of corresponding attributes or
domains of a service offered by a cloud provider. In this case, evidence-based
trust assessment mechanisms (cf. Section 2.2.2) is a good choice for extracting
representative values, which in the end can contribute into trustworthiness
evalution of cloud providers.
In evidence-based trust mechanisms, quality of interactions between a
trustor and a trustee are usually measured based on the collected pieces of
evidence. In cloud computing marketplaces, consumers have to make sure
that they interact with the cloud providers who transparently publish their
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security capabilities. Using the CSA CAIQ framework, cloud providers asserts
the existence of security capabilities of the services they offer. The assertions
are the pieces of evidence, which cloud providers provide based on their
self-assessment. Unlike interaction based evidence units, the self-assessment
based evidence units are not potentially infinite and cannot be classified as
positive or negative evidence only. In order to deal with these special cases,
evidence-based trust mechanism, i.e., CertainTrust representational model,
needs to adapt on the basis of self-assessment based trustworthiness evaluation
(cf. Section 6.1). Furthermore, potential consumers might want to evaluate
the trustworthiness of cloud providers according to their selected domains
or all domains as per the CAIQ specification. In this case, trustworthiness
evaluation mechanism should be able to aggregate the provider-supplied
assertions for calculating a trustworthiness value considering the domains
that consumers are interested of.
4.4.3 Cyber-physical Service Marketplaces
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Figure 4.9: Cyber-physical Service Use Case
Cyber-physical service is defined as a service that involves virtual (i.e.,
internet-based) and physical (i.e., real-world) processes. For instance, or-
dering a product online and delivery of the product via postal shipping is
a cyber-physical service. An ideal example of cyber-physical service mar-
ketplaces are eBay, Amazon, etc. The underlying trust systems in these
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marketplaces only consider customer recommendation to calculate reputation
of a seller (i.e., service provider) and these systems are usually termed as
reputation-based trust systems [JIB07]. Moreover, it can be the case that a
customer does not have any prior experience with a seller and the customer
are not willing to depend on the recommenders or reliable recommenders are
absent. In this setting, trust on the sellers can be established from other
cues [HVHM12].
The cyber-physical services are generally not monolithic. These services
are composed of multiple subsystems and components where some of the
components are visible to the customer and associated with the entities that
customers have interacted with before. Figure 4.9 illustrates a scenario where
a customer would like to provision a composite service from an unknown
provider. By necessity, multiple components of the service is visible to the
customer, e.g., billing and shipping providers considered by the unknown
provider. The billing and shipping components are ‘visible’ means that the
customer are aware about the related providers by means of past experiences
or assurances. For the core service (i.e., Grey box), the service provider does
not reveal its internal processes to the customer directly. However, a certified
auditor may certify the internal processes and issue a certificate (e.g., SAS
70 II), which might be an indicator of trustworthiness of the service provider.
Similar to the cloud marketplace scenario, customers may receive infor-
mation regarding the unknown provider from multiple sources. Given the
nature of the service composition in Figure 4.9, our proposed framework is
able to analyse and represent the composite service architecture by means of
PLTs. Obviously, the representation depends on how the internal processes
are structured and which service-specific attribute are considered important
by the customer.
4.5 Summary
The formal framework proposed in this chapter overcomes the limitations in
the state-of-the-art for trust establishment in distributed service environments.
The formal framework is designed to cover the following aspects which are
not addressed by existing approaches:
• The proposed framework is able to assess the trustworthiness of a
composite distributed service and a system considering the trustwor-
thiness of constituent sub-systems and components. This approach is
independent from how the associated opinions are assessed regarding
different subsystems or components.
• The same framework is adapted to assess the trustworthiness of a
service provider based on their published service-specific attributes.
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This approach is also independent from how the opinions about the
attributes are assessed.
5
Novel Trust Establishment Mechanisms
The previous chapter has demonstrated a formal approach to analyse compos-
ite services regarding their service-specific composite attributes and represent
them using Propositional Logic Terms (PLTs). In order to evaluate the PLTs,
this chapter first provides the definitions of the logical operators that combine
opinions associated with propositions. Then, definitions of the non-standard
FUSION operators are provided to deal with conflicting opinions associated
with propositions. Finally, a novel architecture for Trust Management (TM)
system, which combines the formal framework (cf. Chapter 4) with computa-
tional trust operators, is proposed to mechanise trust establishment in cloud
computing marketplaces.
In the previous chapter (cf. Section 4.3.3), we have stated that the
value associated with a proposition can be termed as opinion. In a practical
setting, an opinion resembles the formal notion of information about an
entity’s expected behaviour (cf. Section 4.2.1) regarding an attribute (cf.
Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2), which can be derived from multiple sources.
Hence, on an abstract level, an opinion is associated with a proposition and is
based on available pieces of evidence derived using different types of tentative
measurements as discussed in Section 4.3.3. In this thesis, an opinion is
formally represented using CertainTrust representational model, i.e., opinion
o = (t, c, f). The CertainTrust model is discussed in Section 2.2.2.2. In the
next section, we introduce a novel extension of CertainTrust, CertainLogic
that operates on opinions about an entity’s expected behaviour regarding
service-specific attributes.
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5.1 CertainLogic: A Framework for Trustworthi-
ness Evaluation
CertainLogic framework contains logical operators along with non-standard
operators that operates on opinions represented by CertainTrust model. The
logical operators are defined to combine opinions associated with propositions
that are independent and the non-standard (FUSION) operators are defined
to combine opinions associated with dependent propositions.
Operators for Independent Propositions: According to Section 4.2.1,
in order to model the trustworthiness of a service or service provider, one
can logically model the relevant attributes in the form of propositions and
combine them using propositional logic. Precisely, the opinions on the
fulfilment of those propositions are combined. As long as the propositions
are considered to be independent, the logical operators (AND, OR, NOT )
are sufficient. However, when the independence cannot be assumed (i.e.,
dependent propositions) those operators are no longer sufficient. For instance,
this is the case when one has to combine two opinions based on the same
observation made by different sources about the expected behaviour of an
entity regarding two different attributes. An example regarding independent
propositions and their relation to opinions are visualised in Figure 5.1.
Operators for Dependent Propositions: The dependency among propo-
sitions as well as opinions needs further discussion. For example, a consumer
wants to know whether a service provider behaves as expected regarding
an attribute or a set of attributes; the consumer can derive opinions about
the service provider from different sources. If these sources, e.g., providers,
consumers, accreditators, and experts, observe the behaviour regarding same
attributes using similar methods and their estimates are equal, it is enough to
take only one of the estimates into account. However, the sources may miss
or misinterpret certain pieces of evidence collected from the same amount
of observations, which can produce varying resulting opinions. Thus, while
the individual opinions about the propositions vary from source to source,
they are still dependent. The non-standard operator, e.g., FUSION, can be
used to aggregate the opinions about dependent propositions. An example
regarding dependent propositions and their relation to opinions are visualised
in Figure 5.1.
CertainTrust Opinion Representation Revisited: According to Cer-
tainTrust definition (cf. Def. 2.2.2), an opinion o is defined as a triple of
values, o = (t, c, f) ∈ {[0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0, 1]}, where t denotes the average
rating, c denotes the certainty associated with the average rating, and f
denotes the initial expectation assigned to the truth of the proposition. Each
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opinion o = (t, c, f) is also associated with a expectation value, i.e., a point
estimate, taking into account the initial expectation f , the average rating t,
and the certainty c as follows:
E(t, c, f) = t ∗ c+ (1− c) ∗ f (5.1)
Thus, the expectation value shifts from the initial expectation value f to
the average rating t with increasing certainty c.
Beyond providing means for explicitly modelling uncertainty, CertainTrust
also provides a graphical representation (HTI), which supports an intuitive
access for users (cf. Section 2.2.2.2).
FS Ʌ HS Ʌ IS Ʌ LG Ʌ CO 
Opinion 
  (t,c,f)FS 
Opinion 
  (t,c,f)HS 
Opinion 
  (t,c,f)IS 
Opinion 
  (t,c,f)LG 
Opinion 
  (t,c,f)CO 
AND 
Independent 
FS Ʌ HS Ʌ IS Ʌ LG Ʌ CO 
Accreditator‘s Opinion 
  (t,c,f)FSɅHSɅISɅLGɅCO  
Consumer‘s Opinion 
  (t,c,f)FSɅHSɅISɅLGɅCO  
Fusion 
Dependent 
Figure 5.1: Visualisation of Independent and Dependent Propositions
Assessment of Opinion: The parameters for an opinion o = (t, c, f) can
be assessed in multiple ways [RHMV11b].
• Direct assessment: They can be assessed directly, e.g., based on the
opinion of an expert, who estimates initial expectation value f based
on her overall knowledge of the context, the average rating t is derived
from the available pieces of evidence, and the certainty c expresses the
expert’s confidence in the representativeness of the average rating.
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• Derive from direct experience and recommendations: They can be
derived from a trust system that considers one’s past experience and
recommendations from third parties. Particularly, CertainLogic can
directly be applied to trust values derived using Bayesian trust models,
e.g., [JI02, BLB04, TPJL06, RH08]. Furthermore, considering that
those models provide operators for discounting, those models can be
leveraged to increase the uncertainty when the information about the
truth of a statement is received from a source that is not fully trusted.
• Subjective Logic: They can be derived from an opinion given in Sub-
jective Logic (cf. Section 2.2.2.1).
• Beta probability distribution: CertainTrust model is an extended
Bayesian model as discussed in Section 2.2.2. Thus, the parameters of
the CertainTrust opinion can also be derived using Beta probability
density function.
5.2 CertainLogic Operators for Combining Inde-
pendent Propositions
In this section, we introduce novel CertainLogic operators to combine inde-
pendent opinions associated with PLTs. In particular, we define the standard
operators of propositional logic: AND, OR, and NOT . These operators are
based on the previously established model, CertainTrust (cf. Section 2.2.2.2)
that serve as a representational model for uncertain probabilities.
5.2.1 Definition of the Operators
The rationale behind the definitions of the CertainLogic’s standard logical
operators demand an analytical discussion. In standard binary logic, logical
operators operates on propositions that only consider the values ‘TRUE’
or ‘FALSE’ (i.e., 1 or 0 respectively) as input arguments. In standard
probabilistic logic, the logical operators operates on propositions that consider
the values in the range of [0, 1] (i.e., probabilities) as input arguments.
However, logical operators in standard probabilistic approach is not able
to consider uncertainty (cf. Section 2.2.2) about the probability values.
Subjective Logic’s logical operators are able to operate on opinions that
consider uncertain probabilities as input arguments. Additionally, Subjective
Logic’s logical operators are generalized version of standard logic operators
and probabilistic logic operators.
CertainLogic’s logical operators operates on CertainTrust’s opinions,
which represents uncertain probabilities in a more flexible and simpler man-
ner than the opinion representation in Subjective Logic (SL). Note that
both CertainTrust’s representation and Subjective Logic’s representation
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of opinions are isomorphic with the mapping provided in [Rie09b]. For
detailed discussion on representational model of Subjective Logic’s opinion
and CertainTrust’s opinion, we refer the readers to Section 2.2.2.3. The
definitions of the CertainLogic’s logical operators are formulated in a way
that they are equivalent to the definitions of logical operators in Subjective
Logic. This equivalence (cf. Section 5.2.6) serves as an argument for the
justification and mathematical validity of the proposed definitions of our
logical operators. Moreover, CertainLogic’s logical operators are the special
cases of binary logic and probabilistic logic operators which will become
evident in Section 5.2.4 and Section 5.2.5.
5.2.1.1 Operator OR (∨)
The operator OR is applicable when opinions about two independent propo-
sitions need to form a new opinion reflecting the degree of truth for at least
one out of two propositions.
Definition 5.2.1 (Operator OR) Let A and B be two independent
propositions and the opinions about the truth of these propositions be given
as oA = (tA, cA, fA) and oB = (tB, cB, fB), respectively. Then, the resulting
opinion is denoted as oA∨B = (tA∨B, cA∨B, fA∨B) where tA∨B, cA∨B, and
fA∨B are defined in Table 5.1 (OR). We use the symbol ‘∨′ to designate the
operator OR and we define oA∨B ≡ oA ∨ oB.
The aggregation (using OR operator) of opinions about independent
propositions A and B are formulated in a way that the resulting initial
expectation (f) are dependent on the initial expectation values, fA and fB
assigned to A and B respectively. Following the equivalent definitions of
Subjective Logic’s normal disjunction operator and the basic characteristics
of the same operator (∨) in standard probabilistic logic, we define fA∨B =
fA + fB− fAfB. The definitions for cA∨B and tA∨B are formulated in similar
manner and the corresponding adjustments in the definitions are made to
maintain the equivalence between the operators of Subjective Logic and
CertainLogic.
5.2.1.2 Operator AND (∧)
The operator AND is applicable when opinions for two independent propo-
sitions need to be aggregated to produce a new opinion reflecting the degree
of truth of both propositions simultaneously.
Definition 5.2.2 (Operator AND) Let A and B be two independent
propositions and the opinions about the truth of these propositions be given
as oA = (tA, cA, fA) and oB = (tB, cB, fB), respectively. Then, the resulting
opinion is denoted as
80 CHAPTER 5. NOVEL TRUST ESTABLISHMENT MECHANISMS
oA∧B = (tA∧B, cA∧B, fA∧B) where tA∧B, cA∧B, and fA∧B are defined in Ta-
ble 5.1 (AND). We use the symbol ′∧′ to designate the operator AND and
we define oA∧B ≡ oA ∧ oB.
The aggregation (using AND operator) of opinions about independent
propositions A and B are formulated in a way that the resulting initial
expectation (f) are dependent on the initial expectation values, fA and fB
assigned to A and B respectively. Following the equivalent definitions of
Subjective Logic’s normal conjunction operator and basic characteristics of
the same operator (∧) in standard probabilistic logic, we define fA∧B = fAfB.
The definitions for cA∧B and tA∧B are formulated in similar manner and
the corresponding adjustments in the definitions are made to maintain the
equivalence between the operators of Subjective Logic and CertainLogic.
5.2.1.3 Operator NOT (¬)
The operator NOT is applicable when an opinion about an proposition needs
to be negated.
Definition 5.2.3 (Operator NOT )
Let A be a proposition and the opinion about the truth of this proposition
be given as oA = (tA, cA, fA). Then, the resulting opinion is denoted as
¬oA = (t¬A, c¬A, f¬A) where t¬A, c¬A, and f¬A are given in Table 5.1
(NOT). We use the symbol ′¬′ to designate the operator NOT and we define,
o¬A ≡ ¬oA
The negation of an opinion about proposition A represents the opinion
about A being false. The definition of the NOT (¬) operator corresponds to
NOT operator in standard logic, i.e., binary logic.
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Table 5.1: Definition of the operators
OR
cA∨B =
{
cA + cB − cAcB − cA(1−cB)fB(1−tA)+(1−cA)cBfA(1−tB)fA+fB−fAfB if fAfB , 0,
“undefined” else.
tA∨B =
{
1
cA∨B
(cAtA + cBtB − cAcBtAtB) if cA∨B , 0,
0.5 else.
fA∨B =fA + fB − fAfB
AND
cA∧B =
{
cA + cB − cAcB − (1−cA)cB(1−fA)tB+cA(1−cB)(1−fB)tA1−fAfB if fAfB , 1,
“undefined” else.
tA∧B =
{
1
cA∧B
(
cAcBtAtB + cA(1−cB)(1−fA)fBtA+(1−cA)cBfA(1−fB)tB1−fAfB
)
if cA∧B , 0, if fAfB , 1,
0.5 else.
fA∧B =fAfB
NOT
t¬A = 1− tA, c¬A = cA, and f¬A = 1− fA
5.2.2 Properties of the Operators
The operators for AND and OR can be shown commutative and associative.
Both of the properties are desirable for the evaluation of propositional logic
terms.
Theorem 5.2.1 (Commutativity)
It holds oA∧B = oB∧A and oA∨B = oB∨A
Theorem 5.2.2 (Associativity)
It holds oA∧(B∧C) = o(A∧B)∧C and oA∨(B∨C) = o(A∨B)∨C .
The proofs are given in Appendices C.1, C.2, and C.3.
The operators are not distributive, i.e., it holds that oA∧(B∨C) , o(A∧B) ∨
o(A∧C), as A∧B and A∧C represents partially dependent propositions. Note
that the evaluation of propositional operators in the standard probabilistic
approach does not satisfy distributivity for the same reason.
The operators does not conform to Idempotent property. Conforming
to this property means that the propositions A and B are identical which
appears counter-intuitive for the assumption that is made while defining the
operators. It must be always assumed that the the propositions as well as
their input opinions are independent.
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Table 5.2: Examples for the operator AND
oA =
(tA, cA, fA)
oB =
(tB , cB , fB)
oA∧B
(0.5,0,0.5) (0.5, 0, 0.5) (0.5, 0, 0.25)
E(oA) = 0.5 E(oB) = 0.5 E(oA∧B) = 0.25
(0,1,0.5) (0.5, 0, 0.5) (0, 1, 0.25)
E(oA) = 0 E(oB) = 0.5 E(oA∧B) = 0
(1,1,0.5) (0.5, 0, 0.5) (1, 0.333, 0.25)
E(oA) = 1 E(oB) = 0.5 E(oA∧B) = 0.5
5.2.3 Examples
In the following, we present some examples to demonstrate the impact of
the newly defined operators on opinions modeled in CertainLogic. Table 5.2
presents three examples for the AND operator and Table 5.3 demonstrates
another 3 examples for the OR operator. For each example, we consider the
opinions according to the CertainTrust representation and additionally we
provide the expectation value (E, according to the Equation 5.1) and the
graphical representation (HTI) of an opinion.
The color-gradient in the HTI indicates the expectation value (E) of each
point in the interface. Therefore, the color of each point in the interface
is calculated as a linear combination of the RGB-vectors of red (E = 0),
yellow (E = 0.5), and green (E = 1). Note that the visualization of opinions
along with the calculation of color-gradient in the background are generated
using a Java application. The examples are basically screen shots from that
application. In the first row, one can see how the AND operator affects the
initial expectation f . The initial expectation for propositions A and B, it
holds fA = fB = 0.5, it holds fA∧B = 0.25, as A and B have to be true
simultaneously. This is directly reflected by the color-gradient of HTI. As
the certainty of cA = cB = 0, i.e., no evidence available, the certainty of the
resulting opinion is cA∧B = 0, and the expectation value (E) of each opinion
is equivalent to the initial expectation, f .
In the second row, we provide an example where one is certain (cA = 1)
that proposition A is false (tA = 0) and for B it holds cB = 0, i.e., complete
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Table 5.3: Examples for the operator OR
oA =
(tA, cA, fA)
oB =
(tB , cB , fB)
oA∨B
(0.5,0,0.5) (0.5, 0, 0.5) (0.5, 0, 0.75)
E(oA) = 0.5 E(oB) = 0.5 E(oA∨B) = 0.75
(0,1,0.25) (0.5, 0, 0.75) (0, 0.0769, 0.8125)
E(oA) = 0 E(oB) = 0.75 E(oA∨B) = 0.75
(1,1,0.25) (0.5, 0, 0.75) (1, 1, 0.8125)
E(oA) = 1 E(oB) = 0.75 E(oA∨B) = 1
uncertainty. The certainty of the resulting opinion is cA∧B = 1 and the
rating is t = 0. In this case, the knowledge about A is sufficient to conclude
that A ∧B is false.
However, the third row shows that if one is certain (cA = 1) that proposi-
tion A is true (tA = 1) and for B it holds cB = 0, i.e., complete uncertainty,
then, the certainty of the resulting opinion is only cA∧B = 0.33. The resulting
opinion demonstrates that even if the proposition A is certainly true, it is
not sufficient for the AND operator to conclude that both propositions, A
and B, are true in composition.
The examples for the OR operator follow a similar reasoning. In the first
row, one can immediately see how the initial expectation value is influenced
by the OR operator; the resulting opinion’s color-gradient is more ’greenish’.
This is reasonable as the initial expectation value of the A and B are
fA = fB = 0.5 and the resulting opinions expectation value is fA∨B = 0.75,
as the chances that A ∨B is true are higher than the chances for only A or
only B.
In the second row, the opinion, (0, 1, 0.25), about proposition A demon-
strates that the proposition is false, whereas the opinion, (0.5, 0, 0.75), about
proposition B shows that a source is completely uncertain about the truth of
the proposition. In this case, the resulting opinion’s certainty value, 0.0769,
indicates that the propositions in composition are unlikely to be false because
of the opinion about the proposition B is based on zero pieces of evidence, i.e.,
no evidence available. Hence, high initial expectation value, i.e., fB = 0.75,
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of oB influence the expectation value as well as the initial expectation value,
E(oA∨B) = 0.75; fA∨B = 0.8125, of propositions in composition. It interprets
that the chances of A ∨B is false are higher than the chances for only A or
equal to B but with higher certainty value (0.0769).
In the third row, the opinion, (1, 1, 0.25), about proposition A is sufficient
to conclude that the propositions in composition is true. The reason behind
the conclusion is that the opinion about A is based on maximum or infinite
number of positive pieces of evidence and for the OR operator this is a
sufficient condition.
5.2.4 Equivalence: CertainLogic to Standard Logic
Standard logic is a special case of CertainLogic for the logical operators,
AND, OR, and NOT . It means that when a corresponding operator is
available in binary logic, and the input arguments are equivalent to TRUE
(1) or FALSE (0) of binary logic, then the resulting opinion is equivalent
to the result that binary logic definition will produce. The truth table
(cf. Appendix B) is generated based on the corresponding definitions of
CertainLogic operators that are applied to opinions with binary values, i.e.,
1 and 0.
5.2.5 Equivalence: CertainLogic to Standard Probabilistic
Logic
In the standard probabilistic logic, the operation for AND is usually defined
as p(A∧B) = p(A)p(B), the operation for OR is given as p(A∨B) = p(A) +
p(B)− p(A)p(B), and the operation for NOT is given as p(¬A) = 1− p(A).
The expectation value E(t, c, f) of an opinion can be interpreted as the
probability for the truth of a proposition and it can be shown that the
following statements are true:
Theorem 5.2.3 (Equivalence)
The propositional logic operators for AND, OR, and NOT as defined
in Table 5.1 are compliant with the standard probabilistic evaluation of
propositional terms as it holds:
1. E(oA∧B) = E(oA)E(oB) (for AND)
2. E(oA∨B) = E(oA) + E(oB)− E(oA)E(oB) (for OR)
3. E(o¬A) = 1− E(oA) (for NOT)
The proof is given in Appendix C.4.
Although, the standard probabilistic approach is compliant with Cer-
tainLogic, there are multiple advantages when combining opinions with
CertainLogic:
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• Our model can express the uncertainty, which is not possible in the
standard probabilistic approach. This is important, because in real
world scenarios probabilities are usually not known, but have to be
estimated or derived from experiments, and thus they are subject to
uncertainty.
• Our model does not only take the (un-)certainty as an input parameter,
but also reflects the uncertainty in the calculated result. Thus, the
certainty is a good indicator for the confidence associated to that result.
5.2.6 Equivalence: CertainLogic to Subjective Logic
Subjective Logic (SL) opinion model has been described in 2.2.2.1, and it
combines elements from belief theory with Bayesian probabilities. In the
following, we show that the logical operators of CertainLogic are equivalent
to those of SL, which provides the argument for the mathematical validity
and justification of our approach.
Definition 5.2.4 (Belief representation (SL))
According to [Jøs01], an opinion is given by ω = (b, d, u, a), where b
models the belief, d the disbelief, u the uncertainty, and a the atomicity.
The mapping between CertainTrust (CT) and SL opinions is provided in
[Rie09b]. The mapping of an opinion in CT to SL is denoted as a function
mCTSL ,which is defined below:
Definition 5.2.5 (Mapping CT to SL)
The mapping from an opinion o = (t, c, f) in CT to an opinion ω =
(b, d, u, a) in SL is denoted as (b, d, u, a) = mCTSL (t, c, f) and defined by b = t∗c,
d = (1− t) ∗ c, u = 1− c, and a = f .
The inverse mapping can be given as follows:
Definition 5.2.6 (Mapping SL to CT)
The mapping from an opinion ω = (b, d, u, a) in SL to an opinion o =
(t, c, f) in CT is denoted as (t, c, f) = mSLCT (b, d, u, a) and defined by c = 1−u,
a = f , and t = bb+d for b+ d , 0, else t = 0.5.
Theorem 5.2.4 (Equivalence of operators) Let A and B be indepen-
dent propositions. In SL, ωA and ωB are two opinions about proposition
A and B, respectively. Using the mapping functions, i.e., mCTSL and mSLCT ,
our operators are equivalent to the normalized versions of AND, OR, NOT
operators of SL in [JM05]. This means that for op ∈ {AND,OR} the first
two statements and for NOT the last two statements given in the following
holds.
1. oA = mSLCT (ωA) and oB = mSLCT (ωB)⇒ ωAopB = mCTSL (oAopB)
86 CHAPTER 5. NOVEL TRUST ESTABLISHMENT MECHANISMS
2. ωA = mCTSL (oA) and ωB = mCTSL (oB)⇒ oAopB = mSLCT (ωAopB)
3. oA = mSLCT (ωA)⇒ ω¬A = mCTSL (o¬A)
4. ωA = mCTSL (oA)⇒ o¬A = mSLCT (ω¬A)
The proof is given in Appendix C.5. As the mapping between opinions
in CT and SL is bijective, this basically means that it is possible to switch
between the representations as well as the logical operators. Although SL
and CT provide capabilities for reasoning under uncertainty, there are several
advantages that CertainLogic inherits from the CertainTrust representational
model, which are explained in Section 2.2.2.3.
Finally, based on the mapping between CT and SL, and following the
arguments provided in [JM05], the operators for AND and OR calculate the
same expectation values as when doing the operation on Beta probability
density functions. However, the variance in this case is not exact, but well
approximated.
5.3 CertainLogic Operators for Dependent Propo-
sitions
In this section, we provide the definitions for the CertainLogic non-standard
operators that operates on dependent opinions associated with PLTs. The
non-standard operators can be used to fuse dependent opinions about a
proposition from multiple sources. A detail discussion on dependent opinions
and their relation to PLTs are provided in Section 5.1.
5.3.1 Definition of the Operators
We provide definitions for three types of fusion operators, i.e., operators
that are suitable for aggregating dependent opinions on a proposition. At
first, we introduce the average fusion operator. This operator is equivalent
(cf. Appendix D.9) to the averaging fusion operator [Jøs09] and consensus
operator for dependent opinions [JMP06] defined in Jøsang’s Subjective
Logic. The equivalence serves as an argument for the justification and the
mathematical validity of our average fusion operator that we use as a starting
point for introducing a novel fusion operator. The novel operator (i.e.,
conflict-aware fusion) is capable of dealing with conflict as well as preferences
(as weights). Note that the weighted fusion operator is an intermediate step
towards defining the novel conflict-aware fusion operator. Our weighted
fusion operator should not be confused with the fusion operator that has
been recently proposed by Zhou et al. [ZSLL11], as they consider two weights
in their definition: one weight from the agent who provide the opinion and
other weight from the agent who fuse the weighted opinions.
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5.3.1.1 Average Fusion Operator
Assume that multiple sources providing n opinions about a proposition. The
opinions are based on identical pieces of evidence and thus, derived opinions
are dependent. Jøsang [Jøs09] argued that even if the opinions are based on
identical pieces of evidence, the opinions might vary due to interpretation
methods that considered by different sources. Thus, Jøsang proposed to apply
averaging rule on the dependent opinions, which is also the rationale behind
the definition of the CertainLogic average fusion (A.FUSION) operator.
Table 5.4: Definition of the Average Fusion Operator
t⊕̂(A1,A2,...,An)
=

n∑
i=1
tAi
n
if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1 ,
0.5 if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 0 ,
n∑
i=1
(cAi tAi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(cAi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
if {cAi , cAj } , 1 .
c⊕̂(A1,A2,...,An)
=

1 if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1 ,
n∑
i=1
(cAi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
if {cAi , cAj } , 1 .
f⊕̂(A1,A2,...,An)
=
n∑
i=1
fAi
n
Definition 5.3.1 (A.FUSION)
Let A be a proposition and let oA1 = (tA1 , cA1 , fA1), oA2 = (tA2 , cA2 , fA2),· · · ,
oAn = (tAn , cAn , fAn) be n opinions associated to A. The average fusion
is denoted as
o⊕̂(A1,A2,··· ,An) = (t⊕̂(A1,A2,··· ,An), c⊕̂(A1,A2,··· ,An), f⊕̂(A1,A2,··· ,An))
where t⊕̂(A1,A2,··· ,An), c⊕̂(A1,A2,··· ,An), f⊕̂(A1,A2,··· ,An) are defined in Table 5.4.
We use the symbol (⊕̂) to designate the operator A.FUSION and we define
o⊕̂(A1,A2,··· ,An) ≡ ⊕̂((oA1), (oA2), · · · , (oAn)).
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Table 5.5: Definition of the Weighted Fusion Operator
t⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An)
=

n∑
i=1
witAi
n∑
i=1
wi
if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1 ,
0.5 if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 0 ,
n∑
i=1
(cAi tAiwi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
if {cAi , cAj } , 1 .
c⊕̂w(A1,A2,...,An)
=

1 if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1 ,
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(wi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
if {cAi , cAj } , 1 .
f⊕̂w(A1,A2,...,An)
=
n∑
i=1
wifAi
n∑
i=1
wi
5.3.1.2 Weighted Fusion Operator
Assume that consumers want to attach preferences with opinions while fusing
the opinions derived from multiple sources. The preferential attachment
might depend on consumers’ personal preferences when selecting the sources,
e.g., providers, experts, consumers, for deriving opinions. In order to extend
the functionality of the state-of-the-art A.FUSION operator to deal with
trustor’s preferential attachments, we propose a novel operator, weighted
fusion (W.FUSION), that operates on opinions associated with weights.
Definition 5.3.2 (W.FUSION)
Let A be a proposition and let oA1 = (tA1 , cA1 , fA1), oA2 = (tA2 , cA2 , fA2), · · · ,
oAn = (tAn , cAn , fAn) be n opinions associated to A. Furthermore, the weights
w1, w2,· · · , wn (with w1, w2, · · · , wn ∈ R+0 and w1+w2+ · · ·+wn , 0) are as-
signed to the opinions oA1 , oA2 ,· · · , oAn , respectively. The weighted fusion
is denoted as
o⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An) = (t⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An), c⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An), f⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An))
where t⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An), c⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An), f⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An) are defined in Ta-
ble 5.5. We use the symbol (⊕̂w) to designate the operator W.FUSION and
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we define o⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An) ≡ ⊕̂w((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · , (oAn , wn)).
5.3.1.3 Conflict-aware Fusion Operator
Assume that consumers want to fuse conflicting opinions derived from mul-
tiple sources. In order to extend the functionality of the state-of-the-art
A.FUSION operator in terms of dealing with conflicting opinions, we pro-
pose a novel operator, conflict-aware fusion (C.FUSION), that operates
on conflicting opinions and reflect the calculated degree of conflict (DoC)
in the resulting fused opinion. Note that this operator is able to deal with
preferential weights associated with opinions.
Definition 5.3.3 (C.FUSION)
Let A be a proposition and let oA1 = (tA1 , cA1 , fA1), oA2 = (tA2 , cA2 , fA2),· · · ,
oAn = (tAn , cAn , fAn) be n opinions associated to A. Furthermore, the weights
w1, w2,· · · , wn (with w1, w2, · · · , wn ∈ R+0 and w1 + w2 + · · ·+ wn , 0) are
assigned to the opinions oA1 , oA2 ,· · · , oAn , respectively. The conflict-aware
fusion is denoted as
o⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An) = ((t⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An), c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An), f⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An)), DoC)
where t⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An), c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An), f⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An), the degree of conflict
DoC are defined in Table 5.6. We use the symbol (⊕̂c) to designate the opera-
tor C.FUSION and we define o⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An) ≡ ⊕̂c((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · ,
(oAn , wn)).
The rationale behind the definition of the conflict-aware fusion demands
an extensive discussion. The basic concept of this operator is that the
operator extends the weighted fusion by calculating the degree of conflict
(DoC) between a pair of opinions. Then, the value of (1−DoC) is multiplied
with the certainty (c) that would be calculated by the weighted fusion (the
parameters for t and f are the same as in the weighted fusion).
Now, we discuss the calculation of the DoC for two opinions. For the
parameter, it holds DoC ∈ [0, 1]. This parameter depends on the average
ratings (t), the certainty values (c), and the weights (w). The weights are
assumed to be selected by the trustors (consumers) and the purpose of the
weights is to model the preferences of the trustor when aggregating opinions
from different sources. We assume that the compliance of their preferences
are ensured under a policy negotiation phase. For example, users might be
given three choices, High (2), Low (1) and No preference (0, i.e., opinion
from a particular source is not considered), to express their preferences on
selecting the sources that provide the opinions. Note that the weights are
not introduced to model the reliability of sources. In this case, it would
be appropriate to use the discounting operator [Rie09b, Jøs01] to explicitly
consider reliability of sources and apply the fusion operator on the results to
influence users’ preferences. The values of DoC can be interpreted as follows:
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Table 5.6: Definition of the Conflict-aware Fusion Operator
t⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An)
=

n∑
i=1
witAi
n∑
i=1
wi
if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1 ,
0.5 if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 0 ,
n∑
i=1
(cAi tAiwi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
if {cAi , cAj } , 1 .
c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An)
=

1 ∗ (1−DoC) if cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1 ,
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(wi
n∏
j=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
∗ (1−DoC) if {cAi , cAj } , 1 .
f⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An)
=
n∑
i=1
wifAi
n∑
i=1
wi
DoC =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1,j,i
DoCAi,Aj
n(n−1)
2
DoCAi,Aj =
∣∣tAi − tAj ∣∣ ∗ cAi ∗ cAj ∗(1− ∣∣∣∣wi − wjwi + wj
∣∣∣∣)
• No conflict (DoC = 0): For DoC = 0, it holds that there is no
conflict between the two opinions. This is true if both opinions agree
on the average rating, i.e., tA1 = tA2 or in case that at least one opinion
has a certainty c = 0 (for completeness we have to state that it is also
true if one of the weights is equal to 0, which means the opinion is not
considered).
• Total conflict (DoC = 1): For DoC = 1, it holds that the two
opinions are weighted equally (w1 = w2) and contradicts each other
to a maximum. This means, that both opinions have a maximum
certainty (cA1 = cA2 = 1) and maximum divergence in the average
ratings, i.e., tA1 = 0 and tA2 = 1 (or tA1 = 1 and tA2 = 0).
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• Conflict (DoC ∈]0, 1[): For DoC ∈]0, 1[, it holds that there are two
opinions contradict each other to a certain degree. This means that
the both opinions does not agree on the average ratings, i.e., tA1 , tA2 ,
having certainty values other than 0 and 1. The weights can be any
real number other than 0.
Next, we argue for integrating the degree of conflict, DoC, into the
resulting opinion by multiplying the certainty with (1−DoC). The argument
is, in case that there are two (equally weighted) conflicting opinions, then
this indicates that the information which these opinions are based on is not
representative for the outcome of the assessment or experiment. Thus, for
the sake of representativeness, in the case of total conflict (i.e., DoC = 1),
we reduce the certainty (c(oA1 ,w1)⊕̂(oA2 ,w2)) of the resulting opinion by a
multiplicative factor, (1−DoC). The certainty value is 0 in this case.
For n opinions, degree of conflict (i.e., DoCAi,Aj ) in Table 5.6 is calculated
for each opinion pairs. The challenge is how to calculate the DoC among n
opinions to adjust the certainty (c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An)) parameter of the resulting
opinion. There are three possible ways that we have considered when
calculating the DoC. These are as follows:
• One of the ways is to calculate the average of all possible DoCAi,Aj
values of all pairs. For instance, if there are n opinions there can be at
most n(n−1)2 pairs and degree of conflict is calculated for each of those
pairs individually. Finally, all the pair-wise DoC values are averaged
(i.e., averaging n(n−1)2 pairs of DoCAi,Aj ) to adjust the certainty (i.e.,
c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An)) parameter of the resulting opinion (cf. Table 5.6).
• Another way is to calculate the degree of conflict (DoC) for each pair
of opinions and adjust the certainty (c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An))
n(n−1)
2 times if
there are n opinions. In this case, we get n(n−1)2 certainty values which
are then averaged to calculate the final certainty value.
• The other way is to calculate the degree of conflict (DoC) pair-wise and
multiply all pair-wise values at once with the certainty (c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An))
of the resulting opinion. This approach has two drawbacks: i) it suffers
from a multiplicative effect which means that the certainty is affected
heavily with the increasing number of opinions, ii) it also heavily affect
the certainty in case a single opinion radically conflict with others.
The first two approaches are equally capable of detecting conflicting
opinions as the conflict analysis is done pair-wise. Either of these approaches
performs better (in detecting conflicting information) than the third approach,
particularly in a complex setting where a large collection of sources are
available and only one of the sources radically conflicts with the other sources
when providing opinions. In this case, either of the first two approaches
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shifts half of the uncertainty on the outlier and others receive only 12n(n−1)
of the extra uncertainty. Moreover, the first two approaches do not suffer
from the multiplicative effect alike the third approach.
Finally, we see that the connection between DoC and c⊕̂c(A1,A2,··· ,An)
(certainty) is linear. One can argue that this connection should be handled
probabilistically rather than linearly. We choose the linear approach as it
is simple, does not lead to unforeseen effects and allow good integration of
weights, which is important for service oriented marketplaces. Moreover, due
to linearity, Weight-specific properties (i.e., Section 5.3.2) hold for conflict-
aware fusion operator as those properties hold for W.FUSION operator.
In Table 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, for all opinions if it holds cAi = 0 (complete
uncertainty), the expectation values (cf. Definition 2.2.3) depends only on
f . However, for soundness we define tAi = 0.5 in this case. The discussion
of the fusion operators is supported by numerical and graphical (i.e., HTI)
examples in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.2 Properties of the Operators
The desirable mathematical properties of the defined operators are classified
into two types: i) Fusion-specific and ii) Weight-specific. The Fusion-specific
properties are the ones which are shown desirable and necessary for the state-
of-the-art fusion operators [JMP06, Jøs09]. The Weight-specific properties
are useful to show the relationship among the average, weighted and conflict-
aware fusion, that also extend to easier computation of the expectation
value E (cf. equation 1) of fused opinions. Moreover, these properties are
aligned with the desirable properties for arithmetic mean-based averaging
operations [BPC07]. As fusion operation belongs to the family of arithmetic
mean-based averaging operations [BPC07], those particular properties are
also desirable for our extended fusion operators.The properties that hold for
our defined operators are outlined as follows:
1. Fusion-specific Properties: Idempotency, Commutativity & Permutabil-
ity belong to this group.
2. Weight-specific Properties: Weight Partitioning, Invariance to Weight
Scaling and three properties regarding Weighted average of expectation
value for common weight and/or certainty belong to this particular
group.
The formal theorems regarding the properties are discussed in the following.
The proofs for the theorems are provided in Appendix D.1–D.8.
Fusion-specific Properties
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Idempotence: When aggregating the same opinion twice, no additional
information is gained for the resulting fused opinion. This should be reflected
in the fusion operation by designing it to be idempotent. Formally, the
following theorem 5.3.1 thus represents a desirable property of the fusion
operator that holds for average, weighted and conflict-aware fusion.
Theorem 5.3.1 (Idempotence)
It holds ⊕̂(oA1 , oA1 , · · · , oA1) = oA1 and ⊕̂w(o(A1,w1), o(A1,w2), · · · , o(A1,wn)) =
oA1 and ⊕̂c(o(A1,w1), o(A1,w2), · · · , o(A1,wn)) = oA1.
Commutativity and Permutability: In averaging operations, the order
of the operands should not affect the final outcome of the calculation. There-
fore, the extended fusion operators are designed to be commutative as well
as indifferent to a permutation of the operands. This makes them compliant
with the following two theorems 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.
Theorem 5.3.2 (Commutativity)
For two opinions, it holds
⊕̂(oA1 , oA2) = ⊕̂(oA2oA1)
⊕̂w((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2)) = ⊕̂w((oA2 , w2), (oA1 , w1))
⊕̂c((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2)) = ⊕̂c((oA2 , w2), (oA1 , w1)).
Theorem 5.3.3 (Permutability of n opinions)
Let pi : [1, . . . , n] 7→ [1, . . . , n] denote a permutation such that oApi(i) = oAi,
then it holds
⊕̂w(oA1 , · · · , oAn) = ⊕̂w(oApi(1) , · · · , oApi(n))
⊕̂c(oA1 , · · · , oAn) = ⊕̂c(oApi(1) , · · · , oApi(n))
In this regard, one can argue that the associativity property is also desir-
able. But, it is not desirable as the defined operations for the fusion operators
belong to the family of arithmetic mean based averaging operation. Note
that for general arithmetic mean based averaging operations, associativity is
not a desirable property [BPC07].
Weight-specific Properties The fusion operators fulfil a number of use-
ful properties regarding the relationship between average and weighted fusion,
that also extend to easier computation of the expectation value E (cf. Defini-
tion 2.2.3) of fused opinions. In the following, we consider primarily weighted
fusion with weight wi ∈ R+0 , 0 < i ≤ n, where i, n ∈ N and
∑n
i=1wi , 0.
Weighted Fusion Partitioning to Average Fusion: For rational weights,
the weighted fusion operator (W.FUSION) and (C.FUSION) is isomorphic
to the average fusion operator (A.FUSION).
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Theorem 5.3.4 (Weight Partitioning)
For w1 = a1b1 , w2 =
a2
b2
, · · · , wn = anbn ∈ Q+0 it holds
1. ⊕̂w((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · , (oAn , wn)) =
⊕̂w((oA1 , 1), · · · , (oA1 , 1)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, (oA2 , 1), · · · , (oA2 , 1)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , (oAn , 1), · · · , (oAn , 1)︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
) =
⊕̂( oA1 , · · · , oA1︸             ︷︷             ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, oA2 , · · · , oA2︸             ︷︷             ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , oAn , · · · , oAn︸              ︷︷              ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
)
2. ⊕̂c((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · , (oAn , wn)) =
⊕̂c((oA1 , 1), · · · , (oA1 , 1)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, (oA2 , 1), · · · , (oA2 , 1)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , (oAn , 1), · · · , (oAn , 1)︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
) =
⊕̂( oA1 , · · · , oA1︸             ︷︷             ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, oA2 , · · · , oA2︸             ︷︷             ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , oAn , · · · , oAn︸              ︷︷              ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
)
Invariance to Weight Scaling: As a weighted aggregation function, the
weighted fusion operation (W.FUSION) and conflict-aware fusion operation
(C.FUSION) is invariant to scaling of its weight terms by a constant.
Theorem 5.3.5 (Invariance to Weight Scaling)
∀k , 0 it holds
1. ⊕̂w((oA1 , w1 ∗ k), (oA2 , w2 ∗ k), · · · , (oAn , wn ∗ k)) =
⊕̂w((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · , (oAn , wn))
2. ⊕̂c((oA1 , w1 ∗ k), (oA2 , w2 ∗ k), · · · , (oAn , wn ∗ k)) =
⊕̂c((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · , (oAn , wn))
Weighted average of expectation value for common weight or com-
mon certainty: The primary decision criterion in CertainTrust [Rie09b]
is the expectation value, E (cf. Definition 2.2.3) associated with an opinion
o = (t, c, f). Thus, in many cases, the computation of this expectation value
is the final objective subsequent to applying the fusion operators. As E ∈ R+0 ,
averaging operations conducted on the expectation values using arithmetic
operations, as opposed to the opinions using fusion, are computationally
preferable. The following theorems 5.3.6, 5.3.7, 5.3.8 outline under which
conditions this is possible.
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Theorem 5.3.6 (Weighted average of E: common w)
For w1 = w2 = · · · = wn = w it holds
E(⊕̂w((oA1 , w), (oA2 , w), · · · , (oAn , w))) = E(⊕̂(oA1 , oA2 , · · · , oAn)) =∑n
i=1 E(oAi )
n .
Theorem 5.3.7 (Weighted average of E: common c)
For cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = c, it holds
E(⊕̂w((oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · , (oAn , wn))) =
∑n
i=1 wiE(oAi )∑n
i=1 wi
.
Weighted average of expectation value for common certainty and
common weights: When defining the W.FUSION and C.FUSION we
made sure that whenever one uses identical certainty values (i.e., cA1 = cA2 or
cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn) and weights (i.e., w1 = w2 or w1 = w2 = · · · = wn),
the result is the same as the result of the average fusion (cf. Thm. 5.3.6).
Theorem 5.3.8 (Weighted average of E: common c and w)
For w1 = w2 = · · · = wn = w and cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = c, it holds
1.
∑n
i=1 E(oAi )
n = E(⊕̂w((oA1 , w), (oA2 , w), · · · , (oAn , w)))
2.
∑n
i=1 E(oAi )
n = E(⊕̂c((oA1 , w), (oA2 , w), · · · , (oAn , w)))
5.3.3 Examples of the Fusion Operators
In the following, we present some examples showing the impact of the newly
defined operators that operates on opinions modelled with CertainTrust
representational model.
In the left part of Table 5.7, all the examples show the effect of the
weighted fusion (W.FUSION) operator in different cases. The right part of
the Table 5.7 shows the effect of average fusion (example 1) and conflict-aware
fusion (example 2 & 3). We have developed a Java application in order
to visualise the impact of fusion operators on opinions. The examples are
basically screen shots from that application.
Example 1: The first example in Table 5.7 illustrates a comparison
between the W.FUSION and A.FUSION operators.
While for the A.FUSION operator it holds that both opinions have the
same impact on the results (which is equivalent to w1 = w2 in the weighted
fusion), the W.FUSION operator supports the customization of the weights
(in the example we use, w1 = 1 and w2 = 2 for the weighted fusion).
In the resulting opinions, one can observe the influence of the weights.
In the A.FUSION (right), the resulting opinion (0.4, 0.75, 0.5) is biased
to oA1 because of the high certainty (0.833) associated with the opinion
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Table 5.7: Examples for the Fusion Operators
Input Opinions Resulting Opinions
oA1 =
(tA1 , cA1 , fA1 )
oA2 =
(tA2 , cA2 , fA2 )
o
A1⊕̂A2
Example 1
W.FUSION A.FUSION
w1 = 1;w2 = 2 w1 = 1;w2 = 1
(0.3, 0.833, 0.5) (0.9, 0.5, 0.5) (0.4717, 0.6996, 0.5) (0.4, 0.75, 0.5)
E(oA1 ) = 0.333 E(oA2 ) = 0.7 E(oA1⊕̂wA2
) = 0.48 E(o
A1⊕̂A2
) = 0.425
Example 2
W.FUSION C.FUSION
w1 = 1;w2 = 1 w1 = 1;w2 = 1
(0, 1, 0.5) (1, 1, 0.5) (0.5, 1, 0.5) (0.5, 0, 0.5)
DoC = 1
E(oA1 ) = 0 E(oA2 ) = 1 E(oA1⊕̂wA2
) = 0.5 E(o
A1⊕̂cA2
) = 0.5
Example 3
W.FUSION C.FUSION
w1 = 1;w2 = 2 w1 = 1;w2 = 2
(0.3, 0.833, 0.05) (0.9, 0.5, 0.35) (0.4717, 0.6996, 0.25) (0.4717, 0.5831, 0.25)
DoC = 0.166
E(oA1 ) = 0.2582 E(oA2 ) = 0.625 E(oA1⊕̂wA2
) =
0.4051
E(o
A1⊕̂cA2
) =
0.3793
oA1 . However, using the W.FUSION (left) and giving a higher weight
(w2 = 2) to oA2 the resulting opinion ((0.4717, 0.6996, 0.5)) shows a shifted
bias towards oA2 . This example shows how the weighted fusion enables
customised aggregation of opinions.
Example 2: The second example in Table 5.7 provides an interesting
comparison between the weighted fusion (on the left) and the conflict-aware
fusion on the right. In both of the cases, we combine two opinions with
maximum certainty, but with conflicting average ratings, i.e., oA1 = (0, 1, 0.5)
(strong negative opinion) and oA1 = (1, 1, 0.5) (strong positive opinion).
When apply the weighted fusion the resulting opinion (ow for short) is
ow = (0.5, 1, 0.5). For this opinion we have to note that the expectation value
of the opinion is E(ow) = 0.5, due to the average rating (tw = 0.5), as the
certainty value of this opinion is cw = 1, which means that the average rating
is representative for future outcomes (i.e., expectation value, E). This in
turn means, that in a repeated series of experiments we can expect a similar
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number of positive outcomes as negative outcomes (given a sufficiently high
number of runs).
On the other hand, we have the resulting opinion (oc for short) is oc =
(0.5, 0, 0.5) and the DoC = 1 (maximum) of the conflict-aware fusion. For
this opinion, note that the expectation value of the opinion is E(oc) = 0.5, too.
However, this is due to the fact that the initial expectation value is fc = 0.5.
Furthermore, we see that the certainty value of this opinion is cc = 0, which
means that the average rating (tc = 0.5) is not necessarily representative for
future outcomes, i.e., it can easily change when new information becomes
available.
Now, we can ask ourselves which of the resulting opinions reflects the
situation better. The expectation value that the proposition under consider-
ation is true, e.g., that the cloud provider has a competent customer service
is 0.5 in both cases. In fact, if we think what would be the outcome of first
request to the customer support, the information that we have collected
propose that there is a probability of 0.5 for a positive experience and of 0.5
for a negative experience.
However, if we consider the case that we repeatedly run the experiment,
e.g., repeated and subsequent interaction with the customer support, we
should expect that the result of the second, third,· · · , n request is as satisfying
(or unsatisfying) as the first one. Therefore, we conclude that this line of
argumentation leads to the statement that the conflict-aware fusion produces
a better result than the weighted fusion.
Finally, if one observes the result of the weighted fusion, i.e., ow =
(0.5, 1, 0.5), this result is highly ambiguous and in fact, this could result from
an infinite amount of opinions, e.g., oA1 = (0, 1, 0.5) and oA2 = (1, 1, 0.5).
With the conflict-aware fusion, we address this problem by additionally
providing the DoC.
Example 3: The third example in Table 5.7 provides another comparison
between the weighted and the conflict-aware fusion. Here, the conflict between
the input parameters (on the left) is not as extreme as in example 2 which
is reflected by the DoC = 0.166 in the conflict-aware fusion (on the right).
In this example, we also see that the reduction of the certainty (i.e., from
cw = 0.6996 to cc = 0.5831) in the conflict-aware fusion usually leads to
a lower expectation value (0.3793) than the expectation value (0.4051) in
the weighted fusion. We argue that the lower expectation value in the
conflict-aware fusion is justified in this example, as the average ratings of
the input parameters are conflicting and thus, not representative. This effect
comes from the reduction of the certainty (in the conflict-aware fusion) which
in turn means that the expectation value is shifting closer to the initial
expectation value (leading to a lower expectation value in this example).
Finally, the example also demonstrates how the choice of the initial
expectation value (f) influence the HTI.
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5.4 Novel Architecture for Trust Management (TM)
using CertainLogic Framework
The mechanisms for assessing, representing and computing trustworthiness
(considering uncertainty and conflict) are introduced in the previous sections.
In this section, we propose a novel architecture (cf. Fig. 5.2) of a system for
managing trust in cloud computing marketplaces. The idea of the system
architecture rests on the definition of [JKD05], where the authors suggested
that a TM should allow trustees to reliably represent their capabilities and
allow trustors to make assessments and decisions regarding the dependability
of the trustees. Moreover, the proposed architecture of the system integrates
the formal framework (cf. Chapter 4) and the computational trust mecha-
nisms (cf. Section 5.1) in order to comply with the requirements stated in
Section 3.1 for trust systems.
The system is comprised of six modules, which are as follows.
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Figure 5.2: System Overview for Trust Management
Registration Manager (RM)
Cloud providers register through the RM to be able to act as sellers in a
cloud marketplace. They have to provide specifications regarding the services
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they offer and fill in the CAIQ as a part of the cloud marketplace policy. The
RM forwards the answers of the questionnaire and system/service description
to the CAIQ engine and TI (Trust Information) respectively for further
processing.
Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) En-
gine
The CAIQ engine enables cloud providers to fill in the questionnaire by
providing an intuitive graphical interface through the RM. The questionnaire
allows cloud providers to represent their capabilities regarding service-specific
attributes. The questions are designed to be answered in ’yes’ or ’no’. All
the assertions are stored in the TI for further processing. In order to utilize
the completed CAIQs in trust assessment process, we first need to assess the
assertions and then, convert the assessment results into the CertainTrust
opinion representation. The CAIQ assessment is discussed in Section 6.1.2.
Experimental evaluation is performed using the completed CAIQs, published
in the CSA STAR, in Section 6.2.
Trust Manager (TMg)
The TMg allows cloud consumers to specify their requirements before as-
sessing the trustworthiness of cloud providers. It provides a front end to
the users for specifying their requirements. Based on the requirements, the
TMg provides the trust score of cloud providers by using the Trust Semantic
Engine (TSE) and Trust Computation Engine (TCE). By default, users
receive the trust value of a cloud provider based on their completed CAIQ
and the assessment of their underlying services/systems. Otherwise, users
can specify their own preferences, e.g., security and performance are preferred
over customer support, according to their business policy and requirements in
order to get a customised trust value of the cloud providers. Users may also
choose the sources of trust information that need to be taken into account
when computing the trustworthiness values of cloud providers. The TMg
should also be able to provide trustworthiness value for every single attribute
considered for the calculation of trustworthiness value by means of opinion
(t, c, f) representation and graphical interface (i.e., HTI ). In the proposed
architecture (cf. Fig. 5.2), the TMg is tightly coupled with the TSE and
TCE to provide the above mentioned features to cloud consumers.
Trust Semantics Engine (TSE)
The TSE is able to model which configuration of PLT s are required by the
consumers in order to evaluate the trustworthiness of a cloud provider. A
default configuration of PLT s is based on the CAIQ assertions stored in the
repository (TI ). For deriving the PLTs from system/service specifications,
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the TSE integrates the formal framework proposed in 4.3.1. PLT s can also
be derived from the CAIQ. The approach for deriving the PLTs from the
CAIQ is discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Moreover, this engine supports users for expressing service-specific at-
tributes as well as the sources of the information according to their choice.
The TSE is able to customise the configuration of PLTs in order to reflect
the users’ preference. Customized PLTs are sent to the TCE for the final
evaluation.
Trust Computation Engine (TCE)
The TCE contains the definitions of CertainLogic operators in order to
aggregate opinions associated with the PLTs. The TCE is tightly coupled
with the TSE in order to enable the quantitative evaluation of PLTs. The
outcome of the evaluation is a numerical score, i.e., trustworthiness value,
along with a graphical representation of the score. The numerical values are
archived in the TI repository after computation.
Trust Update Engine (TUE)
The TUE is designed to collect opinions from various sources about the
trustworthiness of cloud providers. The opinions collected here should
be filtered appropriately so that users may use opinions that are valid
according to their requirements. For example, spam filtering should be
used to eliminate junk or useless information stored in the TI repository.
Moreover, the sources should be authorised before they are able to provide
opinions. The authorisation process should verify the identity of a source as
well as trustworthiness of it’s underlying platforms. The filtering of opinions
and authorisation of sources are extremely important to ensure the reliability
of trust assessment process inside the TM system.
5.5 Summary
This chapter provides a set of novel apparatus and mechanisms to evaluate
the trustworthiness of service providers in distributed service environments,
particularly in cloud computing marketplaces. The core aspects of this
chapter can be summarized as follows:
1. CertainTrust is extended to a framework named CertainLogic that
provides definitions of the logical operators (AND, OR, NOT ) that
combine opinions about independent propositions.
2. CertainLogic has further extended to provide definitions of non-standard
operators, A.FUSION , W.FUSION , C.FUSION , which combine
opinions about dependent propositions. C.FUSION is a novel fusion
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operator which is particularly designed to deal with weights (to model
user preferences) and conflict among the opinions about dependent
propositions.
3. Finally, a novel architecture for trust management is proposed to enable
service providers to present their capabilities and consumers to evaluate
the trustworthiness of service providers in marketplaces. CertainLogic
operators and the formal framework are the nucleus of the proposed
trust management system architecture. The proposed architecture is
designed to manage trust information regarding multiple attributes
and information that are derived from multiple sources to determine
the trustworthiness of service providers.
Our proposed trust establishment mechanisms are evaluated in the next
chapter using an instantiation of the trust management system architecture
proposed in Section 5.4.
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6
Evaluation
This chapter provides a quantitative evaluation of CertainLogic operators in
real-world scenarios of cloud computing. In such scenarios, one would expect
the evaluation of CertainLogic operators on opinions derived from evidence
available from cloud providers in the real world. At present, only Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA) provides a publicly accessible repository, i.e., STAR,
where cloud providers disclose service-specific security attributes regarding
their services. These attributes are basically the domains, e.g., Compliance
(CO), Information Security (IS), in the top level of the CSA CAIQ framework.
The assertions in reply to the lowest level control questions are the pieces
of evidence, which infer the existence of a top level domain in the CAIQ
framework. In this section, those pieces of evidence are leveraged to generate
opinions and the CertainLogic operators along with the formal framework
are applied on the opinions in order to evaluate the trustworthiness of cloud
providers.
For the purpose of evaluation, we implement a realization of the TM
system architecture proposed in Section 5.4. The realization of the sys-
tem is discussed in Section 6.1. The realised system enables quantitative
trustworthiness evaluation (cf. Section 6.2) of service providers based on
the assertions (i.e., evidence) about their service/system attributes. The
main reason for leveraging the STAR datasets in trust evaluation phase is
to demonstrate the practicality of assessing and evaluating trustworthiness
of cloud providers before consumers agree to a contract (e.g., SLA) with
providers on provisioning offered services. In this chapter, several experi-
ments are conducted using the datasets to justify the applicability of the
formal framework and CertainLogic operators proposed in Chapter 4 and 5
respectively.
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This chapter includes following three sets of experiments.
• In the first set of experiments, we demonstrate the applicability of
CertainLogic AND (∧) operator to combine opinions on independent
service-specific capabilities of cloud providers. The real datasets from
the CSA STAR [CSAd] are leveraged to conduct the experiments.
• In the second set of experiments, we demonstrate the applicability of
CertainLogic AND (∧) and OR (∨) operators to assess the trustwor-
thiness of composite distributed systems and services in the context of
cloud computing environments.
• In the third set of experiments, we consider a cloud computing mar-
ketplace scenario to demonstrate the applicability of CertainLogic
FUSION operators to combine opinions from different sources. The
CSA STAR datasets are leveraged to generate opinions for the experi-
ments conducted using FUSION operators.
6.1 Realization of the TM System Architecture
This section discusses the building blocks of the realised system that leverage
the security control self-assessment framework (CAIQ) as a basis for trust
management. Firstly, we provide an overview of the CSA CAIQ which is
important to understand the rationale behind the realised system. Secondly,
we discuss how the formal framework and the proposed operators leverage
the completed CAIQs to evaluate the trustworthiness of cloud providers.
Finally, the key features of the realised system is discussed.
6.1.1 CSA CAIQ Revisited
The CAIQ includes 11 domains such as; Compliance (CO), Data Governance
(DG), Facility Security (FS), Human Resources security (HR), Information
Security (IS), LeGal (LG), OPerations management (OP), RIsk management
(RI), Release Management (RM), ReSiliency (RS) and Security Architecture
(SA). Each of these domains consists of several controls and control questions.
The basic structure of the CAIQ is shown in Figure 6.1. For brevity, only 2
domains and their corresponding structures are shown. The CAIQ consists
of 98 controls under 11 domains. On the one hand, these controls resemble
requirements of the users who are interested to determine whether a cloud
provider satisfies their requirements; while on the other hand, the same
controls represents the cloud provider’s capabilities. Each of these controls
has one or more questions which are designed to be answered by the cloud
providers in a ‘yes/no’ manner. Based on the given answers, consumers learn
about the capabilities of cloud providers.
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Figure 6.1: CSA CAIQ: Overview of basic structure
6.1.2 CAIQ Assessment
Assumptions
Our approach for the CAIQ assessment is based on the following assumptions.
We assume that cloud providers provide one set of valid answers in response
to the CAIQ for each of their services they offer and the answers are stored
in the CSA STAR. The CSA is responsible for checking the authenticity and
the basic accuracy of the answered questionnaires [CSAe].
Approach
In order to assess the CAIQ, we apply the formal framework (cf. Chapter 4)
and necessary CertainLogic operators (cf. Chapter 5). The approach is
detailed as follows:
1. Firstly, the formal framework is used to construct the PLTs from the
given CAIQ domains. The TSE module of the proposed system (cf.
Figure 5.2) is an instantiation of the formal framework that constructs
the PLTs. In the context of the CAIQ, it means that the PLT con-
figuration consists of 11 operands (i.e., domains) combined with 10
AND (∧) operators. Conceptually, PLT configuration is constructed as
follows:
CO ∧DG ∧ FS ∧HR ∧ IS ∧ LG ∧OP ∧RI ∧RM ∧RS ∧ SA
2. Secondly, for evaluating the PLTs, the associated opinion (t, c, f) for
each of the propositions (CAIQ domains) is required. The opinions
need to be extracted from each of the domains, where the underlying
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questions are answered by the cloud providers. The answers are in the
form of ‘yes’ or ‘no’, which upon analysis can be classified to positive
and negative pieces of evidence. These evidence units correspond to the
existence of each of the CAIQ domains, which in the end demonstrate
the level of security capabilities a cloud provider has, regarding the
services they offer in cloud marketplaces. In [Rie09b], there exists a
mapping, which is proposed to map the collected pieces of evidence to
the opinion space. The mapping (cf. Equation 6.1) has been proposed
in the context of ubiquitous computing environments, where evidence
units are collected based on a trustor’s interaction experience with a
trustee. In this context, positive (r) and negative (s) pieces of evidence
are mapped to the CertainTrust opinion space. In the context of CAIQ,
evidence units are based on the self-assessment of security capabilities
that cloud providers possess regarding the services they offer. As the
existence of the capabilities are reasoned based on the given assertions,
the same mapping function is used to derive opinions from the given
assertions, i.e., positive and negative pieces of evidence, under each
of the domains. The mapping between the evidence space and the
CertainTrust opinion space is as follows:
t =
0 if r + s = 0 ,r
r+s else .
c = N · (r + s)2 · (N − (r + s)) +N · (r + s)
f = consumer’s expectation about each of the CAIQ domains = 0.99
(6.1)
The detailed definitions of the parameters are as follows:
• Average rating, t, is calculated based on the number of positive
assertions (i.e., r=yes) and the number of negative assertions
(s=no) under each domain. If there are no questions answered
with ‘yes’ or ‘no’, t is 0. Otherwise, t is the relative frequency of
positive and negative assertions.
• Certainty, c, is calculated based on the total number of questions,
N and the number of positive and negative assertions under each
domain. The c is 1 when all questions under each domain are
answered with positive or negative assertions and 0 if none are
answered.
The definition of N is adjusted according to the context of CAIQ
assessment. The total number of questions, N , not only consider
positive and negative assertions but also the unanswered questions
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under each domain. The unanswered questions can be of two
types:
(a) Question that cloud providers left out for unknown reasons or
an answer to a question is indeterminable to classify as ‘yes’
or ‘no’.
(b) Question that does not fit the scope of the services (i.e., Not
Applicable) that are offered by the cloud providers.
In order to deal with the above mentioned types of questions, we
define N as following:
– For type 2a, the unknown (we refer to as ‘u’) marked answer(s)
to the corresponding question(s) under each domain are taken
into account. That means, N = r + s+ u.
– For type 2b, the Not Applicable (we refer to as ‘NA’) marked
answers under each domain are not included in the calculation
ofN . That means, N = (r+s+u) = Total number of questions
− NA
• Initial expectation, f , is set as high (i.e., 0.99) for every single do-
main assuming that cloud providers publish information regarding
their capabilities in the STAR repository truthfully and accu-
racy of those information are validated using CloudAudit [CSAa]
framework. Recently, a practical approach to validate the CAIQ
assertions is proposed in [HVM13a, HVM13b] using a hybrid trust
framework, i.e., combining evidence-based trust mechanism (soft
trust) with the certificate-based (hard trust) property attestation
mechanism. The outcome of the validation is represented in the
form of CertainTrust opinion representation, i.e., (t, c). The initial
expectation value (f) then can be calculated based on the numer-
ical values associated with t and c using the Equation 2.2.3 given
in Section 2.2.2.2. Another mechanism for calculating f from cer-
tification processes such as audits are demonstrated in [HVHM12].
In both of these cases, calculated f is a continuous value between
0 and 1. Calculating f is considered out of the scope of this thesis.
Hence, both of the above mentioned methods for calculating f
are not taken into account in this thesis.
Example
In order to provide an in-depth insight to our approach, we illustrate
it by means of an intuitive example. Let us apply our approach (cf.
Section 6.1.2) to assess a completed CAIQ questionnaire. In order
to keep it simple, the assessment approach considers two domains,
Compliance (CO) and Information Security (IS).
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According to the latest version of CAIQ [CSAc], CO has 16 questions
under eight different controls. Let us assume that cloud provider ‘X’
has answered the CO domain and the answers are classified as follows:
• Number of positive assertions, r = 11
• Number of negative assertions, s = 2
• Number of unknown assertions, u = 2
• Number of Not Applicable assertions, NA = 1
• Number of questions, N = 15, due to 1 NA question
Now, using the Equation 6.1, the resulting opinion (t, c, f) is computed
as follows:
t = 11(11 + 2) = 0.8462
c = 15 · (11 + 2)2 · (15− (11 + 2)) + 15 · (11 + 2)
= 0.9798
f = 0.99
(6.2)
The corresponding opinion, i.e., (t, c, f), on IS domain can be derived
from the given assertions of cloud provider ‘X’ following the same ap-
proach as CO domain. According to the given assertions, the resulting
opinion for the IS domain is, (t, c, f) = (1, 1, 0.99). It means that
all the questions are answered with positive assertions. Following the
first step of our approach, we construct the PLTs (CO ∧ IS) as shown
earlier. Then, the opinions that are derived from the given assertions
provide a basis for evaluating the PLTs.
3. Opinion on Cloud provider ‘X’ regarding their capabilities, i.e., Com-
pliance (CO) and Information Security (IS), are combined based on
the definition of the AND operator (cf. Table 5.1). The final opinion
on PLTs (i.e., (CO ∧ IS)) means that the cloud provider ‘X’ has an
average rating, t = 0.8478, with high certainty of 0.9898 under an initial
expectation of 0.99 regarding both capabilities. The expectation value
(E = 0.8491), calculated based on the resulting opinion, interprets
that the cloud provider is trustworthy regarding their capabilities to
a degree of 0.8491. This value can also be denoted as trustworthiness
value.
In the next section, a detailed discussion on the implemented CAIQ
assessment tool is given.
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Figure 6.2: Visualization of CCA tool: Domain
6.1.3 Implementation
The implemented realization of the TM system is named “Cloud Control
Assessment (CCA)” tool. The tool is developed to assess the assertions of
the CAIQ and evaluate cloud providers based on the assessment. It has two
special features in contrast to the current status of the CSA CAIQ:
1. The proposed tool provides a intuitive graphical interface for answering
questions and supports interactive visualization of the assessment.
2. Our proposed tool also allows to load a completed questionnaire from
the CSA STAR. For evaluating the questionnaire, CCA includes the
features of the TSE to configure the PLTs and TCE (definition of
the operators such as AND and FUSION ) component as described in
Section 5.4. The main objective is to quantify the CAIQ assessment into
a trustworthiness score (i.e., expectation value) with complementary
numerical and graphical opinion representations.
The graphical interface (cf. Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3) of the tool has
three panels and a menu bar:
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Figure 6.3: Visualization of CCA tool: Control Question
1. Navigation Panel: This panel has a tree-like structure to display and
navigate the users to the CAIQ domains, their controls and control-
specific questions.
2. Description and Input Panel: This panel provides description of each
of the domains when selected in the navigation panel. Moreover,
the control questions are displayed with their corresponding options
(i.e., ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘unknown’ and ‘NA’) when a particular control (e.g.,
Independent Audits) under a domain is selected in the navigation panel.
These four options are given as radio buttons to allow faster input
from the users (i.e., cloud providers) compared to the current approach
(manual input in a Excel sheet) designed by CSA.
3. Display Panel: This panel displays results and progress or status by
means of a graphical interface (i.e., CertainTrust HTI) and status bars,
respectively. The HTI shows the opinion (t, c, f) and the corresponding
expectation value (E) in a special panel on its left. The status bars are
introduced for monitoring the progress of the assessment interactively.
On the one hand, it provides cloud consumers a quick summary of the
assessment based on the assertions given by the cloud providers. On
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the other hand, cloud providers are able to monitor their progress in
terms of numerical and graphical representations.
4. Menu bar: The bar includes ‘Save’ and ‘Load’ functions that are
extremely important for lengthy questionnaire such as the CAIQ with
197 questions. To respond to 197 questions under 11 domains is quite
a cumbersome task. Keeping that problem in mind, we developed this
tool in a way so that the cloud providers can save their undone tasks
while filling the questionnaire and load them at any convenient time.
The load function is also essential for our evaluation phase. We use this
function to load the questionnaires published in the STAR repository.
6.2 Experimental Evaluation: CertainLogic AND
Operator
In this section, we discuss the experiments conducted using the CAIQ datasets
published in the STAR. The objective of the experiments are to demonstrate
the applicability of CertainLogic operators.
Following three cases is considered to demonstrate the applicability of
CertainLogic AND (∧) operator:
1. Best case. In the best case, it is assumed that the Cloud provider ‘X’
provides all positive assertions when filling in the CAIQ. Hence, only
positive synthetic assertions are taken into consideration to demonstrate
the effect of CertainLogic AND (∧) operator on the resulting opinion,
i.e., aggregated opinion associated with the CAIQ domains.
The hypothesis we want to test here is: CertainLogic AND operator
calculates maximum trustworthiness value of a cloud provider if the
provider asserts the existence (i.e., all positive assertions) of all the
capabilties regarding the domains.
2. Practical case. In this case, assertions derived from the STAR
datasets are considered for the experiments. These experiments demon-
strate the realistic effect of CertainLogic AND (∧) operator in the
context of assessment and evaluation of cloud providers based on their
assertions given in the STAR.
The hypothesis we want to test here is: CertainLogic AND operator
calculates the trustworthiness value of a cloud provider based on the
opinions derived from their given assertions published in the STAR and
the operator behaves as expected (cf. Section 5.2.3).
3. Customised case. This case considers personal preferences of a
consumer on selecting attributes, e.g., CO, DG, SA domains in the
context of CAIQ, when assessing the capabilities of cloud providers.
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This particular case demonstrates the effect of AND (∧) operator
by calculating the customised trustworthiness value according to the
requirements specified by a consumer.
The hypothesis we want to test here is: CertainLogic AND operator
calculates the customised trustworthiness value based on the opinions
associated with the domains that are specified by a consumer and the
operator behaves as expected (cf. Section 5.2.3).
Apart from the above mentioned three cases, there can be a worst case
where a cloud provider might leave all the questions unanswered or answer
all the questions with negative assertions. This particular case is assumed to
be unrealistic as a cloud provider is not going to engage in such a practice
which might lower its trustworthiness in a marketplace. One might think
of a case where a cloud provider can be impersonated by a malicious entity
and provides false information in order to hamper the cloud provider’s
trustworthiness. We assume that the CSA (as a trusted third party) checks
the authenticity of the submissions as well as the identities of cloud providers
and accuracy of the contents before publishing them in the CSA STAR.
6.2.1 Experiments: best case
Table 6.1: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ’X’: Best case
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) (t, c, f);E
CO 16 0 0 0 16 (1,1,0.99)
(1,1,0.8953);E=1
DG 16 0 0 0 16 (1,1,0.99)
FS 9 0 0 0 9 (1,1,0.99)
HS 4 0 0 0 4 (1,1,0.99)
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
IS 75 0 0 0 75 (1,1,0.99)
LG 4 0 0 0 4 (1,1,0.99)
OM 9 0 0 0 9 (1,1,0.99)
RI 14 0 0 0 14 (1,1,0.99)
RM 6 0 0 0 6 (1,1,0.99)
RS 12 0 0 0 12 (1,1,0.99)
SA 32 0 0 0 32 (1,1,0.99)
Table 6.1 shows the positive assertions in the evidence space and their
resulting opinions (t, c, f) using Equation 6.1. The last column of the table
shows the final assessment based on the aggregation of all resulting opinions
using the CertainLogic AND (∧) operator. The final assessment is given in
opinion representation (t, c, f) and expectation value (E). In the final assess-
ment, one can see how the AND (∧) operator affects the initial expectation,
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f . It holds 0.99 (high expectation) for every single domain whereas for all
domains it holds 0.8953. This is because of all assertions related to controls
have to be true simultaneously.
6.2.2 Experiments: practical case
The STAR repository has several sets of completed questionnaires filled in by
different cloud providers [CSAd]. We chose three sets of CAIQs completed
by Cloud provider ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘S’. The identities of the cloud providers are
anonymized due to usage restrictions of the STAR. At present, the STAR
repository as it stands does not classify the completed CAIQs according
to the service delivery models (e.g., SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) offered by the cloud
providers. Thus, considering synthetic CAIQs which are assumed to be
completed by Cloud provider ‘Y’ and Cloud provider ‘Z’. Cloud provider
‘Y’ offer services with same functionalities as Cloud provider ‘A’ and Cloud
provider ‘Z’ offer services with same functionalities as Cloud provider ‘B’.
Table 6.2: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘A’ (anonymized): Practical
case
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) (t, c, f);E
CO 16 0 0 0 16 (1,1,0.99)
(0.5186,0.9945,0.8953);E=0.5207
DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 7 0 2 0 9 (1,0.9403,0.99)
HS 4 0 0 0 4 (1,1,0.99)
IS 72 2 0 1 74 (0.973,1,0.99)
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
LG 2 0 0 2 2 (1,1,0.99)
OM 4 3 0 2 7 (0.5714,1,0.99)
RI 12 0 1 1 13 (1,0.9873,0.99)
RM 5 0 0 1 5 (1,1,0.99)
RS 9 0 2 1 11 (1,0.9612,0.99)
SA 22 0 0 10 22 (1,1,0.99)
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 present a summary of the assertions and the
corresponding resulting opinions are calculated using the Equation 6.1, which
maps the given assertions to opinion. According to the final assessment
given in Table 6.2 and 6.3, cloud consumers can identify a potential cloud
provider based on the computed expectation value. The expectation value
of Cloud provider ‘A’ is much higher than that of Cloud provider ‘Y’. It
means that provider ‘A’ is more trustworthy than provider ‘Y’ based on the
assessment of capabilities regarding security controls. Hence, the expectation
value is a reasonable indicator for cloud consumers to identify a trustworthy
114 CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION
Table 6.3: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘Y’: Practical case using
synthetic datasets
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) (t, c, f);E
CO 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
(0.2239,0.9976,0.8953);E=0.2255
DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 7 0 2 0 9 (1,0.9403,0.99)
HS 4 0 0 0 4 (1,1,0.99)
IS 72 2 0 1 74 (0.973,1,0.9865)
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
LG 2 2 0 0 4 (0.5,1,0.99)
OM 4 3 0 2 7 (0.5714,1,0.99)
RI 12 1 1 0 14 (0.9231,0.9891,0.99)
RM 5 0 0 1 5 (1,1,0.99)
RS 9 0 2 1 11 (1,0.9612,0.99)
SA 22 0 0 10 22 (1,1,0.99)
cloud provider, Cloud provider ‘A’ in this case. Note that in addition to the
expectation value, the certainty (c) value is a good indicator of whether the
aggregated average rating (t) is representative or whether further analysis
is required. If the consumers need further analysis, they can browse each
domain individually (using our CCA tool) for comprehensive assessment of
the security controls released by the cloud provider(s).
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 present another set of experiments where Cloud
provider ‘B’ is assessed based on its published capabilities regarding the
service that provider ‘B’ offers. Based on the CAIQ assessment, the computed
expectation value (E) for Cloud provider ‘B’ is 0.1798 which is pretty low
compared to the calculated expectation value, E = 0.5912, of Cloud provider
‘Z’. It means that provider ‘Z’ is more trustworthy than provider ‘B’ based on
the assessment of completed CAIQ. By analysing the assertions given in both
of the tables, we conclude that provider ‘Z’ possess more capabilities compare
to provider ‘B’ regarding several security controls. This is the rationale why
the calculated expectation value (E) for provider ‘Z’ is higher than that of
provider ‘B’.
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Table 6.4: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘B’ (anonymized): Practical
case
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) (t, c, f);E
CO 13 1 0 2 14 (0.9286,1,0.99)
(0.1798,1,0.8953);E=0.1798
DG 14 2 0 0 16 (0.875,1,0.99)
FS 8 1 0 0 9 (0.8889,1,0.99)
HS 4 0 0 0 4 (1,1,0.99)
IS 64 8 0 3 72 (0.8889,1,0.99)
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
LG 2 0 0 2 2 (1,1,0.99)
OM 4 1 0 4 5 (0.8,1,0.99)
RI 12 1 0 1 13 (0.9231,1,0.99)
RM 3 2 0 1 5 (0.6,1,0.99)
RS 9 2 0 1 11 (0.8182,1,0.99)
SA 17 5 0 10 22 (0.7727,1,0.99)
Table 6.5: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘Z’: Practical case using
synthetic datasets
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) (t, c, f);E
CO 14 0 0 2 14 (1,1,0.99)
(0.5911,0.9997,0.8953);E=0.5912
DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 9 0 0 0 9 (1,1,0.99)
HS 4 0 0 0 4 (1,1,0.99)
IS 71 1 0 3 72 (0.9861,1,0.9861)
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
LG 2 0 0 2 2 (1,1,0.99)
OM 5 0 0 4 5 (1,1,0.99)
RI 12 1 0 1 13 (0.9231,1,0.99)
RM 4 1 0 1 5 (0.8,1,0.99)
RS 10 1 0 1 11 (0.9091,1,0.99)
SA 20 1 1 10 22 (0.9524,0.9957,0.99)
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6.2.3 Experiments: customised case
Table 6.6: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ’A’ (anonymised): Cus-
tomised case
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) (t, c, f);E
CO 16 0 0 0 16 (1,1,0.99)
(0.9109,0.9862,0.9606);E=0.9116DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 7 0 2 0 9 (1,0.9403,0.99)
IS 72 2 0 1 74 (0.973,1,0.99) c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Table 6.7: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ’Y’: Customised case
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) (t, c, f);E
CO 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
(0.8532,0.987,0.9606);E=0.8546DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 7 0 2 0 9 (1,0.9403,0.99)
IS 72 2 0 1 74 (0.973,1,0.99) c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 reflect consumer’s preferences to evaluate a
trustworthy provider in the cloud marketplace. In such a marketplace, a
consumer might require cloud providers to possess capabilities regarding CO,
DG, FS and IS domains as a part of their service provisioning policy. We
demonstrate experiments on the completed CAIQs by Cloud ‘A’ and Cloud
‘Y’. By enabling customization feature of the CCA tool on the completed
CAIQs, we observe notable changes in opinion values as well as in expectation
values calculated for both providers in comparison to the results given in
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. Moreover, the customisation feature allows the
customers to get a personalized assessment of cloud providers’ capabilities in
contrast to the existing excel-based tool available on the CSA website.
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In continuation, there will now be an analysis of the documented results
in Table 6.6 and 6.7. The expectation values, calculated based on the
customization of the domains, are an improvement than the values calculated
in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. The reason behind the deflection of the expectation
values is that the assertions related to the required capabilities are more
‘positive’ than that of Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. It means that the cloud
providers in Table 6.6 and 6.7 are more trustworthy in the customised case
than in the practical case. Based on the results of the final assessment in the
customised case, we conclude that cloud provider ‘A’ is more trustworthy than
cloud provider ‘Y’. The reason here is that ‘A’ possess all the capabilities
under CO domain whereas provider ‘Y’ lacks one capability under that
domain.
In this section, we have demonstrated the applicability of the formal
framework and CertainLogic operator for combining opinions on independent
propositions. The propositions are constructed according to the independent
domains given in the CSA CAIQ. Opinions on the propositions are derived
from the assertions given by the cloud providers in the STAR. Considering
CertainLogic AND (∧) operator for combining opinions in this context
demonstrates the operator’s applicability in a real world setting.
6.3 Experimental Evaluation: CertainLogic AND
and OR Operators
In order to demonstrate the applicability of CertainLogic AND and OR
operators together, we revisit the cloud computing scenario discussed briefly
in Chapter 4 Section 4.3. That scenario demonstrates how the evaluation of
trustworthiness of a complex distributed system can be carried out, if there is
an appropriate approach for constructing the PLTs from system specification.
The approach is discussed in Chapter 4 with intuitive examples. Thus,
in this section, we only focus on the quantitative evaluation of PLTs (i.e.,
formal representation of a composite distributed system) using CertainLogic
operators. In this case, the TCE component, implemented for the realised
system (cf. Section 6.1), is used to evaluate the PLTs.
6.3.1 Scenario: A Composite Service in Cloud Computing
Assuming that we evaluate the trustworthiness of a simple cloud-based
Medical Record Management (MRM) service focusing on its availability. We
firstly stick to a single service provider, i.e., Cloud provider ‘X’ offering a
MRM service S.
In this case (cf. Fig. 6.4), the MRM service S directly relies on two
subsystems, S1 providing authentication capabilities, S2 offering storage
capacity for sales data and data mining capabilities, and an atomic component
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A1 A2 
Service S1 
Service S 
N1= {A1,A2} 
 
B1 B2 B3 
Service S2 
 
N2= {B1,B2,B3} 
 
(1 out of N3)=:l3 
Service C N3= C 
(1 out of N1)=:l1 (1 out of N2)=:l2 
(3 out of {l1,l2,l3}):=l 
Figure 6.4: A MRM service: determination of PLTs
C for the service-specific billing. Subsystem S1 consist of two authentication
servers (A1 and A2), where at least one of the servers has to be available.
Similarly, subsystem S2 is composed of three redundant database servers,
where one server needs to be available.
We assume that the collected information (i.e., opinions) about the
trustworthiness of the subsystems and atomic components are known. Based
on the given system description and opinions, trustworthiness evaluation of
the composite system can be carried out by evaluating the following PLTs:
(A1 ∨A2) ∧ (B1 ∨B2 ∨B3) ∧ C
where A1 is a proposition, which is true if component A1 behaves as ex-
pected, e.g., the component replies to requests within a certain time limit;
the interpretations of the other propositions are assigned in the same way.
Although we restricted the scope of our example to availability, note that
it is possible to model statements about the fulfilment of other relevant
properties (e.g., attested / self-evaluated security properties of a component
or subsystem) as propositions and to consider them in the evaluation of the
overall trustworthiness of the system using PLTs. However, as the knowledge
about the fulfilment of the propositions is subject to uncertainty, the evalua-
tion method has to take this uncertainty into account when calculating the
trustworthiness of the overall system.
6.3.2 Evaluation
Here, we show how the AND (∧) and OR (∨) operators of CertainLogic can
be applied to the scenario presented in Section 6.3.1. The propositional logic
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term for evaluating the trustworthiness of the system in the scenario is given
as:
(A1 ∨A2) ∧ (B1 ∨B2 ∨B3) ∧ C
For the evaluation, we assume that we have good knowledge about the
components of subsystem S1 (consisting of A1 and A2) and subsystem S2
(consisting of B1, B2, and B3) and that the components are highly available.
The opinions oA1 and oA2 as well as the resulting opinion oA1∨A2 = oS1 are
given in Table 6.8(a). The opinions oB1 , oB2 , and oB3 as well as the resulting
opinion oB1∨B2∨B3 = oS2 are given in Table 6.8(b). In both cases, the
subsystems are highly trustworthy (E(oS1) = 0.9963 and E(oS2) = 0.9503)
and the certainty for both systems is also high (cS1 = 0.9956 and cS2 =
0.9608).
We demonstrate the advantage of CertainLogic operators by considering
two different test cases regarding the trustworthiness of the atomic component
C. Depending on whether the component is hosted by the owner of the
overall system or by a third party, the certainty about the behaviour of
this component might be higher or lower. The hypothesis we want to test
with these two cases is: the trustworthiness of a single subsystem influences
the trustworthiness of the overall system/service. The third test case is
to demonstrate the application of operators for comparing two competitive
services/systems based on the redundancy of the underlying components. For
this case, we consider adding a redundant component under the subsystem
B, i.e., B4. The hypothesis we want to test here is: adding a redundant
component in service increases the level of trustworthiness of the overall
system/service regarding availability attribute.
Table 6.8: Cloud provider ‘X’: Resulting opinions for S1 and S2
(a) S1:
oA1 (0.90, 0.98, 0.5)
oA2 (0.99, 0.95, 0.5)
oA1∨A2 = oS1 (0.9974, 0.9956, 0.75)
E = 0.9963
(b) S2:
oB1 (0.70, 0.80, 0.50)
oB2 (0.75, 0.80, 0.50)
oB3 (0.70, 0.90, 0.50)
oB1∨B2∨B3 = oS2 (0.9584, 0.9608, 0.875)
E = 0.9503
The experiments regarding the above mentioned three cases are as follows.
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Table 6.9: Cloud provider ‘X’: Resulting opinions for S
(a) Case 1:
oC oS1∧S2∧C = oS
high certainty (0.90, 0.90, 0.50) (0.8604, 0.9211, 0.3281)
E(oS) = 0.8184
 c
 t
0
1
1
0
E
low certainty (0.90, 0.10, 0.50) (0.853, 0.3539, 0.3281)
E(oS) = 0.5139
 c
 t
0
1
1
0
E
(b) Case 2:
oC oS1∧S2∧C = oS
high certainty (0.90, 0.90, 0.90) (0.8665, 0.9635, 0.5906)
E(oS) = 0.8564
 c
 t
0
1
1
0
E
low certainty (0.90, 0.10, 0.90) (0.933, 0.7764, 0.5906)
E(oS) = 0.8564
 c
 t
0
1
1
0
E
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• Case 1: We assume that the trustworthiness of C is given as oC =
(0.90, 0.90, 0.50) [high certainty] and as oC = (0.90, 0.10, 0.50) [low
certainty]. For brevity, the trustworthiness of the overall system S
(consisting of S1, S2, and C) are given in Table 6.9(a). In the first row,
we see that the high certainty in oC is also reflected in the resulting
opinion (cS = 0.9211), whereas the low certainty in oC is reflected in
the resulting opinion (cS = 0.3539) in the second row. In this example,
we have different expectation values for oC (depending on the certainty),
and thus also different expectation values for oS .
• Case 2: Here, we assume that the trustworthiness of C is given as
oC = (0.90, 0.90, 0.90) [high certainty] or as oC = (0.90, 0.10, 0.90)
[low certainty]. Both of these opinions lead to the same expectation
values. The expectation value for the trustworthiness of the overall
system is also the same. It is due to the compliance of the logical
operators of CertainLogic with the same operators in the standard
probabilistic approach. However, in our approach the different values
for the certainty in the input parameters are still visible in the final
result, for the certainty it holds cS = 0.9635 [high certainty] and
cS = 0.7764 [low certainty] (cf. Table 6.9(b)).
Table 6.10: Resulting Opinions for S2
(a) Case 3: S2 of Cloud provider ‘X’
oB1 (0.70, 0.80, 0.50)
oB2 (0.75, 0.80, 0.50)
oB3 (0.70, 0.90, 0.50)
oB1∨B2∨B3 = oS2 (0.9584, 0.9608, 0.875)
E = 0.9503
(b) Case 3: S2 of Cloud provider ‘Z’
oB1 (0.70, 0.80, 0.50)
oB2 (0.75, 0.80, 0.50)
oB3 (0.70, 0.90, 0.50)
oB4 (0.99, 0.99, 0.50)
oB1∨B2∨B3∨B4 = oS2 (0.9992, 0.9987, 0.9375)
E = 0.9991
• Case 3: In a real world setting, one would assume that a MRM service
might be offered by another provider, e.g., Cloud provider ‘Z’. The
service offered by Cloud provider ‘Z’ assumed to have one redundant
component (under S2) more than the subsystem S2 of MRM service
of Cloud provider ‘X’ offers. The redundant component is denoted
as B4 and it is highly trustworthy component, i.e., (0.99, 0.99, 0.50),
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which is evident just by looking at the opinion representation of that
component. Table 6.10(a) and Table 6.10(b) lists the opinions of the
individual components as well as the resulting opinion of the subsystems
of provider ‘X’ and ‘Z’. Now, if we compare only the resulting opinion,
(0.9584, 0.9608, 0.875), of S2 of Cloud provider ‘X’ with the resulting
opinion, (0.9992, 0.9987, 0.9375), of Cloud provider ‘Z’, it is evident
that by adding an additional redundant component under S2 of Cloud
provider ‘Z’ lifts up the trustworthiness value, i.e., E = 0.9991, of
subsystem S2 compare to the trustworthiness value, i.e., E = 0.9503,
of subsystem S2 of provider ‘X’. This is because of the influence of
CertainLogic OR operator on aggregating the opinions associated with
the redundant components under the subsystem S2.
Table 6.11: Comparison between MRM service (S) of Cloud provider ‘X’
and Cloud provider ‘Z’
(a) Case 3: Resulting opinion of MRM service of provider ‘X’
oS1 oS2 oC oS
(0.9974, 0.9956, 0.75) (0.9584, 0.9608, 0.875) (0.90, 0.90, 0.50) (0.8604, 0.9211, 0.3281)
E(oS) = 0.8184
 c
 t
0
1
1
0
E
(b) Case 3: Resulting opinion of MRM service of provider ‘Z’
oS1 oS2 oC oS
(0.9974, 0.9956, 0.75) (0.9992, 0.9987, 0.9375) (0.90, 0.90, 0.50) (0.899, 0.9216, 0.3516)
E(oS) = 0.8561
 c
 t
0
1
1
0
E
Table 6.11 lists the calculated trustworthiness value, i.e., E, of overall
service S offered by Cloud provider ‘X’ and ‘Z’ in Table 6.11(a)
and 6.11(b) respectively. In Table 6.11(b), we see that the expectation
value (E(oS) = 0.8561) of the MRM service offered by Cloud provider
‘Z’ is higher than the expectation value (E(oS) = 0.8184) calculated
for the same service offered by Cloud provider ‘X’. This is only because
of the additional redundant component B4 considered for the MRM
service of provider ‘Z’, as all other components and subsystems as
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well as their values are the same for both services offered by different
providers.
6.4 Experimental Evaluation: CertainLogic FU-
SION Operators
In this section, we consider a cloud marketplace scenario (similar to the
scenario in Section 4.4.1) and demonstrate the applicability of the proposed
fusion operators in that scenario. The objectives are two-fold.
• Firstly, we demonstrate the effect of considering preferential weights
when combining opinions from different sources.
• Secondly, we demonstrate how the novel fusion operator, i.e., conflict-
aware, provides the most representative assessment of trustworthiness
of cloud providers (e.g., Cloud ‘A’ and Cloud ‘B’) compared to the
existing operators, i.e., average fusion and weighted fusion.
6.4.1 Cloud Marketplace Scenario
The cloud marketplace scenario discussed in Section 4.4.1 is revisited to
highlight the integration of multiple trust information sources. The sources
are assumed to provide opinions on the security-specific capabilities of cloud
providers.
In the revisited scenario (cf. Figure 6.5), the cloud marketplace offers
cloud services to the users as well as support them to identify trustworthy
providers. The marketplace considers CSA’s CAIQ framework as a basis to
evaluate the trustworthiness of cloud providers.
The cloud marketplace aims to determine trustworthy cloud providers by
using a reliable and transparent mechanism. The CCA tool provides means
to assess security-specific capabilities published by the cloud providers and
evaluate trustworthiness based on the assessment. In the previous section,
we demonstrated how to combine different capabilities where the opinions
about the capabilities are only considered to be given by a cloud provider.
However, in the current scenario, the opinions about the capabilities are
considered to be provided by various sources, e.g., cloud consumers, experts,
and accreditators. For the sake of simplicity, a single provider is considered
in the running scenario, i.e., Cloud ‘A’.
Cloud ‘A’ fills in the CAIQ. It is published in the STAR as a policy
of the marketplace. The CCA tool is used to assess the published CAIQ
and the assessment is denoted as ‘Q’. To ensure a reliable assessment of
trustworthiness of Cloud A, consumers incorporate opinions based on various
types of assessment from three other sources, i.e., experts (E), consumers’
feedback (F ) and accreditators (A).
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CAIQ Assessment 
(CO ∧ DG ∧ FS ∧ IS ∧ …) 
Feedback 
(ol, CO, DG, FS, IS,…) 
Cloud A 
Expert Assessment 
(CO ∧ DG ∧ FS ∧ IS ∧ …) 
FUSION 
F 
Q 
A 
E 
Cloud Users 
Accreditator 
(CO ∧ DG ∧ FS ∧ IS ∧ …) 
Figure 6.5: Cloud Marketplace – Fusion of Opinions from Multiple Sources
We see that opinions about Cloud A’s trustworthiness are extracted
from different sources. Let us assume that a user requires the following
four capabilities: CO, DG, FS, IS to be fulfilled by potential trustworthy
cloud provider(s). Using our formal framework the capabilities are modelled
in terms of propositional logic terms and these terms are associated with
opinions. Alternatively, feedback based opinions can be given as an overall
statement (ol) on the trustworthiness of the cloud provider.
In the given scenario (cf. Figure 6.5), the opinions (derived from expert
assessment, CAIQ assessment, and accreditators) on the fulfilment of those
propositions are combined using CertainLogic AND operator (i.e., (CO ∧
DG∧FS∧IS)). Users’ opinions on the above mentioned attributes can be an
overall rating (ol) or individual feedback on each of the attributes. A number
of users’ feedback on different attributes are assumed to be combined using
consensus and discounting operators [Rie09b] and we denote the construction
as (ol, CO,DG,FS, IS) in Figure 6.5. The consensus operator is used to
combine opinions from different recommenders and discounting operator is
used to discount individual opinions according to the trustworthiness of those
recommenders.
Finally, when combining the opinions from those different sources, a
consumer may prefer one source over another. The consumer may give higher
weights on E, Q and A than F based on their preferences.
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The fusion (aggregation) of opinions derived from different sources is
especially challenging, as the differing sources’ opinions may be conflicting.
It may based on incomplete information or unreliable sources, and thus, it
is subject to uncertainty. Therefore, the evaluation mechanism (i.e., fusion
operation) should reflect the preferences, degree of conflict (DoC) and the
uncertainty when combining multiple opinions (on propositions) to calculate
the overall trustworthiness of Cloud ‘A’.
6.4.2 Evaluation
In this section, we assume that the propositional logic terms (as shown
in Figure 6.5) representing the trustworthiness of Cloud ‘A’ have already
been evaluated using CertainLogic AND (∧) operator. Thus, we are in a
situation where we have to aggregate four opinions (Q, E, F , and A) on the
trustworthiness of Cloud ‘A’, i.e., we have to compute ⊕̂c(oQ, oE , oF , oA).
6.4.2.1 Experimental Setup and Test Cases
The resulting four opinions are extracted in the following manner:
1. CAIQ assessment (Q): The resulting opinion on the trustworthiness of
Cloud ‘A’ is extracted from their completed CAIQ published by CSA
STAR. Our developed CCA tool is used for this purpose.
2. Accreditators (A): Accreditators use the CCA tool to assess the ca-
pabilities of Cloud ‘A’. The resulting opinion (A) is then extracted
based on the assessment. The opinion is represented using CertainTrust
model.
3. Expert Assessment (E): The capabilities of Cloud ‘A’ are assessed by
the experts leveraging the CCA tool. The resulting opinion is then
derived using the CCA tool by the experts. The opinion is represented
using CertainTrust model.
4. Feedback (F ): The resulting opinion is extracted from other users’
feedback on the trustworthiness of Cloud ‘A’ regarding their pub-
lished capabilities. We assume that the feedback is represented using
CertainTrust model.
In order to derive opinion oQ, the published CAIQs in the STAR are
considered. Hence, we use the resulting opinion (derived from CAIQs)
documented in Table 6.6 for the experiments conducted in this section.
The accreditators and experts may analyse the assertions of CAIQs in a
different manner which results in two different outcomes (cf. Table 6.12 and
Table 6.13). Thus, the resulting opinions (oA and oE) derived from Cloud
provider A’s CAIQ profile are different than the opinion Q. The opinion
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(oF ) that resemble consumers feedback on the trustworthiness of Cloud ‘A’
are synthetically generated using the CCA tool.
Table 6.12: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘A’ (anonymised): Accredi-
tator perspective
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) oA;E
CO 16 0 0 0 16 (1,1,0.99)
(0.8994,0.9938,0.9606);E=0.8998DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 8 0 1 0 9 (1,0.973,0.99)
IS 72 3 0 1 75 (0.96,1,0.99) c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Table 6.13: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘A’ (anonymised): Expert
perspective
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) oE ;E
CO 16 0 0 0 16 (1,1,0.99)
(0.8003,0.9937,0.9606);E=0.8013DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 7 1 1 0 9 (0.875,0.973,0.99)
IS 73 2 0 0 75 (0.9733,1,0.99) c
t
0
1
1
0
E
In the following experiments, we assume an initial expectation value
(f = fQ = fA = fF = fE = 0.1), which reflects a rather pessimistic initial
expectation of the consumers. Note that the consumer could either consider
the calculated f associated with the opinions or replace the calculated value
with her own assumption.
We consider the following test cases for fusion experiments.
• Case 1: We conduct two experiments using average fusion and weighted
fusion operators. The objective is to show the effect by considering
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Table 6.14: Preferential Weights in Different Cases
Test Cases wQ wA wE wF
Case 1 2 2 2 0.1
Case 2 2 2 2 1
Case 3 2 2 2 2
Case 4 2 2 2 1
preferential weights when fusing opinions from different sources.
The hypothesis we want to test here is: weighted fusion operator
(W.FUSION) reflects variable preferential weights associated with the
input opinions on the resulting fusioned opinion whereas average fusion
operator (A.FUSION) does not reflect the variable weights on the
resulting fusioned opinion.
• Case 2: We conduct two experiments to demonstrate the comparison
between weighted fusion and conflict-aware fusion operators. The main
objective is to illustrate the capabilities in handling the conflicting
opinions from different sources.
The next hypothesis to be tested is: conflict-aware fusion operator
(C.FUSION) reflects the degree of conflict (DoC) among input opin-
ions as well as the variable preferential weights associated with the input
opinions on the resulting fusioned opinion whereas weighted fusion op-
erator (W.FUSION) only reflects variable weights on the resulting
fusioned opinion.
• Case 3: In this case, two experiments are conducted to demonstrate
the novelty of conflict-aware fusion operator over the state-of-the-art
average fusion operator.
The hypothesis we want to test here is: conflict-aware fusion operator
(C.FUSION) reflects degree of conflict (DoC) among input opinions
as well as variable preferential weights associated with the input opin-
ions on the resulting fusioned opinion whereas average fusion operator
(A.FUSION) does not reflect variable weights as well as conflict among
the input opinions on the resulting fusioned opinion.
• Case 4: In the last case, the experiments are conducted to demonstrate
a real world setting. In this setting, a user is interested to choose
between a couple of cloud providers in terms of their trustworthiness.
The hypothesis we want to test here is: conflict-aware fusion opera-
tor (C.FUSION) calculates more representative trustworthiness value
compared to the trustworthiness value calculated using non conflict-
aware fusion operators.
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Table 6.15: Opinions (Q, A, E, and F ) on Trustworthiness of Cloud ‘A’
(a) Opinions (oF with high certainty)
oQ (0.9109, 0.9862, 0.1);E = 0.8997
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oA (0.8994, 0.9938, 0.1);E = 0.8944
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oE (0.8003, 0.9937, 0.1);E = 0.7959
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oF (0.1943, 0.899, 0.1);E = 0.1843
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
(b) Opinions (oF with low certainty)
oQ (0.9109, 0.9862, 0.1);E = 0.8997
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oA (0.8994, 0.9938, 0.1);E = 0.8944
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oE (0.8003, 0.9937, 0.1);E = 0.7959
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oF (0.1943, 0.50, 0.1);E = 0.1472
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
6.4.2.2 Experiments
In this section, a detail discussion on the conducted experiments is given.
Case 1. The objective here is to compare the weighted fusion operator
with state-of-the-art average fusion operator in terms of handling preferen-
tial weights. We apply the weighted fusion operator to deal with variable
weights given in Table 6.14 for Case 1. However, the average fusion op-
erator is not designed to handle variable weights. In Table 6.16, user’s
preferences on the opinions, oQ, oA, and oF , are reflected in the resulting
opinion (0.8606, 0.9922, 0.1) calculated using weighted fusion operator, but
not in the resulting opinion (0.8464, 0.99, 0.1) computed using average fusion
operator. In the case of average fusion operation, all the opinions are given
similar preference. The influence of variable weights are also evident in the
expectation values, E(o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.8389, E(o⊕̂w(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.8546.
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Table 6.16: Comparison between Average Fusion and Weighted Fusion Oper-
ators
Test Case Cloud A: o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F ) Cloud A: o⊕̂w(Q,E,A,F )
Case 1 (0.8464, 0.99, 0.1) (0.8606, 0.9922, 0.1)
E(o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.8389 E(o⊕̂w(Q,E,A,F )
) = 0.8546
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Table 6.17: Comparison between Weighted Fusion and Conflict-aware Fusion
Operators
Test Case Cloud A: o⊕̂w(Q,E,A,F )
Cloud A: o⊕̂c(Q,E,A,F )
Case 2 (0.8538, 0.9911, 0.1) (0.8538, 0.7562, 0.1)
E(o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.8470 E(o⊕̂c(Q,E,A,F )
) = 0.67
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Case 2. The objective here is to compare the conflict-aware fusion op-
erator with the weighted fusion operator in terms of handling conflicting
opinions. From the previous experiment, we know that the weighted fusion
operator is able to deal with variable weights. However, this operator is
not able to handle conflicts among the opinions. It is evident when we
apply weighted and conflict-aware fusion operator to aggregate the opinions
given in Table 6.15. By applying conflict-aware fusion operator, the opinion
surrounding trustworthiness of Cloud A is calculated as (0.8538, 0.7562, 0.1),
whereas by using the weighted fusion operator the opinion is calculated as
(0.8538, 0.9911, 0.1) in Table 6.17. The impact of the conflict-aware fusion is
clearly visible on the certainty value 0.7562 compare to the certainty value
0.9911 calculated using weighted fusion operator. The expectation value
(E = 0.67) is also affected in the case of conflict-aware fusion compare to
the value (E = 0.8470) in weighted fusion when conflict among the opinions
are taken into account.
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Table 6.18: Comparison between Average Fusion and Conflict-aware Fusion
Operators
Test Case Cloud A: o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F ) Cloud A: o⊕̂c(Q,E,A,F )
Case 3 (0.8464, 0.99, 0.1) (0.8464, 0.6560, 0.1)
(oF with high certainty) E(o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.8470 E(o⊕̂c(Q,E,A,F )
) = 0.5896
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Case 3 (0.8596, 0.9898, 0.1) (0.8596, 0.7882, 0.1)
(oF with low certainty) E(o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.8518 E(o⊕̂c(Q,E,A,F )
) = 0.6883
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Case 3. The objective in this case is to demonstrate the novelty of the
conflict-aware fusion operator compare to the average fusion operator. Note
that the average fusion operator is equivalent (cf. Appendix D.9) to the state-
of-the-art fusion operator for dealing with dependent opinions in subjective
logic. As an average fusion operator is not designed to deal with preferential
weights, we consider the same weights for the opinions in this case.
We apply average fusion and conflict-aware fusion operators to combine
the opinions given in Table 6.15. In Table 6.18, aggregated opinions on
the trustworthiness of Cloud A are (0.8464, 0.99, 0.1) (average fusion) and
(0.8464, 0.6560, 0.1) (conflict-aware fusion). The impact of the conflict-aware
operator is clearly visible on the certainty value 0.6560 compared to the
certainty value 0.99. The impact is mainly due to the conflicting opinion
(oF = (0.1943, 0.899, 0.1)) given by the users with high certainty. In the
second row, the impact is low on the certainty value (0.7882) due to the
conflicting opinion (oF = (0.1943, 0.50, 0.1)) given by the users with low cer-
tainty (cf. Table 6.15(b)). The expectation values, E(o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.8470;
E(o⊕̂c(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.5896, are also affected due to the same reasons that
affect the certainty values. In the second row, the expectation values,
E(o⊕̂(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.8518; E(o⊕̂c(Q,E,A,F )) = 0.6883, are slightly better com-
pare to the values in the first row. This is due to the conflicting opinion
(oF = (0.1943, 0.50, 0.1)) given by the users with low certainty (cf. Ta-
ble 6.15(b)).
We conclude that the conflict-aware fusion operator provides the most
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representative assessment of Cloud A’s trustworthiness. Thus, this operator
is best suited among the three operators that we have discussed. Note that
the fusion operators in subjective logic do not consider preferential weights
and conflicts when aggregating dependent opinions. Therefore, conflict-aware
fusion operator is a better choice than the fusion operators in subjective logic
when one requires the most representative trust assessment under uncertainty,
conflict and personal preferences.
Table 6.19: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘S’ (anonymised): cus-
tomised case (oQ)
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) (t, c, f);E
CO 13 1 0 2 14 (0.9286,1,0.99)
(0.6366,0.9998,0.9606);E=0.6367DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 7 2 0 0 9 (0.7778,1,0.99)
IS 63 4 3 5 70 (0.9403,0.9987,0.99) c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Table 6.20: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘S’ (anonymised): Accred-
itator perspective (oA)
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) oA;E
CO 11 1 2 2 14 (0.9167,0.9767,0.99)
(0.6277,0.9957,0.9606);E=0.6291DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 7 2 0 0 9 (0.7778,1,0.99)
IS 62 4 4 5 70 (0.9394,0.9983,0.99) c
t
0
1
1
0
E
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Table 6.21: Cloud Control Assessment for Cloud ‘S’ (anonymised): Expert
perspective (oE)
Domains r s u NA N Resulting Final
Opinion Assessment
(t, c, f) oE ;E
CO 11 3 0 2 14 (0.7857,1,0.99)
(0.6894,0.9893,0.9606);E=0.6923DG 15 1 0 0 16 (0.9375,1,0.99)
FS 7 0 2 0 9 (1,0.9403,0.99)
IS 63 4 3 5 75 (0.9403,0.9987,0.99) c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Table 6.22: Opinions (Q, A, E, and F ) on Trustworthiness of Cloud providers
(a) Opinions on Cloud provider ‘A’
oQ (0.9109, 0.9862, 0.1);E = 0.8997
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oA (0.8994, 0.9938, 0.1);E = 0.8944
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oE (0.8003, 0.9937, 0.1);E = 0.7959
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oF (0.1943, 0.899, 0.1);E = 0.1843
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
(b) Opinions on Cloud provider ‘S’
oQ (0.6366, 0.9998, 0.1);E = 0.6365
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oA (0.6277, 0.9957, 0.1);E = 0.6254
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oE (0.6894, 0.9893, 0.1);E = 0.6831
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
oF (0.5943, 0.988, 0.1);E = 0.5884
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
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Table 6.23: Cloud ‘A’ Vs. Cloud ‘S’
Conflict-aware Cloud provider ‘A’: o⊕̂c(Q,A,E,F )
Cloud provider ‘S’: o⊕̂c(Q,A,E,F )
Fusioned Opinion (0.8538, 0.7562, 0.1) (0.6368, 0.9604, 0.1)
Expectation value E = 0.67 E = 0.6155
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Degree of Conflict DoC = 0.2369 DoC = 0.0389
Non conflict-aware Cloud provider ‘A’: o⊕̂w(Q,A,E,F )
Cloud provider ‘S’: o⊕̂w(Q,A,E,F )
Fusioned Opinion (0.8538, 0.9911, 0.1) (0.6368, 0.0.9993, 0.1)
Expectation value E = 0.8470 E = 0.6364
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
c
t
0
1
1
0
E
Case 4. In a real world setting, one would assume that a user can choose
between a couple of cloud providers, e.g., Cloud provider ‘A’ and ‘S’. In
this case, we propose to sort the cloud providers based by their expectation
value (E) and using the DoC as a second criteria if necessary. The opinions
considered to calculate the fusioned opinion of Cloud provider ‘A’ and Cloud
provider ‘S’ are given in Table 6.22. Table 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21 document
the detailed CAIQ assessment of Cloud provider ‘S’ from the perspective of
consumers, accreditators and experts respectively.
In the first set of experiments, conflict-aware fusion is applied to aggre-
gate the opinions on trustworthiness of Cloud provider ‘A’ and ‘S’ given
in Table 6.22(a) and 6.22(b) respectively. According to the calculated ex-
pectation values, Cloud provider ‘A’ is better ranked than Cloud provider
‘S’. This comes from the fact that the given assertions by provider ‘A’ are
more positive (t = 0.8538) than that of provider ‘S’ (t = 0.6368) regarding
the required capabilities (CO, DG, FS, IS). Even though the certainty value
(0.9604) indicates better representativeness of average rating of Cloud ‘S’,
it is not enough for provider ‘S’ to receive a better expectation value (E)
than provider ‘A’. Additionally, the value, DoC = 0.0389 of provider ‘S’
indicates that the opinions considered for fusion operation is less conflicting
than that of the opinions considered for fusing in the case of provider ‘A’
(DoC = 0.2369).
In the second set of experiments, the expectation value (0.8470) of Cloud
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provider ‘A’ is way better than that of the Cloud ‘S’ (E = 0.6364). This
is due to the weighted fusion operator which is not able to handle conflicts
among the opinions. Thus, conflicting opinions does not influence E when
weighted fusion operation is considered for trustworthiness evaluation. Now,
if we compare the results derived using non conflict-aware fusion (weighted
fusion) operator with the results derived using conflict-aware fusion, we see
that additional information, e.g., DoC and a representative certainty (c)
value, is available in the latter case. These additional information supports
users to reason about the capabilities of cloud providers in a more reliable
and transparent manner compared to the existing approaches discussed in
this section.
We conclude that the conflict-aware fusion operator is more desirable
than the non conflict-aware operators when combining conflicting opinions
as well as opinions associated with variable weights and the opinions are
derived from multiple sources.
6.5 Summary
This chapter demonstrates the applicability of novel trust establishment
mechanisms in different application scenarios as well as in real world set-
tings. The developed mechanisms show that the requirements, outlined
in Chapter 3, are fulfilled when novel mechanisms are applied to establish
trust in distributed service environments, particularly in cloud computing
environments. The evaluation can be summarized as follows:
• The first two experiments demonstrate that the CertainLogic logi-
cal operators along with the formal framework are able to aggregate
opinions about multiple attributes and customise the trustworthiness
values according to the consumers’ preference. In particular, the second
experiment demonstrates that the proposed operators are also able to
evaluate the trustworthiness of a composite service and system, based
on the knowledge of their architecture and the trustworthiness of their
components and subsystems. Moreover, the operators are designed to
deal with uncertainty when aggregating opinions as well as reflect it
in the resulting trustworthiness values in order to support users for
reliable decision making.
• The third experiment demonstrates that the novel CertainLogic fusion
operator (i.e., C.FUSION) is able to aggregate opinions that are
derived from multiple sources. In particular, the fusion operator is
designed to deal with conflicting opinions. Additionally, the novel
operator considers consumer preferences when deriving opinions from
multiple sources. The experiments also demonstrated the impact of
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conflicting opinions as well as consumers’ preferential attachment with
the opinions in the resulting trustworthiness value.
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7
Conclusions and Outlook
Composite distributed services in the emerging service environments, e.g.,
cloud computing, are increasingly becoming a reality. This paradigm shift in
service environments enable providers to offer more dynamic, scalable and
cost-effective services than ever before. Consequently, consumers are facing
considerable obstacles in such a complex setting to distinguish among the
service providers based on their service-specific attributes. This is due to the
lack of an integrated solution for assessing and evaluating the trustworthiness
of service providers based on their published attributes. Moreover, the
solution should eventually support consumers to distinguish the service
providers based on their calculated trustworthiness value.
7.1 Conclusions
This thesis contributes to a new architecture of trust management system for
allowing service providers to represent their service-specific attributes and
consequently enable customers to assess and evaluate the trustworthiness
of service providers according to their requirements. Additionally, we con-
tribute to the required novel mechanisms for developing the proposed trust
system and demonstrate its applicability in the context of cloud computing
marketplaces.
In this thesis, requirements for designing trust systems in distributed
service environments have been outlined in Section 3.1, which serve as a
guideline to analyse and discuss the state-of-the-art systems and mechanisms
in various complementary application domains. According to the discussion in
Chapter 3, none of the existing trust systems comply with all the requirements.
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However, a couple of non-application specific trust mechanisms, Subjective
Logic and CertainTrust, comply with non-functional requirement, NR1.
CertainTrust model is a better choice in terms of its flexible and simple
representational model, intuitive graphical trust representation (FR4) and
attack-resistant (NR3) operators for robust trust aggregation. Thus, the
following core contributions are made in order to comply with rest of the
requirements, which are essential for developing a trust system for cloud
computing marketplaces.
• QoS+ provides a list of service-specific attributes that potentially con-
tributes to the trustworthiness of service providers in cloud computing
marketplaces. Additionally, we contribute to the identification of differ-
ent sources that provide information regarding those attributes as well
as different means for deriving those information. We conclude that
the multi-faceted nature of QoS+ attributes demonstrate the necessity
to formulate the trustworthiness of service providers regarding those
attributes in a generalised and simplified manner.
• Formal framework is designed and constructed to assess composite
service architecture regarding their specific attributes. The framework
allows composite service architecture and service-specific attributes
to represent in simplified meaningful terms that we refer to as PLTs.
The PLTs serve as a formal basis to evaluate the trustworthiness of
service providers in distributed service environments. Particularly,
the proposed framework consider consumer requirements to enable
customisation of propositions in the PLTs. This in turn enables the
proposed trust system to customise the evaluation of trustworthiness
according to consumer requirements. The significant advantage of
integrating the formal framework in the trust system architecture is
that the framework is able to provide an abstract representation of
underlying service architecture without analysing the service methods,
i.e., functionality of a service it supports. We conclude that the
integration of the formal framework in the proposed trust management
system allows to fulfil the requirements FR2 and FR3, which are
outlined in Section 3.1 for developing trust systems in distributed
service environments.
• CertainLogic, a framework that contains computational operators that
operates on trust information (i.e., opinions) about multiple attributes
derived from multiple sources. The operators are able to operate on
CertainTrust’s representation of opinions, which are subject to un-
certainty and when derived from multiple sources the opinions might
be conflicting. The significant advantage of using the CertainLogic
operators in the proposed trust system is that the definition of the
operators enable aggregation of opinions independent of how opinions
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are assessed. Note that the opinions are aggregated based on the propo-
sitional structure in the PLTs because an opinion is always associated
with a proposition. We conclude that the integration of CertainLogic
framework in the proposed trust management system allows to fulfil
the requirements FR1 (except the multi-context feature), FR3, and
NR2, which are outlined in Section 3.1 for developing trust systems in
distributed service environments.
The evaluation of our contributions demonstrate their applicability in
an instantiated scenario of distributed service environments. However, the
generalised formalisation and the established mathematical foundations
behind our contributions can lead their applicability to other complemented
scenarios. Moreover, the trust establishment mechanisms that are presented
and evaluated in this thesis lead to close the gaps identified in the state-
of-the-art trust systems. Consequently, these mechanisms are valuable and
significant in the field of evidence-based trust systems.
7.2 Outlook
The proposed architecture of the trust management system provides a first
step towards assessment and evaluation of the trustworthiness of service
providers in cloud marketplaces. In this thesis, we have provided the related
concepts and proposed novel mechanisms for trust management architecture
and proof-of-concept prototype. Beyond the contributions in this thesis, the
following challenges are open for future research.
Trust-aware Validation of Opinions
Our current realisation of the proposed trust management system assumes
that opinions derived from a source, e.g., CSA’s STAR, are based on truthful
pieces of evidence. The assumption is realistic due to the CSA CloudAudit
working group’s proposal for integrating automated audit framework [CSAa]
to validate the pieces of evidence. However, the current state of the CSA
STAR as it stands does not provide such integration as well as the CloudAudit
framework is in its early stage of development. Here, the trusted computing
based techniques such as property based attestation would be interesting
to investigate for enabling validation of attributes claimed by the service
providers in the CSA STAR. In this regard, CSA’s Cloud Trust Protocol
(CTP) project [CSAb] would be also interesting to consider as the project
proposal promises to develop mechanisms that will enable consumers to
find out relevant pieces of information concerning security attributes. These
pieces of information might serve as means to validate the opinions derived
from the CSA STAR.
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Attack-resistant Trust Management
The proposed architecture of the trust management system relies on Sybil
attack-resistant computational operators proposed in [RA09]. These oper-
ators are designed to mitigate the influence of Sybil recommenders when
combining pieces of evidence from a number of users, and thus, the operators
are applicable to recommender networks. The attack-resistant operators
serve as means to protect the manipulation of opinions which in the end
supports our proposed system architecture to deal with manipulated opinions
derived from user feedback. When hosting such a system online, one should
definitely consider designing attacks models and mitigation mechanisms in
order to safe guard the proposed trust management system from known
attacks. Moreover, the Trust Update Engine (TUE) module in the proposed
system architecture allow multiple sources to provide opinions about service-
specific attributes of service providers. Taking into account the hostile online
environments, one should also consider novel authorisation mechanisms in
order to ensure the reliability of the proposed trust management system.
For example, compromised user platforms, i.e., hosting malicious software
applications, can render the entire process of trust management useless by
generating false opinions. Traditional user-centric authorisation mechanisms
are only able to verify the identity of a source and necessary access control
policies allowed for that source. In order to address the malicious behav-
ior of the platforms in the authorisation process, existing trust enhanced
mechanisms [Nag10] would be interesting to investigate.
Multi-context aware Trust Mechanisms
Computational trust mechanisms underlying our proposed trust management
system consider context as an embedded information given in a proposition.
For example, “Alice expects that storage Service provider B has the capability
to provide data protection”; where “storage service” is a SaaS context. Based
on the derived opinions, one is only able to reason about the trustworthiness
of a service in the given context. However, the proposed mechanisms in this
thesis are not able to deal with cases where one has to reason about the
trustworthiness of a service provider, who offers services in different contexts.
For example, provider B also provides a database service and Alice expects
that the provider B also has the capability to provide data protection. As the
contexts are not the same, one cannot conclude that the provider B has the
same level of trustworthiness regarding data protection attributes in both
contexts. Reasoning overall trustworthiness of a service provider in such a
multi-context scenario is non-trivial. Thus, future research should focus on
developing computational trust mechanisms that are adaptive to multiple
contexts as well as are able to transfer trust across those contexts.
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Generalisation of CertainLogic
The CertainLogic operators provided in this thesis are able to combine opin-
ions about independent and dependent propositions. We have demonstrated
that these operators allow one to combine an opinion about a security at-
tribute with an attribute related to performance, e.g., availability. However,
in a real-world setting, attributes such as latency or availability of a service
might depend on the security attributes such as DDoS vulnerability or in-
secure encryption mechanism. In such a case, one has to consider the level
of dependency between the attributes and how the dependency level can
be transferred to the computation of opinions. Our proposed operators for
combining opinions are not able to deal with partial dependency between
the attributes. Thus, CertainLogic operators requires generalised definitions
to deal with partial dependency between attributes and mechanisms for
combining associated opinions.
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A
Proofs (Formal Framework)
A.1 Proofs for Theorem 4.3.1
Proof We prove the theorem along the inductive definition of trustwor-
thiness terms, and we provide for each definition of trustworthiness terms
the corresponding propositional logic formula. The principal idea of the
proof is that we reformulate the expression “k ‘out-of’ a set L" by explicitly
considering all combinations of elements of L, where L can be either a set of
basic components or of trustworthiness terms of subsystems. The provision
of such a mapping f (of trustworthiness terms on propositional logic terms)
proves the theorem.
• If l = (k ‘out-of’ N), k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, N ⊆ A (def. 1), then
f(l) :=
∨
{Ai1 , . . . , Aik} ⊆ A
|{Ai1 , . . . , Aik}| = k
 ik∧
j=i1
Aj
 (A.1)
• If l = ((k1 ? . . .? km) ‘out-of’ (N1, . . . , Nm)), Ni ⊆ A ∀i (def. 2a),
then
f(l) :=
m∧
i=1
(f((ki ‘out-of’ Ni))) (A.2)
• If l = ((k1 > . . .> km) ‘out-of’ (N1, . . . , Nm)), Ni ⊆ A ∀i (def. 2b),
then
f(l) :=
m∨
i=1
(f((ki ‘out-of’ Ni))) (A.3)
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• If l = (k ‘out-of’ {li1 , . . . , lim}) , lij trustworthiness
terms, {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} (def. 3), then
f(l) :=
∨
{j1, . . . , jk} ⊆ {i1, . . . , im}
|{j1, . . . , jk}| = k
 jk∧
j=j1
(f(lj))
 (A.4)
• If l = ((k1 ? . . .? km) ‘outof’ (Q1, . . . , Qm)) , Qi set of
trustworthiness terms (def. 4a), then
f(l) :=
m∧
i=1
(f((ki ‘out-of’ Qi))) (A.5)
• If l = ((k1 > . . .> km) ‘out-of’ (Q1, . . . , Qm)) , Qi set of
trustworthiness terms (def. 4b), then
f(l) :=
m∨
i=1
(f((ki ‘out-of’ Qi))) (A.6)

A.2 Proofs for Theorem 4.3.2
Proof We prove the theorem along the inductive definition of trustwor-
thiness terms, and we provide for each definition of trustworthiness terms
the corresponding propositional logic formula. The principal idea of the
proof is that we reformulate the expression “k out of a set L" by explicitly
considering all combinations of elements of L, where L can be either a set
of properties or of trustworthiness terms of sub-properties. The provision
of such a mapping f (of trustworthiness terms on propositional logic terms)
proves the theorem.
• If l = (k ‘out-of’ N), k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, N ⊆ A (def. 5), then
f(l) :=
∨
{Ai1 , . . . , Aik} ⊆ A
|{Ai1 , . . . , Aik}| = k
 ik∧
j=i1
Aj
 (A.7)
• If l = ((k1 ? . . .? km) ‘out-of’ (N1, . . . , Nm)), Ni ⊆ A ∀i (def. 6), then
f(l) :=
m∧
i=1
(f((ki ‘out-of’ Ni))) (A.8)
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• If l = (k ‘out-of’ {li1 , . . . , lim}) , lij trustworthiness
terms, {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} (def. 7), then
f(l) :=
∨
{j1, . . . , jk} ⊆ {i1, . . . , im}
|{j1, . . . , jk}| = k
 jk∧
j=j1
(f(lj))
 (A.9)
• If l = ((k1 ? . . .? km) ‘out-of’ (Q1, . . . , Qm)) , Qi set of
trustworthiness terms (def. 8), then
f(l) :=
m∧
i=1
(f((ki ‘out-of’ Qi))) (A.10)

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B
Standard Logic Equivalent Truth Table
using CertainLogic
B.1 Truth Table using CertainLogic AND
The following truth table is generated using the definitions in Table 5.1
of CertainLogic AND operator. The CertainLogic truth table for AND
operator is equivalent to the corresponding truth table in standard logic
when input values are 1 and 0.
Table B.1: CertainLogic Truth Table using AND Operator
Average Rating Certainty Initial Expectation
tA tB tA∧B cA cB cA∧B fA fB fA∧B
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B.2 Truth Table using CertainLogic OR
The following truth table is generated using the definitions in Table 5.1 of
CertainLogic OR operator. The CertainLogic truth table for OR operator
is equivalent to the corresponding truth table in standard logic when input
values are 1 and 0.
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USING CERTAINLOGIC
Table B.2: CertainLogic Truth Table using OR Operator
Average Rating Certainty Initial Expectation
tA tB tA∨B cA cB cA∨B fA fB fA∨B
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C
Proofs (CertainLogic)
According to Table 5.1, it holds 0 ≤ tA, tB, cA, cB ≤ 1; fA = fB , 1 for AND
operator and fA = fB , 0 for OR operator.
C.1 Proof: Theorem 5.2.1 (OR;AND)
The proof for oA∨B = oB∨A can be carried out component-wise by verifying
tA∨B = tB∨A, cA∨B = cB∨A , and fA∨B = fB∨A. Using Table 5.1(OR), we
see that altering the positions for the opinion parameters do not affect the
outcome of the result.
The proof for oA∧B = oB∧A can be carried out analogously using Table
5.1(AND).
C.2 Proof: Theorem 5.2.2 (OR)
Before proving the theorem, we introduce four Lemmas that we need for the
proof.
Lemma C.2.1 As a Lemma we prove: cA∨B > 0 if cA = 0 and cB , 0.
161
162 APPENDIX C. PROOFS (CERTAINLOGIC)
Proof
0 < cA + cB − cAcB − cA(1− cB)fB(1− tA) + (1− cA)cBfA(1− tB)
fA + fB − fAfB
Using cA = 0 it holds:
0 < cB − cBfA(1− tB)
fA + fB − fAfB
0 < cBfA + cBfB − cBfAfB − cBfA(1− tB)
(C.1)
which is true as it holds cBfA ≥ cBfA(1− tB) and cBfA > cBfAfB. 
Lemma C.2.2 As a Lemma we proof: cA∨B > 0 if cA , 0 and cB = 0.
Proof
0 < cA + cB − cAcB − cA(1− cB)fB(1− tA) + (1− cA)cBfA(1− tB)
fA + fB − fAfB
Using cB = 0 it holds:
0 < cA − cAfB(1− tA)
fA + fB − fAfB
0 < cAfA + cAfB − cAfAfB − cAfB(1− tA)
(C.2)
which is true as it holds cAfB ≥ cAfB(1− tA) and cAfA > cAfAfB. 
Lemma C.2.3 As a Lemma we prove: cA∨B > 0 if cA , 0 and cB , 0.
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Proof
0 < cA + cB − cAcB − cA(1− cB)fB(1− tA) + (1− cA)cBfA(1− tB)
fA + fB − fAfB
Expand and reorganize, using fA + fB + fAfB > 0 it holds:
cAfA + cBfA + cAfB + cBfB + cAcBfAfB > cAfAfB + cBfAfB + cAcBfA+
+ cAcBfB + cA(1− cB)fB(1− tA) + (1− cA)cBfA(1− tB)
Simplify:
cAfA + cBfA + cAfB + cBfB + cAcBfAfB > cAfAfB + cBfAfB+
+ cAfB(cB + (1− cB)(1− tA)) + cBfA(cA + (1− cA)(1− tB))
Using cAfA > cAfAfB and cBfB > cBfAfB it holds:
cBfA + cAfB + cAcBfAfB > cAfB(cB + (1− cB)(1− tA))+
cBfA(cA + (1− cA)(1− tB))
Using cAfB(cB + (1− cB)(1− tA)) ≤ cAfB(cB + (1− cB))
and cBfA(cA + (1− cA)(1− tB)) ≤ cBfA(cA + (1− cA)) it holds:
cAfB + cBfA + cAcBfAfB > cAfB + cBfA
Simplify:
cAcBfAfB > 0
(C.3)
which is true as it holds fA, fB, cA, cB , 0. 
Lemma C.2.4 As a Lemma we prove also: cA∨B = 0 if cA = 0 and cB = 0.
Proof Replacing cA = 0 and cB = 0 in cA∨B, we get cA∨B = 0, which is
exactly what we want to prove. 
Proof Theorem 5.2.2 (OR):
The proof will be carried out componentwise by verifying t(A∨B)∨C =
tA∨(B∨C), c(A∨B)∨C = cA∨(B∨C), and f(A∨B)∨C = fA∨(B∨C).
Proof for f(A∨B)∨C = fA∨(B∨C):
f(A∨B)∨C = fA∨B + fC − fA∨BfC
= (fA + fB − fAfB) + fC − (fA + fB − fAfB)fC
= fA + fB − fAfB + fC − fAfC − fBfC + fAfBfC
= fA + (fB + fC − fBfC)− fA(fB + fC − fBfC)
= fA + fB∨C − fAfB∨C = fA∨(B∨C)
(C.4)
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Proof for c(A∨B)∨C = cA∨(B∨C):
c(A∨B)∨C = cA∨B + cC − cA∨BcC−
− cA∨B(1− cB)fB(1− tA∨B) + (1− cA∨B)cBfA∨B(1− tB)
fA∨B + fB − fA∨BfB
= ... [Expand tA∨B, cA∨B, and fA∨B]...
(C.5)
= (cC((−1+fA)(−1+fB)fC+(−fA(−1+fB)+fB)tC)+cB(−(−1+fA)fB(1+
(−1 + cC)fC − cCtC) + tB(−(−1 + cC)fC + fA(1 + (−1 + cC)fC − cCtC))) +
cA(fA(1+(−1+cB)fB−cBtB)(1+(−1+cC)fC−cCtC)+tA((−1+cC)fC(−1+
cBtB)− (−1 + cB)fB(1 + (−1 + cC)fC − cCtC))))/(fA(−1 + fB)(−1 + fC)−
fB(−1 + fC) + fC)
= ... [Concentrate tB∨C , cB∨C , and fB∨C ]...
= cA + cB∨C − cAcB∨C−
− cA(1− cB∨C)fB(1− tA) + (1− cA)cB∨CfA(1− tB∨C)
fA + fB∨C − fAfB∨C
= cA∨(B∨C)
(C.6)
Proof for t(A∨B)∨C = tA∨(B∨C):
For proving t(A∨B)∨C = tA∨(B∨C), we have to consider that there are two
cases for calculating tX∨Y :
1. cX∨Y , 0
2. cX∨Y = 0.
For the proof, we use the observation that it holds cX∨Y = 0 if and only
if cX = cY = 0 (see Lemmas C.2.3 and C.2.4), which leads to 5 cases. The
proofs are given for each of these cases seperately.
Case 1. cA , 0, cB , 0, and cC , 0 or exactly one term out of cA, cB, and
cC is equivalent to 0: In this case, it holds c(A∨B)∨C , 0 and cA∨(B∨C) , 0
(using Lemmas C.2.1 and C.2.2):
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
c(A∨B)∨C
(cA∨BtA∨B + cCtC − cA∨BcCtA∨BtC)
= ...[Expand tA∨B, cA∨B, and fA∨B]...
(C.7)
= ((fA(−1 + fB)(−1 + fC)− fB(−1 + fC) + fC)(cCtC + cBtB(1− cCtC) +
cAtA(−1+cBtB)(−1+cCtC)))/(cC((−1+fA)(−1+fB)fC +(−fA(−1+fB)+
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fB)tC)+cB(−(−1+fA)fB(1+(−1+cC)fC−cCtC)+tB(−(−1+cC)fC+fA(1+
(−1 + cC)fC − cCtC))) + cA(fA(1 + (−1 + cB)fB − cBtB)(1 + (−1 + cC)fC −
cCtC)+tA((−1+cC)fC(−1+cBtB)−(−1+cB)fB(1+(−1+cC)fC−cCtC))))
= ... [Concentrate tB∨C , cB∨C , and fB∨C ]...
= 1
cA∨(B∨C)
(cAtA + cB∨CtB∨C − cAcB∨CtAtB∨C)
= tA∨(B∨C)
(C.8)
Furthermore, there are four cases to consider:
1. cA = 0, cB = 0, and cC , 0
2. cA = 0, cB , 0, and cC = 0
3. cA , 0, cB = 0, and cC = 0
4. cA = cB = cC = 0
Case 2.) cA = 0, cB = 0, and cC , 0
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
c(A∨B)∨C
(cA∨BtA∨B + cCtC − cA∨BcCtA∨BtC)
Using cA = cB = 0⇒ cA∨B = 0 (Lemma C.2.4) it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
c(A∨B)∨C
cCtC
Using c(A∨B)∨C = cA∨(B∨C) it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
cA∨(B∨C)
cCtC
Using cA = cB = 0 and cB∨CtB∨C = cBtB + cCtC − cBtBcCtC it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
cA∨(B∨C)
(cAtA + cB∨CtB∨C − cAcB∨CtAtB∨C)
t(A∨B)∨C = tA∨(B∨C)
(C.9)
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Case 3.) cA = 0, cB , 0, and cC = 0
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
c(A∨B)∨C
(cA∨BtA∨B + cCtC − cA∨BcCtA∨BtC)
Using cC = 0 it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
c(A∨B)∨C
cA∨BtA∨B
Using cA∨BtA∨B = cAtA + cBtB + cAtAcBtB and cA = 0 it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
c(A∨B)∨C
cBtB
Using c(A∨B)∨C = cA∨(B∨C) it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
cA∨(B∨C)
cBtB
Using cB∨CtB∨C = cBtB + cCtC + cBtBcCtC and cC = 0 it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
cA∨(B∨C)
cB∨CtB∨C
Using cA = 0 it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
cA∨(B∨C)
(cAtA + cB∨CtB∨C − cAtAcB∨CtB∨C)
t(A∨B)∨C = tA∨(B∨C)
(C.10)
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Case 4.) cA , 0, cB = 0, and cC = 0:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
c(A∨B)∨C
(cA∨BtA∨B + cCtC − cA∨BcCtA∨BtC)
Using cC = 0 it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
c(A∨B)∨C
cA∨BtA∨B
Using c(A∨B)∨C = cA∨(B∨C) it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
cA∨(B∨C)
cA∨BtA∨B
Using cA∨BtA∨B = cAtA + cBtB − cAtAcBtB and cB = 0 it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
cA∨(B∨C)
cAtA
Using cB∨C = 0 (Lemma C.2.4) it holds:
t(A∨B)∨C =
1
cA∨(B∨C)
(cAtA + cB∨CtB∨C − cAcB∨CtAtB∨C)
t(A∨B)∨C = tA∨(B∨C)
(C.11)

Case 5.) cA = cB = cC = 0
In this case it holds c(A∨B)∨C = cA∨(B∨C) = 0 (applying the Lemma
C.2.4 two times when calculating c(A∨B)∨C or cA∨(B∨C), respectively, and
thus c(A∨B)∨C = tA∨(B∨C) = 0.5
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C.3 Proof: Theorem 5.2.2 (AND)
For proving t(A∧B)∧C = tA∧(B∧C), we have to consider that there are two
cases for calculating tX∧Y :
• (1) the case cX∧Y , 0
• and (2) the case cX∧Y = 0.
For the proof, we use the observation that it holds cX∧Y = 0 if and only if
cX = cY = 0 (see Lemma C.3.1, C.3.2, C.3.3 and C.3.4), which leads to 5
cases. The proofs are given for each of these cases separately.
Before proving the theorem, we prove the following four Lemmas necessary
for the proof.
Lemma C.3.1 As a Lemma we proof: cA∧B > 0 if cA = 0 and cB , 0.
Proof
0 < cB − cB(1− fA)tB1− fAfB
0 < cB(1− fAfB)− cB(1− fA)tB
cB(1− fA)tB < cB(1− fAfB)
(C.12)
which is true as it holds 1− fA < 1− fAfB and cBtB ≤ cB. 
Lemma C.3.2 As a Lemma we proof: cA∧B > 0 if cA , 0 and cB = 0.
Proof
0 < cA − cA(1− fB)tA1− fAfB
0 < cA(1− fAfB)− cA(1− fB)tA
cA(1− fB)tA < cA(1− fAfB)
(C.13)
which is true as it holds 1− fB < 1− fAfB and cAtA ≤ cA. 
Lemma C.3.3 As a Lemma we proof: cA∧B > 0 if cA , 0 and cB , 0.
Proof
0 < cA + cB − cAcB − (1− cA)cB(1− fA)tB + cA(1− cB)(1− fB)tA1− fAfB
0 < cA(1− fAfB) + cB(1− fAfB)− cAcB(1− fAfB)− (1− cA)cB(1− fA)tB−
− cA(1− cB)(1− fB)tA
(C.14)
To proof this we show that it holds A) and B):
A) cA(1− fAfB) > cA(1− cB)(1− fB)tA
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which is true as it holds 1− fAfB > 1− fB and cA ≥ cA(1− cB)tA.
B) cB(1− fAfB) > cAcB(1− fAfB) + (1− cA)cB(1− fA)tB which is true
as it holds (using 1− fAfB > 1− fA):
cAcB(1− fAfB) + (1− cA)cB(1− fA)tB
< cAcB(1− fAfB) + (1− cA)cB(1− fAfB)tB
< cB(1− fAfB)(cA + (1− cA)tB)
< cB(1− fAfB)(cA + (1− cA))
< cB(1− fAfB) 
Lemma C.3.4 As a Lemma we proof: cA∧B = 0 if cA = 0 and cB = 0.
Proof Replacing cA = 0 and cB = 0 in cA∧B, we get cA∧B = 0, which is
exactly what we want to prove. 
Proof Theorem 5.2.2 (AND)
Proof for f(A∧B)∧C = fA∧(B∧C):
f(A∧B)∧C = fAfBfC = fA∧(B∧C) (C.15)
Proof for c(A∧B)∧C = cA∧(B∧C):
c(A∧B)∧C = cA∧B + cC − cA∧BcC−
− (1− cA∧B)cC(1− fA∧B)tC + cA∧B(1− cC)(1− fC)tA∧B1− fA∧BfC
= ... Expand tA∧B, cA∧B, and fA∧B ...
= ... Concentrate tB∧C , cB∧C , and fB∧C ...
= cA + cB∧C − cAcB∧C−
− (1− cA)cB∧C(1− fA)tB∧C + cA(1− cB∧C)(1− fB∧C)tA1− fAfB∧C
= cA∧(B∧C)
(C.16)
Proof for t(A∧B)∧C = tA∧(B∧C):
Case 1.) cA , 0, cB , 0, and cC , 0.
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In this case it holds:
t(A∧B)∧C =
1
c(A∧B)∧C
(cA∧BcCtA∧BtC+
cA∧B(1− cC)(1− fA∧B)fCtA∧B
1− fA∧BfC +
+ (1− cA∧B)cCfA∧B(1− fC)tC1− fA∧BfC )
= ... Expand tA∧B, cA∧B, and fA∧B ...
= ... Concentrate tB∧C , cB∧C , and fB∧C ...
= 1
cA∧(B∧C)
(cAcB∧CtAtB∧C+
+ cA(1− cB∧C)(1− fA)fB∧CtA1− fAfB∧C +
+ (1− cA)cB∧CfA(1− fB∧C)tB∧C1− fAfB∧C )
(C.17)
Furthermore, there are four other cases to consider:
1. cA = 0, cB = 0, and cC , 0
2. cA = 0, cB , 0, and cC = 0
3. cA , 0, cB = 0, and cC = 0
4. cA = cB = cC = 0
Case 2.) cA = cB = 0
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t(A∧B)∧C =
1
c(A∧B)∧C
(cA∧BcCtA∧BtC+
cA∧B(1− cC)(1− fA∧B)fCtA∧B + (1− cA∧B)cCfA∧B(1− fC)tC
1− fA∧BfC )
Using cA = cB = 0 it holds cA∧B = 0 (Lemma C.3.4), and thus:
t(A∧B)∧C =
1
c(A∧B)∧C
cCfA∧B(1− fC)tC
1− fA∧BfC
Using fA∧B = fAfB it holds:
t(A∧B)∧C =
1
c(A∧B)∧C
cCfAfB(1− fC)tC
1− fAfBfC
Using 1
c(A∧B)∧C
= 1
cA∧(B∧C)
it holds:
t(A∧B)∧C =
1
cA∧(B∧C)
cCfAfB(1− fC)tC
1− fAfBfC
Expanding with (1− fBfC) it holds:
t(A∧B)∧C =
1
cA∧(B∧C)
cCfAfB(1− fC)tC(1− fBfC)
(1− fAfBfC)(1− fBfC)
Using cB = 0 and cB∧CtB∧C =
cCfB(1− fC)tC
1− fBfC it holds:
t(A∧B)∧C =
1
cA∧(B∧C)
cB∧CfA(1− fB∧C)tB∧C
1− fAfB∧C
Using cA = 0 it holds:
t(A∧B)∧C =
1
cA∧(B∧C)
(cAcCtAtC+
cA(1− cB∧C)(1− fA)fB∧CtA + (1− cA)cB∧CfA(1− fB∧C)tC
1− fAfB∧C )
t(A∧B)∧C = tA∧(B∧C)
(C.18)
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Case 3.) cA = 0, cB , 0, and cC = 0
The algebriac proof is analogous to Case 2.
Case 4.) cA , 0, cB = 0, and cC = 0
The algebriac proof is analogous to Case 2.
Case 5.) cA = cB = cC = 0
In this case, it holds c(A∧B)∧C = cA∧(B∧C) = 0 (applying Lemma C.3.4
two times, when calculating c(A∧B)∧C and cA∧(B∧C), respectively, and thus
t(A∧B)∧C = tA∧(B∧C) = 0.5. 
C.4 Proof: Theorem 5.2.3
Proof We can prove each of the equations in the theorem separately. The
detail algebraic simplifications are omitted for first two proofs.
1. E(oA∧B) = E(tA∧B, cA∧B, fA∧B)[Using Definition 5.2.2]
= tA∧B ∗ cA∧B + (1− cA∧B) ∗ fA∧B[Using Definition 2.2.3]
= . . . [Substitution of tA∧B, cA∧B, and fA∧B using Table 5.1 (AND)
and algebraic simplifications]
= (tA ∗ cA + (1− cA) ∗ fA)(tB ∗ cB + (1− cB) ∗ fB)
= E(oA)E(oB)[Using Definition 2.2.2 and Definition 2.2.3]
2. E(oA∨B) = E(tA∨B, cA∨B, fA∨B)[Using Definition 5.2.1]
= tA∨B ∗ cA∨B + (1− cA∨B) ∗ fA∨B[Using Definition 2.2.3]
= . . . [Substitution of tA∨B, cA∨B, and fA∨B using Table 5.1 (OR)
and algebraic simplifications]
= (tA ∗ cA + (1− cA) ∗ fA) + (tB ∗ cB + (1− cB) ∗ fB)− (tA ∗ cA + (1−
cA) ∗ fA)(tB ∗ cB + (1− cB) ∗ fB)
= E(oA) + E(oB)− E(oA)E(oB)
[Using Definition 2.2.2 and Definition 2.2.3]
3. E(o¬A) = E(t¬A, c¬A, f¬A)[Using Definition 5.2.3]
= (t¬A ∗ c¬A) + (1− c¬A) ∗ f¬A[Using Definition 2.2.3]
= (1−tA)∗cA+(1−cA)∗(1−fA)[Substitution using Table 5.1 (NOT )]
= cA − tA ∗ cA + 1− cA − fA + fA ∗ cA
= 1− (tA ∗ cA + (1− cA) ∗ fA)
= 1− E(oA)[Using Definition 2.2.2 and Definition 2.2.3] 
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C.5 Sketch of Proof: Theorem 5.2.4
Proof In the following we provide the for the NOT operator and show
sketches for AND and OR.
1. ω¬A = (b¬A, d¬A, u¬A, a¬A)
= (dA, bA, uA, 1− aA)[Using Theorem 6 in [Jøs01]]
= ((1− tA)cA, tAcA, 1− cA, 1− fA)[Using oA = mSLCT (ωA)]
= mCTSL (1− tA, cA, 1− fA)[Using Definition 5.2.5]
= mCTSL (t¬A, c¬A, f¬A)[Using Table 5.1(NOT )]
= mCTSL (o¬A)
2. o¬A = (t¬A, c¬A, f¬A)
= (1− tA, cA, 1− fA)[Using Table 5.1 (NOT )]
= mSLCT ((1− tA)cA, tAcA, 1− cA, 1− fA)[Using Definition 5.2.6]
= mSLCT (dA, bA, uA, 1− aA)[Using ωA = mCTSL oA]
= mSLCT (ω¬A)[Using Theorem 6 in [Jøs01]]
The proof for the operators AND and OR can be carried out analogous
to the proof for NOT . However, here we just provide a sketch of the proofs.
1. ωA∧B = (bA∧B, dA∧B, uA∧B, aA∧B)[Using 5.2.4]
= . . . [Substitution of bA∧B, dA∧B, uA∧B,aA∧B with
bA, dA, uA, aA, bB, dB, uB, and aB ...
... as defined by the normal multiplication in [JM05] ...
... applying oA = mSLCT (ωA) and oB = mSLCT (ωB) ...
... algebraic simplifications and applying Definition 5.2.5]
= mCTSL (tA∧B, cA∧B, fA∧B)
= mCTSL (oA∧B)
2. oA∧B = (tA∧B, cA∧B, fA∧B)
= . . . [Introduce tA, cA,... and replace them by bA, dA,...]
= mSLCT (bA∧B, dA∧B, uA∧B, aA∧B)
= mSLCT (ωA∧B)
3. ωA∨B = (bA∨B, dA∨B, uA∨B, aA∨B)[Using 5.2.4]
= . . . [Introduce bA, dA,... and replace them by tA, cA,...]
= mCTSL (tA∨B, cA∨B, fA∨B)
= mCTSL (oA∨B)
4. oA∨B = (tA∨B, cA∨B, fA∨B)[Using 2.2.2]
= . . . [Introduce tA, cA,... and replace them by bA, dA,...]
= mSLCT (bA∨B, dA∨B, uA∨B, aA∨B)
= mSLCT (ωA∨B) 
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D
Proofs (CertainLogic FUSION)
D.1 Proof: Theorem 5.3.1
Proof We prove the theorem component-wise for average fusion (A.FUSION)
operator by verifying the following under different cases:
t⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) = tA1 ; c⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) = cA1 ; f⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) = fA1 . (D.1)
At first, we prove t⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) = tA1 under following three cases:
• Case 1: If cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1.
• Case 2: If cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 0.
• Case 3: if {cAi , cAj} , 1.
Proof for Case 1:
t⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) =
tA1 + tA1 + · · ·+ tA1
n
[Using Table 5.4 and replace all Ai’s by A1]
= n ∗ tA1
n
= tA1
(D.2)
Proof for Case 2:
t⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) = 0.5 [Using Table 5.4 and replace Ai’s by A1] = tA1
(D.3)
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Proof for Case 3:
t⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1)
= (cA1tA1(1− cA1)(1− cA1) · · · (1− cA1)) + · · ·+ (cA1tA1(1− cA1)(1− cA1) · · · (1− cA1))(cA1(1− cA1)(1− cA1) · · · (1− cA1)) + · · ·+ (cA1(1− cA1)(1− cA1) · · · (1− cA1))
[Using Table 5.4 and replace Ai’s by A1]
= n ∗ (tA1cA1(1− cA1)
n ∗ (cA1(1− cA1))
= tA1
(D.4)
Next, we prove c⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) = cA1 under following two cases:
• Case 1: If cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1.
• Case 2: if {cAi , cAj} , 1.
Proof for Case 1:
c⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1)
= 1 [Using Table 5.4 and replace Ai’s by A1]
= cA1
(D.5)
Proof for Case 2:
c⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1)
= (cA1(1− cA1)(1− cA1) · · · (1− cA1)) + · · ·+ (cA1(1− cA1)(1− cA1) · · · (1− cA1))((1− cA1)(1− cA1) · · · (1− cA1)) + · · ·+ ((1− cA1)(1− cA1) · · · (1− cA1))
[Using Table 5.4 and replace Ai’s by A1]
= n ∗ (cA1(1− cA1))
n ∗ (1− cA1)
= cA1
(D.6)
Finally, we prove f⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) = fA1
f⊕̂(A1,A1,··· ,A1) =
fA1 + fA1 + · · ·+ fA1
n
[Using Table 5.4 and replace Ai’s by A1]
= n ∗ fA1
n
= fA1
(D.7)

The proof for the W.FUSION and C.FUSION operators of Theo-
rem 5.3.1 can be carried out analogously.
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D.2 Sketch of the Proof: Theorem 5.3.2
Proof The proof for ⊕̂(oA1 , oA2) = ⊕̂(oA2 , oA1) can be carried out component-
wise by verifying ⊕̂(tA1 , tA2) = ⊕̂(tA2 , tA1), ⊕̂(cA1 , cA2) = ⊕̂(cA2 , cA1) , and
⊕̂(fA1 , fA2) = ⊕̂(fA2 , fA1). Using Table 5.4, these can be verified. 
The proof for ⊕̂w(oA1 , oA2) = ⊕̂w(oA2 , oA1) and ⊕̂c(oA1 , oA2) = ⊕̂(oA2 , oA1)
can be carried out analogously, using Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 respectively.
D.3 Sketch of the Proof: Theorem 5.3.3
Looking at the definitions of the fusion operators (see Table 5.4, 5.5, 5.6),
one sees that the theorem holds due to the commutativity of the summation.
D.4 Proof: Theorem 5.3.4
Proof We prove the theorem component-wise by verifying the following
under different cases:
⊕̂w(tA1 , tA2 , · · · , tAn) = ⊕̂( tA1 , · · · , tA1︸            ︷︷            ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, tA2 , · · · , tA2︸            ︷︷            ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , tAn , · · · , tAn︸             ︷︷             ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
),
⊕̂w(cA1 , cA2 , · · · , cAn) = ⊕̂( cA1 , · · · , cA1︸             ︷︷             ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, cA2 , · · · , cA2︸             ︷︷             ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , cAn , · · · , cAn︸             ︷︷             ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
),
⊕̂w(fA1 , fA2 , · · · , fAn) = ⊕̂( fA1 , · · · , fA1︸             ︷︷             ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, fA2 , · · · , fA2︸             ︷︷             ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , fAn , · · · , fAn︸              ︷︷              ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
).
We prove ⊕̂w(tA1 , tA2 , · · · , tAn) =
⊕̂( tA1 , · · · , tA1︸            ︷︷            ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, tA2 , · · · , tA2︸            ︷︷            ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , tAn , · · · , tAn︸             ︷︷             ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
) under following three
cases:
• Case 1: If cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 0.
• Case 2: If cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1.
• Case 3: if {cAi , cAj} , 1.
Proof for Case 1:
⊕̂w(tA1 , tA2 , · · · , tAn)
= t⊕̂wA1,A2,··· ,An
= 0.5 = t⊕̂A1,A2,··· ,An
(D.8)
178 APPENDIX D. PROOFS (CERTAINLOGIC FUSION)
Proof for Case 2:
⊕̂w(tA1 , tA2 , · · · , tAn)
= t⊕̂wA1,A2,··· ,An
=
n∑
i=1
witAi
n∑
i=1
wi
[Using Table 5.5]
=
n∑
i=1
ai
bi
tAi
n∑
i=1
ai
bi
=
n∑
i=1
ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj
n∏
k=1
bk
tAi
n∑
i=1
ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj
n∏
k=1
bk
=
n∑
i=1
tAiai ·
n∏
j,i
bj
n∑
i=1
ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj
=
n∑
i=1
tAimi
n∑
i=1
mi
[Replace ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj with mi;product of integers is an integer]
=
n∑
i=1
(
mi∑
j=1
tAi)
n∑
i=1
mi
= ⊕̂( tA1 , · · · , tA1︸            ︷︷            ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, tA2 , · · · , tA2︸            ︷︷            ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , tAn , · · · , tAn︸             ︷︷             ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
) [where mi = ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj ]
(D.9)
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Proof for Case 3:
⊕̂w(tA1 , tA2 , · · · , tAn)
= t⊕̂wA1,A2,··· ,An
=
n∑
i=1
(cAitAiwi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(cAiwi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
[Using Table 5.5]
=
n∑
i=1
ai
bi
(cAitAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
ai
bi
(cAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
=
n∑
i=1
ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj
n∏
k=1
bk
(cAitAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj
n∏
k=1
bk
(cAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
=
n∑
i=1
(ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj · cAitAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj · cAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
=
n∑
i=1
(mi · cAitAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(mi · cAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
[Replace ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj with mi;product of integers is an integer]
=
n∑
i=1
(
mi∑
i=1
cAitAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
n∑
i=1
(mi · cAi
n∏
i=1, j,i
(1− cAj ))
=
n∑
i=1
(
mi∑
j=1
tAi)
n∑
i=1
mi
[Expanding the equation and reducing the common terms]
= ⊕̂( tA1 , · · · , tA1︸            ︷︷            ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, tA2 , · · · , tA2︸            ︷︷            ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , tAn , · · · , tAn︸             ︷︷             ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
)
[where mi = ai ·
n∏
j,i
bj ]
(D.10)
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The proof for the following two equations can be carried out analogously
using Table 5.4 and Table 5.5:
⊕̂w(cA1 , cA2 , · · · , cAn) = ⊕̂( cA1 , · · · , cA1︸             ︷︷             ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, cA2 , · · · , cA2︸             ︷︷             ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , cAn , · · · , cAn︸             ︷︷             ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
),
⊕̂w(fA1 , fA2 , · · · , fAn) = ⊕̂( fA1 , · · · , fA1︸             ︷︷             ︸
a1·
∏
j,1 bj times
, fA2 , · · · , fA2︸             ︷︷             ︸
a2·
∏
j,2 bj times
, · · · , fAn , · · · , fAn︸              ︷︷              ︸
an·
∏
j,n bj times
)
Finally, the component-wise algebraic verifications implies the verification of
the theorem itself. 
The proof of the same theorem for C.FUSION operator can be carried
out analogously using Table 5.4 and Table 5.6
D.5 Proof: Theorem 5.3.5
Proof We prove the theorem component-wise by verifying the following
equations under different cases:
⊕̂w((tA1 , w1 ∗ k), (tA2 , w2 ∗ k), · · · , (tAn , wn ∗ k) =
⊕̂w((tA1 , w1), (tA2 , w2), · · · , (tAn , wn)
⊕̂w((cA1 , w1 ∗ k), (cA2 , c2 ∗ k), · · · , (cAn , wn ∗ k) =
⊕̂w((cA1 , w1), (cA2 , w2), · · · , (cAn , wn)
⊕̂w((fA1 , w1 ∗ k), (fA2 , w2 ∗ k), · · · , (fAn , wn ∗ k) =
⊕̂w((fA1 , w1), (fA2 , w2), · · · , (fAn , wn)
We prove ⊕̂w((tA1 , w1 ∗ k), (tA2 , w2 ∗ k), · · · , (tAn , wn ∗ k) =
⊕̂w((tA1 , w1), (tA2 , w2), · · · , (tAn , wn)) under following three cases:
• Case 1: If cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 1.
• Case 2: If cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn = 0.
• Case 3: if {cAi , cAj} , 1.
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Proof for Case 1:
⊕̂w((tA1 , w1 ∗ k), (tA2 , w2 ∗ k), · · · , (tAn , wn ∗ k)
=
n∑
i=1
k ∗ witAi
n∑
i=1
wi
[Using Table 5.5 and replace wi with scaling factor k]
=
n∑
i=1
k · witAi
n∑
i=1
k · wi
[Multiply with a scaling factor k]
= k · w1tA1 + k · w2tA2 + · · ·+ k · wntAn
k · w1 + k · w2 + · · ·+ k · wn
=
n∑
i=1
witAi
n∑
i=1
wi
[Reduce common constant k]
= ⊕̂w((tA1 , w1), (tA2 , w2), · · · , (tAn , wn))
(D.11)
The proof for Case 2 and 3 can be carried out analogously using Ta-
ble 5.5. Moreover, the proof for the following two equations can be carried
out analogously using Table 5.5:
⊕̂w((cA1 , w1 ∗ k), (cA2 , c2 ∗ k), · · · , (cAn , wn ∗ k) =
⊕̂w((cA1 , w1), (cA2 , w2), · · · , (cAn , wn)
⊕̂w((fA1 , w1 ∗ k), (fA2 , w2 ∗ k), · · · , (fAn , wn ∗ k) =
⊕̂w((fA1 , w1), (fA2 , w2), · · · , (fAn , wn)
Finally, the component-wise algebraic verifications implies the verification
of the theorem itself. 
The proof of the same theorem for C.FUSION operator can be carried
out analogously using Table 5.4 and Table 5.6.
D.6 Proof: Theorem 5.3.6
Proof We prove the theorem and omit detail algebraic simplifications for
brevity.
First, we prove
E(⊕̂w(oA1 , w), (oA2 , w), · · · , (oAn , w)) = E(⊕̂(oA1 , oA2 , ..., oAn))
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E(⊕̂w(oA1 , w), (oA2 , w), · · · , (oAn , w))
= E(⊕̂w(t(A1,w),··· ,(An,w)), ⊕̂w(c(A1,w),··· ,(An,w)), ⊕̂w(f(A1,w),··· ,(An,w)))
= t⊕̂w((A1,w),··· ,(An,w)) ∗ c⊕̂w((A1,w),··· ,(An,w)) + (1− c⊕̂w((A1,w),··· ,(An,w)))∗
f⊕̂w((A1,w),··· ,(An,w))
. . . [Substitution of t⊕̂w((A1,w),··· ,(An,w)), c⊕̂w((A1,w),··· ,(An,w)), f⊕̂w((A1,w),··· ,(An,w))]
[using Table 5.5]
. . . [replace wi by w where i = 1 · · ·n and algebraic simplifications]
= t⊕̂(A1,··· ,An) ∗ c⊕̂(A1,··· ,An) + (1− c⊕̂(A1,··· ,An)) ∗ f⊕̂(A1,··· ,An)
= E(⊕̂(oA1 , oA2 , ..., oAn)) [Using the Equation 5.1]
(D.12)
Next, we prove
E(⊕̂(oA1 , oA2 , ..., oAn)) =
∑n
i=1E(oAi)
n
E(⊕̂(oA1 , oA2 , ..., oAn))
= t⊕̂(A1,··· ,An) ∗ c⊕̂(A1,··· ,An) + (1− c⊕̂(A1,··· ,An)) ∗ f⊕̂(A1,··· ,An)
. . . [Substitution of t⊕̂(A1,··· ,An), c⊕̂w(A1,··· ,An), f⊕̂w(A1,··· ,An) under different cases]
[using Table 5.4]
. . . [after several steps of algebraic simplifications and using the Equation 5.1 for each Ai]
= E(oA1) + E(oA2) + · · ·+ E(oAn)
n
=
∑n
i=1E(oAi)
n
(D.13)

D.7 Proof: Theorem 5.3.7
Proof We prove the theorem and omit detail algebraic simplifications for
brevity.
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E(⊕̂w(oA1 , w1), (oA2 , w2), · · · , (oAn , wn))
= E(⊕̂w(t(A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn)), ⊕̂w(c(A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn)), ⊕̂w(f(A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn)))
= t⊕̂w((A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn)) ∗ c⊕̂w((A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn)) + (1− c⊕̂w((A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn)))∗
f⊕̂w((A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn))
. . . [Substitution of t⊕̂w((A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn)), c⊕̂w((A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn)), f⊕̂w((A1,w1),··· ,(An,wn))]
[using Table 5.5]
. . . [replace ci by c where i = 1 · · ·n and algebraic simplifications]
= w1 ∗ (tA1 ∗ c+ (1− c) ∗ fA1) + · · ·+ wi ∗ (tAn ∗ c+ (1− c) ∗ fAn)
w1 + w2 + · · ·+ wi
=
∑n
i=1wiE(oAi)∑n
i=1wi
[Using Equation 5.1 for each Ai and c = cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn ]
(D.14)

D.8 Proof: Theorem 5.3.8
Proof We prove the theorem and omit detail algebraic simplifications for
brevity.
∑n
i=1E(oAi)
n
= E(tA1 , c, fA1) + E(tA2 , c, fA2) + · · ·+ E(tAn , c, fAn)
n
[If c = cA1 = cA2 = · · · = cAn ]
= (tA1 ∗ c+ (1− c) ∗ fA1) + (tA2 ∗ c+ (1− c) ∗ fA2) + · · ·+ (tAn ∗ c+ (1− c) ∗ fAn)
n
[Using Equation 5.1]
= (tA1 + tA2 + · · ·+ tAn) ∗ c+ (fA1 + fA2 + · · ·+ fAn) ∗ (1− c)
n
= t⊕̂w(A1,A2,··· ,An) ∗ c+ f(A1,A2,··· ,An) ∗ (1− c)
[Substitute cAi by c and wi by w where i = 1 · · ·n in Table 5.5]
= E(⊕̂w((oA1 , w), (oA2 , w), · · · , (oAn , w)))
[Using Equation 5.1 and Definition 5.3.2]
(D.15)

The proof of the same theorem for C.FUSION operator can be carried
out analogously using Table 5.6.
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D.9 Sketch of the Proof: Equivalence with Aver-
aging Fusion in Subjective Logic
The proof regarding the equivalence between CertainLogic’s A.FUSION
and Subjective Logic’s averaging fusion operator follow the same algebraic
process as demonstrated in Appendix C.5. Hereby, we only provide the
sketch of the proof.
A bijective mapping (cf. Definition 5.2.5 and 5.2.6) between an opinion
in CertainTrust given by its parameters, o = (t, c, f) and Subjective Logic,
where the opinion is given as o = (b, d, u, a) has been provided in [Rie09b]. To
prove the equivalence between the average fusion proposed in this thesis and
the averaging fusion and consensus operator for dependent opinions proposed
for subjective logic in [Jøs09, JMP06] one can start with the definition of the
average fusion/consensus operator for dependent opinions in subjective logic
and replace the parameters b, d, u, and a by the corresponding parameters
of CertainLogic following the bijective mapping. Finally, one applies the
bijective mapping another time in order to convert the resulting equations,
which are in the form of b, d, u and a to calculate the parameters of
CertainLogic t, c, and f . The result will be equivalent to the average fusion
defined in this thesis.
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